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2. Banks versus venture capital when the venture capitalist values private benefits of control. (2010). Inci, Eren ; Barlo, Mehmet.
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3. Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority. (2010). Englmaier, Florian ; Singh, Ravi ; Filipi, Ales .
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4. Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes. (2008). Guriev, Sergei.
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5. You cant make an omelette without breaking eggs: the impact of venture capitalists on executive turnover. (2007). Heger, Diana ; Tykvova, Tereza.
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6. The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?. (2007). Weill, Laurent ; BLAZY, Régis.
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7. The impact of legal sanctions on moral hazard when debt contracts are renegotiable?. (2007). Weill, Laurent ; BLAZY, Régis.
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8. When Should Control Be Shared?. (2007). Milgrom, Paul ; Singh, Ravi.
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9. Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts. (2006). Muehlheusser, Gerd.
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10. The Division of Ownership in New Ventures. (2006). Fabel, Oliver ; Demougin, Dominique.
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11. Household debt sustainability: what explains household non-performing loans? An empirical analysis. (2006). Rinaldi, Laura ; Sanchis-Arellano, Alicia .
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12. Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments. (2006). Evans, Robert.
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13. Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights. (2005). Bester, Helmut.
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14. A Dynamic Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Executive Compensation. (2005). Cole, Harold ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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15. Financial Distress and Reputational Concerns. (2005). .
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16. Banks, markets, and efficiency. (2005). Martin, Antoine ; Fecht, Falko.
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17. Relationship Banking in post Bubble Japan: Co-existence of soft-and hard budget constraint. (2005). Hideaki, Miyajima ; Yasuhiro, Arikawa.
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19. Financial constraints and capacity adjustment in the United Kingdom: evidence from a large panel of survey data. (2005). von Kalckreuth, Ulf ; Murphy, Emma.
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20. Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity. (2004). Kraft, Kornelius ; Czarnitzki, Dirk.
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21. Macroeconomic Volatility and endogenous debt maturity choice. (2004). Kharroubi, Enisse.
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22. On the governance of start-ups. (2004). Ambec, Stefan.
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23. The Determinants of Debt and (Private-) Equity Financing in Young Innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany. (2004). Werwatz, Axel ; Schäfer, Dorothea ; Zimmermann, Volker.
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24. Ledger Provision in Hog Marketing Contracts. (2003). Hennessy, David ; Lien, Donald.
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25. Property Rights and the New Institutional Arrangement for Product Innovation in Silicon Valley. (2003). Takizawa, Hirokazu.
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26. Les leviers de contrôle des actionnaires majoritaires. (2002). Szafarz, Ariane ; Chapelle, Ariane ; Biebuyck, Thibault.
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27. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. (2002). Matthews, Steven ; Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
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28. Information and Control in Alliances and Ventures. (2002). Dessein, Wouter.
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29. Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure. (2002). Inderst, Roman ; Muller, Holger M.
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30. Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison. (2002). Zingales, Luigi ; Dyck, Isaac.
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31. Legal rules, governance structures and financial systems.. (2001). Jovanovic, Aleksandra.
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32. Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?. (2001). Renneboog, Luc ; Mayer, Colin ; Franks, Julian R.
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33. How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?. (2001). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
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34. Capital Structure and Risk Management. (2001). Gobert, Karine.
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35. Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?. (2001). Cestone, Giacinta.
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39. In Search of New Foundations. (2000). Zingales, Luigi.
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43. A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses. (1999). Choi, Jay Pil.
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48. Solutions au stress financier : Un survol de la littérature. (1996). Martel, Jocelyn.
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