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   RePEc:gat:wpaper:2316.

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1. A promise is credible, if and only if the probability of keeping such a promise is maximal among all interior promises. We refer to this class of equilibria as retrospectiveprospective equilibria. This equilibrium selection contrasts with the literature on voting to aggregate information or ideological voting, where voters’ information or preferences for policy options differ and pivotality of voters plays a crucial role. In our setting, the information and preferences for policy options are the same for all voters except for the two candidates. Focusing on retrospective-prospective equilibria then “picks the best possible equilibrium from the voters’ point of view in a restricted class of voting rules” In this case, we allow for random tie-breaking if both candidates make the same promise and voters are indifferent between the resulting equilibria. See also below description of this class of equilibria by Persson et al. (1997). i
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1. Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma. (2022). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Jiang, Shuguang.
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2. Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win. (2022). Mattozzi, Andrea ; Modica, Salvatore ; Levine, David K.
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3. Meta-Nudging Honesty: Past, Present, and Future of the Research Frontier. (2022). Dimant, Eugen ; Shalvi, Shaul.
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4. The Effect of Self-Awareness and Competition on Dishonesty. (2021). Sgroi, Daniel ; Ibik, Ceren Bengu.
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   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14256.

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5. Licence to lie and the social (In)appropriateness of lying. (2021). Serdarevic, Nina.
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   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:199:y:2021:i:c:s0165176520304766.

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6. Because I (dont) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior. (2020). Parra Carreño, Daniel ; Fries, Tilman.
   In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Ethics and Behavioral Economics.
   RePEc:zbw:wzbebe:spii2020401.

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7. Nudging cooperation in public goods provision. (2020). Barron, Kai ; Nurminen, Tuomas.
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   RePEc:zbw:espost:216878.

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8. Reputation and lying aversion in the die roll paradigm: Reducing ambiguity fosters honest behavior. (2020). von Bieberstein, Frauke ; Crede, Annkathrin.
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9. Insurable losses, pre-filled claims forms and honesty in reporting. (2020). Ruffle, Bradley ; Morrison, William G.
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10. The Reference Point Bias in Judging Cheaters. (2020). Ibanez, Lisette ; Grolleau, Gilles ; Clot, Sophie.
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11. Bad bankers no more? Truth-telling and (dis)honesty in the finance industry. (2020). Huber, Christoph.
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    RePEc:osf:osfxxx:b5682.

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12. A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science-With An Application to the Public Goods Game. (2020). Villeval, Marie Claire ; List, John ; Houser, Daniel ; grossman, philip ; Butera, Luigi.
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13. The limits of verification in preventing the spread of false information on networks. (2020). Munoz, Manuel ; Munoz-Herrera, Manuel ; Makovi, Kinga.
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14. Bad bankers no more? Truth-telling and (dis)honesty in the finance industry. (2020). Huber, Christoph.
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15. The Reference Point Bias in Judging Cheaters. (2020). Ibanez, Lisette ; Grolleau, Gilles ; Clot, Sophie.
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16. A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods GameA Review. (2020). Villeval, Marie Claire ; List, John ; Houser, Daniel ; grossman, philip ; Butera, Luigi.
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17. The Reference Point Bias in Judging Cheaters. (2020). Ibanez, Lisette ; Grolleau, Gilles ; Clot, Sophie.
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18. A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Con?dence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game. (2020). Villeval, Marie Claire ; List, John ; Houser, Daniel ; grossman, philip ; Butera, Luigi.
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19. A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science - With an Application to the Public Goods Game. (2020). List, John ; Houser, Daniel ; grossman, philip ; Butera, Luigi ; Villeval, Marie-Claire.
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20. Constraining temptation: How specific and general rules mitigate the effect of personal gain on unethical behavior. (2020). Mulder, Laetitia B ; Jordan, Jennifer ; Rink, Floor.
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23. Bribing the Self. (2020). van Veldhuizen, Roel ; Serra-Garcia, Marta ; gneezy, uri ; Saccardo, Silvia.
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24. Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games. (2020). Shogren, Jason ; Malézieux, Antoine ; Jacquemet, Nicolas ; Luchini, S ; Malezieux, A.
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27. (Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises. (2020). Schudy, Simeon ; Lang, Matthias ; Dermot, Simeon Andreas.
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28. Requiem for a Nudge: Framing Effects in Nudging Honesty. (2020). Dimant, Eugen ; Shalvi, Shaul ; van Kleef, Gerben A.
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29. Bribing the Self. (2020). van Veldhuizen, Roel ; Serra-Garcia, Marta ; gneezy, uri ; Saccardo, Silvia.
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30. Its Not a Lie If You Believe the Norm Does Not Apply: Conditional Norm-Following with Strategic Beliefs. (2020). Dimant, Eugen ; Bicchieri, Cristina ; Sonderegger, Silvia.
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32. Incorporating Conditional Morality into Economic Decisions. (2019). Masclet, David ; Dickinson, David.
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33. Lying in Two Dimensions and Moral Spillovers. (2019). Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Heinicke, Franziska ; Geraldes, Diogo.
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34. Decision-making in everyday moral conflict situations: Development and validation of a new measure. (2019). Kudielka, Brigitte M ; Wst, Stefan ; Sommer, Monika ; Kreuzpointner, Ludwig ; Singer, Nina.
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35. Requiem for a Nudge: Framing Effects in Nudging Honesty. (2019). Dimant, Eugen ; Shalvi, Shaul ; van Kleef, Gerben A.
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36. Some Contributions of Economics to the Study of Personality. (2019). Jagelka, Tomáš ; Heckman, James ; Kautz, Timothy D.
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37. Incorporating Conditional Morality into Economic Decisions. (2019). Masclet, David ; Dickinson, David.
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38. Some Contributions of Economics to the Study of Personality. (2019). Jagelka, Tomáš ; Heckman, James ; Kautz, Tim.
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39. Some Contributions of Economics to the Study of Personality. (2019). Jagelka, Tomáš ; Heckman, James ; Kautz, Tim.
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40. Doing Bad to Look Good: Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Pro-social Behavior. (2019). van de Ven, Jeroen ; Suvorov, Anton ; Soraperra, Ivan ; Villeval, Marie.
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41. Embezzlement and guilt aversion. (2019). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Rimbaud, Claire.
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42. Doing Bad to Look Good: Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Pro-social Behavior. (2019). Villeval, Marie Claire ; van de Ven, Jeroen ; Suvorov, Anton ; Soraperra, Ivan.
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43. Is dishonesty persistent?. (2019). van de Ven, Jeroen ; Belot, Michèle.
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44. Unethical behavior and group identity in contests. (2019). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Benistant, Julien.
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45. Parents’ marital status, psychological counseling and dishonest kindergarten children: An experimental study. (2019). Tobol, Yossef ; Yaniv, Gideon.
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46. Lying and reciprocity. (2019). Nieken, Petra ; Feess, Eberhard ; Dato, Simon.
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47. Truth-telling and the regulator. Experimental evidence from commercial fishermen. (2019). Quaas, Martin ; Khadjavi, Menusch ; Drupp, Moritz.
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48. Gender Differences in Face-to-Face Deceptive Behavior. (2019). Qari, Salmai ; Lohse, Tim.
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49. Credence Goods Markets and the Informational Value of New Media: A Natural Field Experiment. (2019). Sutter, Matthias ; Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Neururer, Daniel.
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50. Incorporating Conditional Morality into Economic Decisions. (2019). Masclet, David ; Dickinson, David.
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