1. Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction. (2011). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1818.

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2. Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability. (2011). Takahashi, Satoru ; Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772r.

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3. Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction. (2011). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000187.

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4. Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability. (2011). Takahashi, Satoru ; Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054.

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5. Rationalizability in Continuous Games. (2008). Arieli, Itai.
   In: Discussion Paper Series.
   RePEc:huj:dispap:dp495.

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6. Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine. (2007). Serrano, Roberto ; Kunimoto, Takashi ; Artemov, Georgy.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-14.

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7. Belief Free Incomplete Information Games. (2007). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1629.

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8. The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation. (2007). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1628.

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9. The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types. (2007). Gul, Faruk.
   In: Levine's Bibliography.
   RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000345.

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10. Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors. (2007). tercieux, olivier ; Oyama, Daisuke.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000210.

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11. The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation. (2007). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001574.

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12. Belief Free Incomplete Information Games. (2007). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001569.

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13. Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine. (2007). Serrano, Roberto ; Kunimoto, Takashi ; Artemov, Georgy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-6.

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14. Topologies on Type. (2006). Fudenberg, Drew ; Dekel, Eddie.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1417.

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15. Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms. (2006). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1561.

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16. Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige. (2006). O'Neill, Barry.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1560.

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17. Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger). (2006). Friedenberg, Amanda.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:815595000000000005.

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18. The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences. (2006). Gul, Faruk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000457.

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19. Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms. (2006). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001194.

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20. Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1519.

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21. The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences. (2005). Gul, Faruk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000434.

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22. Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116.

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23. Topologies on Types. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Dekel, Eddie.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000061.

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24. The Canonical Type Space of Interdependent Preferences. (2005). .
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000565.

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25. Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications. (2004). Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:275.

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26. Robust Mechanism Design. (2004). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421r.

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27. Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium. (2004). Yildiz, Muhamet ; Weinstein, Jonathan.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000065.

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28. Robust Mechanism Design. (2003). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421.

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1. Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?. (2011). Mallawaarachchi, Thilak ; Beard, Rodney.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:34303.

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2. On Robust Constitution Design. (2007). Gary-Bobo, Robert ; Auriol, Emmanuelle.
   In: Theory and Decision.
   RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:3:p:241-279.

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3. RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS. (2006). Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
   In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR).
   RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000795.

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4. Topologies on Type. (2006). Fudenberg, Drew ; Dekel, Eddie.
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1417.

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5. On Robust Constitution Design. (2006). Gary-Bobo, Robert ; Auriol, Emmanuelle.
   In: IDEI Working Papers.
   RePEc:ide:wpaper:657.

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6. Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations. (2006). Athey, Susan.
   In: Levine's Bibliography.
   RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000256.

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7. Ex Post Implementation. (2006). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Levine's Bibliography.
   RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001110.

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8. The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information. (2005). Miller, David.
   In: Game Theory and Information.
   RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510002.

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9. Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms. (2005). Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
   In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
   RePEc:trf:wpaper:142.

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10. Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. (2005). Ostrovsky, Michael ; Schwarz, Michael ; Edelman, Benjamin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11765.

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11. Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1519.

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12. Ex Post Implementation. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1502.

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13. The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclawp:839.

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14. Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclawp:838.

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15. Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms. (2005). Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000490.

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16. Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116.

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17. Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000556.

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18. The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000548.

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19. Secure Implementation. (2005). Sjostrom, Tomas ; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi ; Yamato, Takehiko.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ads:wpaper:0056.

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20. Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications. (2004). Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:275.

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21. Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions. (2004). Sen, Arunava ; Bikhchandani, Sushil ; Chatterjee, Shurojit.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000750.

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22. Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms. (2003). Ely, Jeffrey.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000064.

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23. Rationalization and Incomplete Information. (2002). Siniscalchi, Marciano ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
    In: Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:princt:9817a118e65062903de7c3577d29be36.

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