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47. Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions. (2013). Sweeting, Andrew ; Bhattacharya, Vivek ; Roberts, James W..
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48. A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions. (2013). Komarova, Tatiana.
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49. Multiple-round timber auction design and simulation. (2013). Beaudry, Catherine ; Lebel, Luc ; Frayret, Jean-Marc ; Farnia, Farnoush .
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50. A cutting plane method for solving harvest scheduling models with area restrictions. (2013). Toth, Sandor F. ; Konny, Nora .
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51. What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach. (2013). Marmer, Vadim ; Xu, Pai ; Shneyerov, Artyom.
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52. Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test. (2013). Hill, Jonathan ; Shneyerov, Artyom.
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53. Essays in auction theory. (2012). Maasland, Emiel.
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54. Identification in auctions with selective entry. (2012). Li, Tong.
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55. What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach. (2011). Shneyerov, Artyom ; Marmer, Vadim ; Xu, Pai.
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56. Premium auctions and risk preferences. (2011). Offerman, Theo ; Zou, Liang ; Hu, Audrey.
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57. Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions. (2011). Krasnokutskaya, Elena ; Seim, Katja.
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