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2. Monetary Policy Press Releases of 24 Inflation Targeting Central Banks – A Comparison of their Key Features and Complexity. (2024). Bogdanowicz, Wojciech ; Szczerba, Piotr ; Niedwiedziska, Joanna ; Wojtyniak, Anna.
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