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Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values. (2005). Peck, James ; Levin, Dan.
In: Levine's Bibliography.
RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000607.

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  1. Behavioral Biases, Informational Externalities, and Efficiency in Endogenous-Timing Herding Games: an Experimental Study. (2010). Peck, James ; Levin, Dan ; Ivanov, Asen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1004.

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  2. Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing. (2008). Sgroi, Daniel ; Park, Andreas.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:868.

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  3. Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values. (2008). Peck, James ; Levin, Dan ; Ivanov, Asen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0801.

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  4. Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing. (2008). Sgroi, Daniel ; Park, Andreas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-341.

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  5. Bad news can be good news: Early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals. (2007). Ye, Lixin ; Peck, James ; Levin, Dan.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:3:p:462-467.

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  6. Social learning in continuous time : when are informational cascades more likely to be inefficient?. (2006). Pastine, Ivan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200621.

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References

References cited by this document

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