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In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures. (2013). Rizzolli, Matteo ; Nicita, Antonio.
In: BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series.
RePEc:bzn:wpaper:bemps04.

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