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Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games. (2003). .
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-02.

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Cited: 8

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  1. Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable. (2014). Rehbeck, John.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:207-210.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable. (2013). Sprumont, Yves ; Bossert, Walter.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2013.

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  3. Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable. (2013). Sprumont, Yves ; Bossert, Walter.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. The testable implications of zero-sum games. (2012). Lee, Sangmok.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:1:p:39-46.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Learning from a Piece of Pie: the Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining. (2006). Donni, Olivier ; Chiappori, Pierre.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0619.

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  6. Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining. (2006). Donni, Olivier ; Chiappori, Pierre.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2128.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining. (2005). Donni, Olivier ; Chiappori, Pierre.
    In: THEMA Working Papers.
    RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-07.

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  8. Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification. (2004). Snyder, Susan ; Ray, Indrajit ; Carvajal, Andrés.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:40:y:2004:i:1-2:p:1-40.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. 1. Bossert, W., and Sprumont, Y. (2002): Core Rationalizability in Two- Agent Exchange Economies. Economic Theory, 20: 777-791.

  2. 10. Sprumont, Y. (2000): On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories. Journal of Economic Theory, 93: 205-232.

  3. 11. Sprumont, Y. (2001): Paretian Quasi-Orders: The Regular Two-Agent Case. Journal of Economic Theory, 101: 437-456.

  4. 12. Zhou, L. (1997): Revealed Preferences and Status Quo Effect. Mimeo, Duke University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  5. 13. Zhou, L. (2002): Testable Implications of Nash Equilibrium Theory. Mimeo, Arizona State University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  6. 2. Bossert, W., and Sprumont, Y. (2003): Efficient and Non-Deteriorating Choice. Mathematical Social Sciences, Forthcoming.

  7. 3. Carvajal, A. (2002): On Individually-Rational Choice and Equilibrium. PhD Thesis, Brown University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  8. 4. Diewert, W. E., and Parkan, C. (1985): Tests for the Consistency of Consumer Data. Journal of Econometrics, 30: 127-147.

  9. 5. Kalai, G., Rubinstein, A., and Spiegler, R. (2002): Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales. Econometrica, 70: 2481-2488.

  10. 6. Osborne, M. J., and Rubinstein, A. (1994): A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  11. 7. Ray, I., and Zhou, L. (2001): Game Theory via Revealed Preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 37: 415-424.

  12. 8. Richter, M. (1966): Revealed Preference Theory. Econometrica, 34: 635-645.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  13. 9. Sen, A. K. (1971): Choice Functions and Revealed Preference. Review of Economic Studies, 38, 307-317.

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  5. Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable. (2017). Tang, Rui ; Li, Jiangtao.
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  12. Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable. (2014). Rehbeck, John.
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