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2. Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence. (2024). Strausz, Roland ; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian.
   In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
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3. Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence. (2023). Strausz, Roland ; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian.
   In: Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0030.

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   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:233:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000915.

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2. Do beliefs in the model minority stereotype reduce attention to inequality that adversely affects Asian Americans?. (2024). Powdthavee, Nattavudh ; Chen, Shuai ; Wiese, Juliane.
   In: GLO Discussion Paper Series.
   RePEc:zbw:glodps:1449.

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3. Meritocracy and Inequality. (2024). Moisson, Paul-Henri.
   In: TSE Working Papers.
   RePEc:tse:wpaper:129192.

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4. Proximate and ultimate drivers of norms and norm change. (2024). Alger, Ingela ; Gavrilets, Sergey ; Durkee, Patrick.
   In: IAST Working Papers.
   RePEc:tse:iastwp:129422.

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5. Learning to cooperate in the shadow of the law. (2024). Jacquemet, Nicolas ; Henry, Emeric ; Galbiati, Roberto.
   In: Journal of the Economic Science Association.
   RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:10:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s40881-023-00159-x.

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6. Do Beliefs in the Model Minority Stereotype Reduce Attention to Inequality That Adversely Affects Asian Americans?. (2024). Powdthavee, Nattavudh ; Chen, Shuai ; Wiese, Juliane V.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17087.

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7. Talking About Performance or Paying for It? A Field Experiment on Performance Reviews and Incentives. (2023). Vogelsang, Timo ; Manthei, Kathrin ; Sliwka, Dirk.
   In: Management Science.
   RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:4:p:2198-2216.

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8. Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?. (2023). Guth, Werner ; Ackfeld, Viola.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:1-32.

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9. The probability of pluralistic ignorance. (2022). Fernandez Duque, Mauricio ; Fernandez-Duque, Mauricio.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:202:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000394.

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10. Fostering participation in digital contact tracing. (2022). Rehse, Dominik ; Tremohlen, Felix.
    In: Information Economics and Policy.
    RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:58:y:2022:i:c:s0167624521000263.

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11. Laws and norms with (un)observable actions. (2022). Fluet, Claude ; Mungan, Murat C.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:145:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000642.

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12. Privacy, Patience, and Protection. (2021). Gradwohl, Ronen ; Smorodinsky, Rann.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:11:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-021-00386-z.

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13. Data Privacy and Temptation. (2021). Liu, Zhuang ; Xiong, Wei ; Sockin, Michael.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:econom:2021-77.

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14. The Impact of Gender Role Norms on Mothers Labor Supply. (2021). Nicoletti, Cheti ; Francesconi, Marco ; Cavapozzi, Danilo.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14219.

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    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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16. The Impact of Gender Role Norms on Mothers Labor Supply. (2021). Nicoletti, Cheti ; Francesconi, Marco ; Cavapozzi, Danilo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15957.

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17. The Impact of Gender Role Norms on Mothers Labor Supply. (2021). Nicoletti, Cheti ; Francesconi, Marco ; Cavapozzi, Danilo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8983.

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18. The Social Dilemma of Big Data: Donating Personal Data to Promote Social Welfare. (2021). Hornuf, Lars ; Hillebrand, Kirsten.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8926.

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19. Fostering participation in digital public health interventions: The case of digital contact tracing. (2020). Rehse, Dominik ; Tremohlen, Felix.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:20076.

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20. Environmental preferences and technological choices: is market competition clean or dirty?. (2020). Martin, Ralf ; Benabou, Roland ; Aghion, Philippe ; Roulet, Alexandra.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:108425.

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21. Mechanism Design with Narratives. (2020). Lang, Matthias.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8502.

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