1. No double standards: Quantifying the impact of standard harmonization on trade. (2022). Steingress, Walter ; Schmidt, Julia.
   In: Journal of International Economics.
   RePEc:eee:inecon:v:137:y:2022:i:c:s0022199622000514.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Quality heterogeneity and misallocation: The welfare benefits of raising your standards. (2022). Macedoni, Luca ; Weinberger, Ariel.
   In: Journal of International Economics.
   RePEc:eee:inecon:v:134:y:2022:i:c:s0022199621001240.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Asymmetric information, quality, and regulations. (2022). Macedoni, Luca.
   In: Review of International Economics.
   RePEc:bla:reviec:v:30:y:2022:i:4:p:1180-1198.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. A Theory of Zombie Lending. (2021). Varas, Felipe ; Hu, Yunzhi.
   In: Journal of Finance.
   RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:76:y:2021:i:4:p:1813-1867.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Strategic real options. (2019). Kolb, Aaron M.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:344-383.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Reputation building through costly adjustment. (2019). Dilme, Francesc.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:586-626.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. No double standards: quantifying the impact of standard harmonization on trade. (2019). Steingress, Walter ; Schmidt, Julia.
   In: Working papers.
   RePEc:bfr:banfra:729.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. No Double Standards: Quantifying the Impact of Standard Harmonization on Trade. (2019). Steingress, Walter ; Schmidt, Julia.
   In: Staff Working Papers.
   RePEc:bca:bocawp:19-36.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. . 1986. “Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing.” Review of Economic Studies 53 (5): 843–862.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
2. . 2002. “The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism.” Journal of Political Economy 110 (4): 854–882.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
3. . 2012. “A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics.” Working Paper, UCLA.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
4. Arnott, Richard, Bruce Greenwald, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1993. “Information and Economic Efficiency.” NBER Working Paper 4533.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
5. Bar-Isaac, Heski. 2003. “Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model.” Review of Economic Studies 70 (2): 231–251.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

6. Board, Simon, and Moritz Meyer-ter Vehn. 2010. “Reputation for Quality.” Working Paper, UCLA.

7. Daley, Brendan, and Brett Green. 2012. “Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons.” Econometrica 80:1433–1504.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
8. Faingold, Eduardo, and Yuliy Sannikov. 2011. “Reputation in Continuous-Time Games.” Econometrica 79 (3): 773–876.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
9. Fattal Jaef, Roberto. 2013. “Entry, Exit adn Misallocation Frictions.” Working Paper, UCLA.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

10. Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson. 2012. “The Slow Growth of New Plants: Learning about Demand?” NBER Working Paper 17853.

11. Garcia-Fontes, Walter, and Hugo Hopenhayn. 2000. “Entry Restrictions and the Determination of Quality.” Spanish Economic Review 2 (2): 105–127.

12. Herrendorf, Berthold, and Arilton Teixeira. 2011. “Barriers to Entry and Development. ” International Economic Review 52:573–602.

13. Hopenhayn, Hugo, and Richard Rogerson. 1993. “Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 101:915–938. H

14. Hopenhayn, Hugo. 1992. “Entry, Exit and Firms Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium.

15. Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter J. Klenow. 2009. “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4): 1403–1448.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
16. Klein, Benjamin, and Keith B. Leffler. 1981. “The Role of Market forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (4): 615–641.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
17. Leland, Hayne E. 1979. “Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards.” Journal of Political Economy 87 (6): 1328–1346.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

18. Luttmer, Erzo. 2007. “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:1103–1144.

19. MacLeod, W. Bentley. 2007. “Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement. ” Journal of Economic Literature 45 (3): 595–628.

20. Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson. 2001. “Who Wants a Good Reputation?” Review of Economic Studies 68 (2): 415–441.

21. Maksimovic, Vojislav, and Sheridan Titman. 1991. “Financial Policy and Reputation for Product Quality.” Review of Financial Studies 4 (1): 175–200.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
22. Marvel, Howard P., and Stephen McCafferty. 1984. “Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification.” RAND Journal of Economics 15 (3): 346–359.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

23. Melitz, Marc. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica 71:1695–1725.

24. orner, Johannes. 2002. “Reputation and Competition.” American Economic Review 92 (3): 644–663.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
25. Parente, Stephen, and Edward Prescott. 1999. “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches.” American Economic Review 89:1215–1233.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
26. Pigou, Arthur. 1938. The Economics of Welfare. London: MacMillan and Co.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

27. Prat, Julien, and Carlos Alos-Ferrer. 2010. “Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning.” Working Paper, IAE-CSIC.

28. Prescott, Edward C., and Robert M. Townsend. 1984. “Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.” Econometrica 52 (1): 21–45.

29. Restuccia, Diego, and Richard Rogerson. 2008. “Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with Heterogeneous Establishments.” Review of Economic Dynamics 11:707–720.

30. Shaked, Avner, and John Sutton. 1981. “The Self-Regulating Profession.” Review of Economic Studies 48 (2): 217–234.

31. Shapiro, Carl. 1983. “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations. ” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (4): 659–680.

32. Tadelis, Steven. 1999. “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset.” American Economic Review 89 (3): 548–563.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

1. Product quality and third-party certification in potential lemons markets. (2020). Vossler, Christian ; Gilpatric, Scott M ; Yan, Dong.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ten:wpaper:2020-04.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. The Effect of Price on Firm Reputation. (2020). Reshef, Oren ; Luca, Michael.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27405.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Catastrophes, delays, and learning. (2020). Salanié, François ; Liski, Matti.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:fae:wpaper:2020.20.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment. (2020). Pei, Harry.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2006.08071.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Residual Deterrence. (2019). Garrett, Daniel ; Dilme, Francesc.
   In: TSE Working Papers.
   RePEc:tse:wpaper:123218.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. A Dynamic Theory of Collateral Quality and Long-Term Interventions. (2019). Lee, Michael ; Neuhann, Daniel.
   In: Staff Reports.
   RePEc:fip:fednsr:894.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types. (2019). Thomas, Caroline.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:366-415.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition. (2019). Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David ; Bardey, David ; Gromb, Denis.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13543.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Collective reputation with stochastic production and unknown willingness to pay for quality. (2018). moretto, michele ; Millock, Katrin ; Fontini, Fulvio.
   In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
   RePEc:spr:envpol:v:20:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10018-017-0198-1.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Is there a safety premium in the design of corporate bond contracts?. (2018). Takaoka, Sumiko.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:86422.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem. (2018). Bohren, Aislinn.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:18-015.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Can reputation discipline the gig economy? Experimental evidence from an online labor market. (2018). Sojourner, Aaron ; Benson, Alan ; Umyarov, Akhmed.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hka:wpaper:2018-066.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Growth patterns of US professional services firms.. (2018). Ribes, Edouard.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01762381.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Reputation and Sovereign Default. (2018). Phelan, Christopher ; Amador, Manuel.
    In: Staff Report.
    RePEc:fip:fedmsr:564.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market. (2018). Sojourner, Aaron ; Benson, Alan ; Umyarov, Akhmed.
    In: Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedmoi:0016.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Experimenting with Career Concerns. (2018). Halac, Marina ; Kremer, Ilan.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12569.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Career concerns with exponential learning. (2017). Hörner, Johannes ; Bonatti, Alessandro ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:2115.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. A structural model of the retail market for illicit drugs. (2017). Galenianos, Manolis ; Gavazza, Alessandro.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:80287.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. The career effects of scandal: Evidence from scientific retractions. (2017). Bonatti, Alessandro ; Azoulay, Pierre ; Krieger, Joshua L.
    In: Research Policy.
    RePEc:eee:respol:v:46:y:2017:i:9:p:1552-1569.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels. (2017). Heinsalu, Sander.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:73:y:2017:i:c:p:132-141.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. On the incentive effects of job rotation. (2017). Katolnik, Svetlana ; Hakenes, Hendrik.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:98:y:2017:i:c:p:424-441.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard. (2017). Kwon, Suehuyn .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6621.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Consumer Rating Dynamics. (2016). Stenzel, Andre ; Wolf, Christoph.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145694.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem. (2016). Bohren, Aislinn.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:16-024.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Promoting a Reputation for Quality. (2016). Hauser, Daniel.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:16-014.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Melons as Lemons: Asymmetric Information, Consumer Learning and Seller Reputation. (2016). Bai, Jie.
    In: Natural Field Experiments.
    RePEc:feb:natura:00540.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning. (2016). Maestri, Lucas ; Gottlieb, Daniel ; Gomes, Renato.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:145-169.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Optimal provision of information about consumption choices in the presence of a cognitive constraint. (2016). Saak, Alexander.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:25-28.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting. (2016). Bar-Isaac, Heski ; Deb, Joyee.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2041.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting. (2016). Bar-Isaac, Heski ; Deb, Joyee.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11513.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation. (2015). Forand, Jean Guillaume.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wat:wpaper:1207.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. A dynamic model of certification and reputation. (2015). Zhang, Simpson ; Schaar, Mihaela.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:58:y:2015:i:3:p:509-541.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics. (2015). Board, Simon ; Meyer-Ter, Moritz.
    In: 2015 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed015:427.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Reputations in Repeated Games. (2015). Samuelson, Larry ; Mailath, George J..
    In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
    RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:165-238.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Innovation Adoption by Forward-Looking Social Learners. (2015). Ishii, Yuhta ; Frick, Mira.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1988.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Residual Deterrence. (2015). Garrett, Daniel ; Dilme, Francesc.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10994.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. A Quantitative Analysis of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs. (2015). Galenianos, Manolis ; Gavazza, Alessandro.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10363.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version. (2014). Bohren, Aislinn.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:14-033.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility. (2014). Park, In-Uck ; Jullien, Bruno.
    In: IDEI Working Papers.
    RePEc:ide:wpaper:21001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. A Dynamic Model of Price Signaling, Consumer Learning, and Price Adjustment. (2014). Shapiro, Adam ; Osborne, Matthew.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2014-27.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns. (2014). Ordonez, Guillermo ; Hellwig, Christian ; Atkeson, Andrew ; Ordoez, Guillermo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10080.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement. (2014). Prat, Andrea ; Halac, Marina.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10035.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. A Quantitative Analysis of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs. (2014). Galenianos, Manolis ; Gavazza, Alessandro.
    In: STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers.
    RePEc:cep:stieip:53.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Breakdowns. (2013). Rady, Sven ; Keller, R.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000635.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. Breakdowns. (2012). Rady, Sven ; Keller, R.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:396.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Coarse Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Choice. (2012). Yanni, Pierre-Yves.
    In: 2012 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed012:1142.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns. (2012). Ordonez, Guillermo ; Hellwig, Christian ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17898.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns. (2012). Ordonez, Guillermo ; Hellwig, Christian ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: Staff Report.
    RePEc:fip:fedmsr:464.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. Career Concerns with Coarse Information. (2012). Hörner, Johannes ; Bonatti, Alessandro ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1831.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Career Concerns with Coarse Information. (2012). Hörner, Johannes ; Bonatti, Alessandro ; Horner, Johannes.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000342.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-10-04 10:49:06 || Missing content? Let us know