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1. (2014) analyze the data of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and reject separability for almost one half of the participants on the basis of its revealed preference implications; using their own method and data, Ericson and Noor (2015) reject separability for almost 70% of their participants. Conclusion 3. On the money domain, the separability of preferences into discounting and instantaneous utilities tends to be violated when tested.
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2. 0-5/1/Ws 11 11 Read, Frederick, and Airoldi (2012, exp. 2) 201 BC, L 0, 3/2/Ws 9 10 US residents (email recruits) Dupas and Robinson (2013) 185 BC* 0, 1/1/Ms 35 20 Poor working Kenyans Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2014) 75 CTB, L 0, 3/3, 6/Ws 37 20 Contrast results with those for effort Giné, Goldberg, Silverman, and Yang (2014) 661 CTB, L
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3. 0-7/2-7/Ds 13 29 Up to 50% FB for t & ∆ small Sayman and Öncüler (2009, study 2a) 72 BC* 0-14/2-14/Ds 6 13 Attema, Bleichrodt, Rohde, and Wakker (2010) 55 M-D* 0/n.a./Ms 15 65 Meier and Sprenger (2010) 541 BC 0, 6/1/Ms 36 9
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4. 1-61/30/Ds 34 31 Malawian farmers Halevy (2015, larger stakes) 176 BC, L 0, 4/1/Ws 34 20 Many violate (time-) invariance Halevy (2015, smaller stakes) 176 BC, L 0, 4/1/Ws 31 17 Many violate (time-) invariance (β, δ)-Estimations (PB as β < 1, FB as β &gt; 1) Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010) 27 M-A 0/3-181/Ds Median β &gt; 1
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63. Finally, a few authors have also investigated the separability into discounting and instantaneous utility functions (on the money domain). Benhabib et al. (2010) find that a fixed-cost of delay in addition to discounting greatly improves their estimation results. Echenique et al.
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65. For the purpose of using this evidence in the present bargaining application, two difficulties in qualitatively classifying participants’ choices should be mentioned. First, due to the discreteness of the choice problems posed, small biases go undetected. A rather extreme example is the longitudinal design of Read et al. (2012): all participants received only a estimation of utility-discount rates when studying monetary rewards. 38 The table is not exhaustive of the large number of recent studies. Rather, it is meant to be representative.
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82. However, I exclude studies (e.g., Read, 2001; Meier and Sprenger, 2015) or parts of studies (e.g., Eil, 2012) where qualitative results would be distorted by the failure to control for utility curvature (see Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström, 2008). Moreover, I exclude studies which provide too little information on qualitative individual heterogeneity; e.g., between-subjects designs (e.g., Rubinstein, 2003; Cohen, Tallon, and Vergnaud, 2011) or fits of mixture models (e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström, 2014) as well as models with individual random effects on parameters (e.g., Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and l’Haridon, 2013). A-21 Study N Method Delays (t/∆/unit) % PB %
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83. In longitudinal designs future bias also turns into actual dynamic preference reversals: e.g., 19 out of the 38 participants in Sayman and Öncüler (2009, experiment 1) chose 7 euros the next day over 10 euros in three days, but reversed their choice the next day (when it was 7 euros now v. 10 euros in two days). While the incidence of future bias fluctuates across designs, it appears particularly strong when both the delay to SS and that between SS and LL are relatively short (Sayman and Öncüler, 2009, suggest less than a week, p. 470); such designs have been investigated only more recently but are most relevant for bargaining applications. Salience of the time dimension seems to be another strongly promoting factor (see Eil, 2012).
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139. Table 1: Experimental studies of individual time preferences over monetary rewards not included in Frederick et al. (2002) (discounting estimations are only included if they control for curvature and allow for future bias).
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140. Takeuchi (2011) 55 M-D 0/n.a./Ds 17 66 Also estimates “concave” discounting Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2012) 344 BC 0, 6/6, 12/Ms 34 32 % of those who were classified Eil (2012, "WTP" task) 95 BC 0, 6/1, 6/Ms 36 43 Comparison for fixed ∆ = 1
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3. Peer Effects and Students’ Self-Control. (2014). Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Büchel, Berno ; Petersen, Julia ; Buechel, Berno.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:53658.

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4. Commitment savings in informal banking markets. (2014). Basu, Karna.
   In: Journal of Development Economics.
   RePEc:eee:deveco:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:97-111.

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5. The Future in Mind: Aspirations and Forward-Looking Behaviour in Rural Ethiopia. (2014). Taffesse, Alemayehu ; Orkin, Kate ; Dercon, Stefan ; Bernard, Tanguy.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10224.

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6. Social preferences under uncertainty. (2013). Gaudeul, Alexia.
   In: Jena Economics Research Papers.
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7. Eliciting risk and time preferences under induced mood states. (2013). Nayga, Rodolfo ; Drichoutis, Andreas.
   In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
   RePEc:eee:soceco:v:45:y:2013:i:c:p:18-27.

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8. The incorporation of subjective risks into choice experiments to test scenario adjustment. (2013). Cerroni, Simone ; Notaro, Sandra ; Raffaelli, Roberta ; Shaw, Douglass W..
   In: 2013 Second Congress, June 6-7, 2013, Parma, Italy.
   RePEc:ags:aiea13:149894.

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9. Time Preference and Technology Adoption: A Single-Choice Experiment with U.S. Farmers. (2013). Duquette, Eric ; Higgins, Nathaniel ; Horowitz, John.
   In: 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C..
   RePEc:ags:aaea13:150719.

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10. Eliciting risk and time preferences under induced mood states. (2011). Nayga, Rodolfo ; Drichoutis, Andreas.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:33013.

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11. Ambiguity in Individual Choice and Market Environments: On the Importance of Comparative Ignorance. (2011). Alevy, Jonathan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ala:wpaper:2011-04.

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12. Poverty and Time Preference. (2010). Carvalho, Leandro.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ran:wpaper:759.

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13. Patience, cognitive skill and coordination in the repeated stag hunt. (2010). Jones, Garett ; Al-Ubaydli, Omar ; Weel, Jaap .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:27723.

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14. Eliciting risk and time preferences under induced mood states. (2010). Nayga, Rodolfo ; Drichoutis, Andreas.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:25731.

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15. The Effects of Induced Mood on Preference Reversals and Bidding Behavior in Experimental Auction Valuation. (2010). Nayga, Rodolfo ; Klonaris, Stathis ; Drichoutis, Andreas.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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16. Preference for increasing wages: How do people value various streams of income?. (2010). Smith, John ; Duffy, Sean.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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17. Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences: Discounted Expected Utility with a Disproportionate Preference for Certainty. (2010). Sprenger, Charles ; Andreoni, James.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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18. Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets. (2010). Sprenger, Charles ; Andreoni, James.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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19. Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?. (2010). Kuhn, Peter ; Charness, Gary.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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20. Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence. (2010). Mittone, Luigi ; Mariotti, Marco ; Manzini, Paola.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:3:p:327-354.

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21. A parametric analysis of prospect theory’s functionals for the general population. (2010). Kuilen, Gijs ; Praag, Bernard ; Booij, Adam .
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:115-148.

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22. Eliciting risk preferences: When is simple better?. (2010). Eckel, Catherine ; Dave, Chetan ; Rojas, Christian ; Johnson, Cathleen.
    In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
    RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:41:y:2010:i:3:p:219-243.

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23. At the nexus of risk and time preferences: An experimental investigation. (2010). Lusk, Jayson ; Coble, Keith.
    In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
    RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:67-79.

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24. Behavioral Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural India. (2010). Morduch, Jonathan ; Chytilová, Julie ; Bauer, Michal ; Chytilova, Julie.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4901.

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25. Stability of Time Preferences. (2010). Sprenger, Charles ; Meier, Stephan.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4756.

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26. Characterizing the amount and speed of discounting procedures. (2010). Jamison, Julian C..
    In: Working Papers.
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27. The Evolution of Decision and Experienced Utilities. (2010). Robson, Arthur ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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28. Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile. (2010). Melo, Oscar ; Cristi, Oscar ; Alevy, Jonathan.
    In: Working Papers.
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29. Do fishermen have different preferences?: Insights from an experimental study and household data. (2009). Nguyen, Quang.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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30. Expected utility theory and prospect theory: one wedding and a decent funeral. (2009). Rutstrom, Elisabet ; Harrison, Glenn.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:12:y:2009:i:2:p:133-158.

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31. Women, Children and Patience: Experimental Evidence from Indian Villages. (2009). Chytilová, Julie ; Bauer, Michal ; Chytilova, Julie.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4241.

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32. Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing. (2009). Sprenger, Charles ; Meier, Stephan.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
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33. A Parametric Analysis of Prospect Theorys Functionals for the General Population. (2009). van Praag, Bernard ; Kuilen, Gijs ; van de Kuilen, Gijs ; Booij, Adam S..
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
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34. Kontrolliert und repräsentativ: Beispiele zur Komplementarität von Labor- und Felddaten. (2009). Sunde, Uwe ; Falk, Armin ; Dohmen, Thomas.
    In: SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research.
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35. The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty. (2009). Robson, Arthur ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000087.

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36. A Parametric Analysis of Prospect Theorys Functionals for the General Population. (2009). van Praag, Bernard ; Kuilen, Gijs ; van de Kuilen, Gijs ; Booij, Adam S..
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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37. Kontrolliert und repräsentativ: Beispiele zur Komplementarität von Labor‐ und Felddaten. (2009). Sunde, Uwe ; Falk, Armin ; Dohmen, Thomas.
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:10:y:2009:i:s1:p:54-74.

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38. The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty. (2009). Robson, Arthur ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1925-53.

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39. Loss Aversion for time: An experimental investigation of time preferences. (2008). Kroll, Eike ; Vogt, Bodo.
    In: FEMM Working Papers.
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40. Discounting Financial Literacy: Time Preferences and Participation in Financial Education Programs. (2008). Sprenger, Charles ; Meier, Stephan.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3507.

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41. Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?. (2008). Sunde, Uwe ; Huffman, David ; Falk, Armin ; Dohmen, Thomas.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6852.

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42. Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration. (2008). Harrison, Glenn.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001915.

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43. Stochastically more risk averse: A contextual theory of stochastic discrete choice under risk. (2007). Wilcox, Nathaniel.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:11851.

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44. Choice Over Time. (2007). Mariotti, Marco ; Manzini, Paola.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2993.

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45. Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?. (2007). Sunde, Uwe ; Huffman, David ; Falk, Armin ; Dohmen, Thomas.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2735.

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46. Gender, Affect and Intertemporal Consistency: An Experimental Approach. (2007). Oxoby, Robert ; McLeish, Kendra.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2663.

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47. Impatience and credit behavior: evidence from a field experiment. (2007). Sprenger, Charles ; Meier, Stephan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedbwp:07-3.

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48. Selection into financial literacy programs: evidence from a field study. (2007). Sprenger, Charles ; Meier, Stephan.
    In: Public Policy Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:fip:fedbpp:07-5.

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49. Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?. (2007). Sunde, Uwe ; Huffman, David ; Falk, Armin ; Dohmen, Thomas.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6398.

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50. Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment. (2005). Rutstrom, Elisabet ; Johnson, Eric ; Harrison, Glenn.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:3:p:897-901.

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