This document has not been cited yet.

1. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369–1401. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1369.

2. Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: A survey. Economic Journal, 113, 632–652. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0013‐0133.2003.00171.x.

3. Barelli, P., & De Abreu Pessôa, S. (2012). Rent‐seeking and capital accumulation. Economic Inquiry, 50(2), 399–417. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465‐7295.2010.00318.x.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

4. Barseghyan, L., & DiCecio, R. (2011). Entry costs, industry structure, and cross‐country income and TFP differences. Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 1828–1851. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.010.

5. Benhabib, J., & Rustichini, A. (1996). Social conflict and growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(1), 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00163345.

6. Bethencourt, C., & Perera‐Tallo, F. (2015). Declining predation during development: A feedback process. Economica, 82, 253–294. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12105.

7. Bethencourt, C., & Perera‐Tallo, F. (2020). On the relationship between sectorial and institutional structural changes. Metroeconomica, 71, 533–565. https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12288.

8. Buchanan, J., Chai, D. H., & Deakin, S. (2014). Empirical analysis of legal institutions and institutional change: Multiple‐methods approaches and their application to corporate governance research. Journal of Institutional Economics, 10(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000349.

9. Campos, N. F., & Giovannoni, F. (2017). Political institutions, lobbying and corruption. Journal of Institutional Economics, 13(4), 917–939. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000108.

10. Campos, N. F., & Nugent, J. B. (1999). Development performance and the institutions of governance: Evidence from East Asia and Latin America. World Development, 27(3), 439–452. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305‐750X(98)00149‐1.

11. Campos, N. F., Dimova, R., & Saleh, A. (2016). Corruption and economic growth: An econometric survey of the evidence. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 172(3), 521–543. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14616712130543.

12. Chang, H. J. (2011). Institutions and economic development: Theory, policy and history. Journal of Institutional Economics, 7(4), 473–498. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137410000378.

13. Chin, M. S., & Chou, Y. K. (2004). Modelling social infrastructure and economic growth. Australian Economic Papers, 43(2), 136–157. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐8454.2004.00221.x.

14. Cingolani, L., Thomsson, K., & Crombrugghe, D. (2015). Minding Weber more than ever? The impacts of state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy on development goals. World Development, 72, 191–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.02.016.

15. del Río, F. (2019). Property rights, predation, and productivity. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 121(3), 1154–1188. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12294.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

16. del Rio, F., & Sampayo, A. (2017). Complementarity, linkages between firms, and the effect of entry costs on productivity. Review of Development Economics, 21(4), 1281–1304. https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12339.

17. del Rosal, I. (2011). The empirical measurement of rent‐seeking costs. Journal of Economic Surveys, 25(2), 298–325. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐6419.2009.00621.x.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

18. del Vaal, A., & Ebben, W. (2011). Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth. Review of Development Economics, 15(1), 108–123. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐9361.2010.00596.x.

19. Fatás, A., & Mihov, I. (2013). Policy volatility, institutions, and economic growth. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(2), 362–376. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST.a.00265.

20. Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R., & Timmer, M. P. (2015). The next generation of the Penn World Table. American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150–3182. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130954.

21. Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2002). Global foreign direct investment flows: The role of governance infrastructure. World Development, 30(11), 1899–1919. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305‐750X(02)00110‐9.

22. Gonzalez, F. M. (2005). Insecure property and technological backwardness. Economic Journal, 115, 703–721. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468‐0297.2005.01016.x.

23. Gradstein, M. (2004). Governance and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 73, 505–518. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.05.002.

24. Gradstein, M. (2007). Inequality, democracy and the protection of property rights. Economic Journal, 117, 252–269. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468‐0297.2007.02010.x.

25. Gradstein, M. (2008). Institutional traps and economic growth. International Economic Review, 49(3), 1043–1066. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468‐2354.2008.00505.x.

26. Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M. (1996). Predation and accumulation. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(3), 333–350. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141042.

27. Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83–116. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399555954.

28. Holcombe, R. G., & Boudreaux, C. J. (2016). Market institutions and income inequality. Journal of Institutional Economics, 12(2), 263–276. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137415000272.

29. Holcombe, R. G., & Rodet, C. S. (2012). Rule of law and the size of government. Journal of Institutional Economics, 8(1), 49–69. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137411000348.

30. Hsieh, C.‐T., & Klenow, P. J. (2009). Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and India. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1403–1448. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1403.

31. Inklaar, R., & Timmer, M. P. (2013). Capital, labor and TFP in PWT8.0. Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

32. Johnson, N. D., LaFountain, C. L., & Yamarik, S. (2011). Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States). Public Choice, 147(3), 377–393. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127‐010‐9634‐5.

33. Jonasson, E. (2011). Informal employment and the role of regional governance. Review of Development Economics, 15(3), 429–441. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467‐9361.2011.00618.x.

34. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: A summary of methodology, data and analytical issues (Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430). World Bank.

35. Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross‐country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251–1288. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555475.

36. Kwon, H. J., & Kim, E. (2014). Poverty reduction and good governance: Examining the rationale of the Millennium Development Goals. Development and Change, 45(2), 353–375. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12084.

37. Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1982). Time to build and aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 50, 1345–1370. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913386.

38. Laband, D. N., & McClintock, G. (2001). The transfer society: Economic expenditures on transfer activity. Cato Institute.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

39. Laband, D. N., & Sophocleus, J. P. (1992). An estimate of resource expenditures on transfer activity in the United States. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 959–983. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118370.

40. Laband, D. N., & Sophocleus, J. P. (2019). Measuring rent‐seeking. Public Choice, 181(1–2), 49–69. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127‐018‐0566‐9.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

41. Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003). How corruption affects productivity. Kyklos, 56(4), 457–474. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0023‐5962.2003.00233.x.

42. Long, N. (2013). The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature. European Journal of Political Economy, 32, 161–181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.07.006.

43. Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681–712. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696.

44. Mixon, F. G., Laband, D. N., & Ekelund, R. B. Jr. (1994). Rent seeking and hidden resource distortion: Some empirical evidence. Public Choice, 78(2), 171–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01050393.

45. Moscoso‐Boedo, H. J., & Mukoyama, T. (2012). Evaluating the effects of entry regulations and firing costs on international income differences. Journal of Economic Growth, 17, 143–170. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887‐011‐9077‐y.

46. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
47. North, D. C., & Thomas, R. P. (1973). The rise of the Western world: A new economic history. Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

48. Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 567–576. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938736.

49. Olson, M. (2000). Power and prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships. Basic Books.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
50. Parente, S. L., & Prescott, E. C. (2000). Barriers to riches. MIT Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

51. Park, H., Philippopoulos, A., & Vassilatos, V. (2005). ‘Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(4), 830–850. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.04.004.

52. Poschke, M. (2010). The regulation of entry and aggregate productivity. Economic Journal, 120(549), 1175–1200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468‐0297.2010.02367.x.

53. Posner, R. A. (1975). The social cost of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 83(4), 807–828. https://doi.org/10.1086/260357.

54. Restuccia, D., & Rogerson, R. (2008). Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with heterogeneous establishments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 707–720. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2008.05.002.

55. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2), 131–165. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000031425.72248.85.

56. Sobel, R. S., & Garrett, T. A. (2002). On the measurement of rent seeking and its social opportunity cost. Public Choice, 112(1–2), 115–136. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015666307423.

57. Tornell, A., & Velasco, A. (1992). The tragedy of the commons and economic growth: Why does capital flow from poor to rich countries? Journal of Political Economy, 100(6), 1208–1231. https://doi.org/10.1086/261858.

58. Torvik, R. (2002). Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare. Journal of Development Economics, 67(2), 455–470. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304‐3878(01)00195‐X.

59. Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

60. Tullock, G. (1975). On the efficient organization of trials. Kyklos, 28, 745–762.

61. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J. M. Buchanan, R. Tollinson, & G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of rent seeking society (pp. 97–112). Texas AM University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

62. Wilson, R. (2016). Does governance cause growth? Evidence from China. World Development, 79, 138–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.015.

63. Younas, J. (2009). Does institutional quality affect capital mobility? Evidence from developing countries. Journal of Institutional Economics, 5(2), 207–223. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409001301.

1. Does Data Disclosure Increase Citations? Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Leading Economics Journals. (2019). Mueller-Langer, Frank ; McCabe, Mark J.
   In: JRC Working Papers on Digital Economy.
   RePEc:ipt:decwpa:201902.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Caught in a Productivity Trap: A Distributional Perspective on Gender Differences in Malawian Agriculture. (2015). Palacios-Lopez, Amparo ; Kilic, Talip ; Goldstein, Markus.
   In: World Development.
   RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:70:y:2015:i:c:p:416-463.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Tax effort performance in sub-Sahara Africa and the role of colonialism. (2014). Asafu-Adjaye, John ; Feger, Thuto .
   In: Economic Modelling.
   RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:38:y:2014:i:c:p:163-174.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Institutional Reform and Depositors Portfolio Choice - Evidence from Censored Quantile Regressions. (2014). Berlemann, Michael ; Luik, Marc-Andre.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4782.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Do Weak Institutions Prolong Crises? On the Identification, Characteristics, and Duration of Declines during Economic Slumps. (2014). Bluhm, Richard ; de Crombrugghe, Denis.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4594.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. The friday the thirteenth effect in stock prices: international evidence using panel data. (2011). Khaled, Mohammed ; Keef, Stephen.
   In: Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:vuw:vuwecf:1994.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Application of Gravity Model to the Analysis of Cross-Country Differences in the Levels of Institutional Development. (2011). Freinkman, Lev ; Dashkeev, Vladimir.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:55427.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments. (2011). Voigt, Stefan.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:205-256.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption. (2009). Hodler, Roland ; Bhattacharyya, Sambit.
   In: OxCarre Working Papers.
   RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:020.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Governance and Development. (2009). Robinson, James ; Moene, Karl Ove ; Baland, Jean-Marie.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:nam:wpaper:1007.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Norms and Institution Formation. (2008). Francois, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6735.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives. (2007). Tabellini, Guido.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000866.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Macroeconomic policy and the distribution of growth rates. (2006). Temple, Jonathan ; Sirimaneetham, Vatcharin.
    In: Bristol Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bri:uobdis:06/584.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India. (2006). Visaria, Sujata.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-157.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Altruism and Climate. (2006). Weibull, Jörgen ; Alger, Ingela.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:643.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. The Choice of Institutions: The Role of Risk and Risk-Aversion. (2005). Weinhold, Diana ; Zak, Paul J..
    In: Others.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0508004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Intelligence, Human Capital, and Economic Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach. (2005). Jones, Garett ; SCHNEIDER, JOEL W..
    In: Development and Comp Systems.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0507005.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. IQ in the Ramsey Model: A Naive Calibration. (2005). Jones, Garett.
    In: Development and Comp Systems.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0507004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. The overhang hangover. (2005). Ranciere, Romain ; Imbs, Jean.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3673.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Institution building and growth in transition economies. (2005). Laeven, Luc ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3657.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Will political liberalisation bring about financial development?. (2005). Huang, Yongfu.
    In: Bristol Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bri:uobdis:05/578.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Fooling Ourselves: Evaluating the Globalization and Growth Debate. (2004). Levinsohn, James ; Hallak, Juan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10244.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector. (2003). .
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0311002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance. (2003). Schwartz, Shalom ; Goldschmidt, Chanan ; Licht, Amir N..
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-605.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanations of Economic Differences. (2003). Engerman, Stanley L. ; Sokoloff, Kenneth L..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9989.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9945.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Unbundling Institutions. (2003). Johnson, Simon ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9934.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Geography and Export Performance: External Market Access and Internal Supply Capacity. (2003). Venables, Anthony ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9637.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Institutions Dont Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income. (2003). Sachs, Jeffrey D..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9490.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?. (2003). Schott, Peter ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9447.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash?. (2003). Stulz, René ; Williamson, Rohan ; Pinkowitz, Lee.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10188.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Consequences of Constitutions. (2003). Persson, Torsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10170.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. (2003). Verdier, Thierry ; Robinson, James ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10136.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies. (2003). Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10037.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Geography and Institutions: A Review of Plausible and Implausible Linkages. (2003). Olsson, Ola.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0106.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. More on finance and growth: more finance, more growth?. (2003). Levine, Ross.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2003:i:jul:p:31-46:n:v.85no.4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?. (2003). Schott, Peter ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0572.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. The Roads To and From Serfdom. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0212011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Mortality and early growth in England, France, and Sweden. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0212010.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. The Roads To and From Serfdom. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: GE, Growth, Math methods.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0212002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Does it Take a Lula to go to Davos? A Brief Overview of Brazilian Reforms, 1980-2000. (2002). Moreira, Mauricio ; Campos, Nauro ; Giambiagi, Fabio ; Pinheiro, Armando Castellar.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-580.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9379.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. (2002). Trebbi, Francesco ; Subramanian, Arvind ; Rodrik, Dani.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9305.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economics. (2002). Engerman, Stanley L ; Sokoloff, Kenneth L..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9259.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. International Financial Integration and Economic Growth. (2002). Slok, Torsten ; Ricci, Luca ; Levine, Ross ; Edison, Hali.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9164.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Easterly, William.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9106.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. R&D, Implementation and Stagnation: A Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence Clubs. (2002). Mayer-Foulkes, David ; Howitt, Peter.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9104.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Law, Endowment, and Finance. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9089.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth. (2002). Zilibotti, Fabrizio ; Aghion, Philippe ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9066.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Property Rights and Finance. (2002). Woodruff, Christopher ; Johnson, Simon.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8852.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-09-29 23:27:10 || Missing content? Let us know