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2. Observing actions in global games. (2022). Kuhle, Wolfgang ; Grafenhofer, Dominik.
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3. Observing Actions in Global Games. (2021). Kuhle, Wolfgang ; Grafenhofer, Dominik.
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4. Observing Actions in Bayesian Games. (2019). Kuhle, Wolfgang ; Grafenhofer, Dominik.
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5. Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria. (2017). Zuazo-Garin, Peio ; Germano, Fabrizio.
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6. Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk ; Heumann, Tibor.
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7. Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria. (2015). Zuazo-Garin, Peio ; Germano, Fabrizio.
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8. Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction. (2015). Vives, Xavier ; Pavan, Alessandro.
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9. Information and Market Power. (2015). Morris, Stephen ; Heumann, Tibor ; Bergemann, Dirk.
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10. Information and Market Power. (2015). Morris, Stephen ; Heumann, Tibor ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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11. Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria. (2015). Zuazo-Garin, Peio ; Germano, Fabrizio.
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1. Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information. (2019). Li, Zhuozheng ; Zhang, Lan ; Yang, Huanxing.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0637-7.

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2. Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. (2016). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:1808.

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3. Sentiments, financial markets, and macroeconomic fluctuations. (2016). Wang, Pengfei ; Benhabib, Jess ; Liu, Xuewen.
   In: Journal of Financial Economics.
   RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:120:y:2016:i:2:p:420-443.

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4. Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction. (2015). Vida, Péter ; Azacis, Helmuts.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:58:y:2015:i:1:p:125-160.

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5. Sentiments, Financial Markets, and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. (2015). Wang, Pengfei ; Benhabib, Jess ; Liu, Xuewen.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21294.

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6. Information and volatility. (2015). Morris, Stephen ; Heumann, Tibor ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pb:p:427-465.

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7. Experimental design to persuade. (2015). Kolotilin, Anton.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:215-226.

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8. Epistemic Game Theory. (2015). Siniscalchi, Marciano ; Dekel, Eddie.
   In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
   RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:619-702.

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9. Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. (2015). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909rrr.

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10. The Limits of Price Discrimination. (2015). Morris, Stephen ; Brooks, Benjamin ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:3:p:921-57.

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11. Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games. (2014). Milchtaich, Igal.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:283-350.

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12. Rational inattention and revealed preference: The data-theoretic approach to economic modeling. (2014). Caplin, Andrew.
    In: Research in Economics.
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13. Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. (2014). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909rr.

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14. The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency. (2014). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909r.

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15. Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. (2013). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
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    RePEc:pri:metric:054-2013.

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16. Uncertainty and Sentiment-Driven Equilibria. (2013). Wen, Yi ; Wang, Pengfei ; Benhabib, Jess.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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17. Strategic correlativity and network games. (2013). Yang, Jianxia ; Wu, John.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:663-669.

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18. The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency. (2013). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909.

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19. The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency. (2013). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000730.

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20. A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games. (2012). Blume, Andreas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:510-517.

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21. Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction. (2012). Vida, Péter ; Azacis, Helmuts.
    In: Cardiff Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/11.

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