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2. Optimal risk sharing with ex post private information: Rules versus discretion. (2022). Dai, Chifeng.
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5. Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier. (2021). Dai, Chifeng.
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6. Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction. (2021). Yoon, Kiho.
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9. Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity. (2019). Bhattacharjee, Swagata.
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11. Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. (2018). Välimäki, Juuso ; Bergemann, Dirk ; Valimaki, Juuso.
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12. A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints. (2017). Lamba, Rohit ; Krasikov, Ilia.
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13. Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. (2017). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David.
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14. Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. (2017). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David.
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15. Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. (2017). Valimaki, Juuso ; Bergemann, Dirk.
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16. Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. (2017). Välimäki, Juuso ; Bergemann, Dirk ; Valimaki, Juuso.
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17. Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. (2017). Välimäki, Juuso ; Bergemann, Dirk ; Valimaki, Juuso.
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18. Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. (2017). Ricci, Francesco ; Pouyet, Jerome ; MARTIMORT, David.
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19. Role of Information Rents in Relational Contracts. (2016). Ishihara, Akifumi.
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20. Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts. (2016). MARTIMORT, David ; Arve, Malin.
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15. Model selection tests for moment inequality models. (2015). shi, xiaoxia.
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    RePEc:eee:econom:v:187:y:2015:i:1:p:1-17.

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16. Noncompensatory consideration and compensatory choice: an application to Stackelberg competition. (2014). Papi, Mauro.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
    RePEc:spr:etbull:v:2:y:2014:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0026-0.

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17. Measuring de facto versus de iure political institutions in the long-run: a multivariate statistical approach. (2014). Földvári, Péter ; Foldvari, Peter.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:56576.

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18. Behavioral Economics and Macroeconomic Models. (2014). Holden, Steinar ; Driscoll, John.
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2014-43.

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19. Behavioral Economics and Macroeconomic Models. (2014). Holden, Steinar ; Driscoll, John.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4785.

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20. Asian Disease-type of Framing of Outcomes as an Historical Curiosity. (2013). Jullien, Dorian.
    In: GREDEG Working Papers.
    RePEc:gre:wpaper:2013-47.

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21. Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model. (2013). Papi, Mauro.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:385-389.

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22. Overconfidence and asymmetric information: The case of insurance. (2013). Squintani, Francesco ; Sandroni, Alvaro.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:149-165.

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23. Multi-dimensional price discrimination. (2013). Shuai, Jie ; Liu, Qihong.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:5:p:417-428.

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24. Identifying Distributional Characteristics in Random Coefficients Panel Data Models. (2012). Bonhomme, Stéphane ; Arellano, Manuel.
    In: The Review of Economic Studies.
    RePEc:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:3:p:987-1020.

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25. Fettered Consumers and Sophisticated Firms: Evidence from Mexicos Privatized Social Security Market. (2012). Hastings, Justine ; Duarte, Fabián.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18582.

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26. A Probabilistic Ghost in the Experimental Machine. (2012). Jullien, Dorian ; Vallois, Nicolas.
    In: GREDEG Working Papers.
    RePEc:gre:wpaper:2012-05.

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27. Is There Rent Sharing in Italy? Evidence from Employer-Employee Data. (2011). Naticchioni, Paolo ; Matano, Alessia.
    In: European Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:liu:liucej:v:8:y:2011:i:2:p:265-279.

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28. Private equity premium in a general equilibrium model of uninsurable investment risk. (2011). Fujita, Shigeru ; Covas, Francisco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:11-18.

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29. Nonlinear pricing on private roads with congestion and toll collection costs. (2011). Yang, Hai ; Lindsey, Charles ; Wang, Judith Y. T., .
    In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological.
    RePEc:eee:transb:v:45:y:2011:i:1:p:9-40.

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30. Estimating the impact of rural investments in Nepal. (2011). Zhang, Xiaobo ; Sharma, Manohar ; Dillon, Andrew.
    In: Food Policy.
    RePEc:eee:jfpoli:v:36:y:2011:i:2:p:250-258.

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31. Non-parametric test of time consistency: Present bias and future bias. (2011). Takeuchi, Kan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:456-478.

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32. Do more diverse environments increase the diversity of subsequent interaction? Evidence from random dorm assignment. (2011). Puller, Steven ; Mayer, Adalbert ; Baker, Sara .
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:2:p:110-112.

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33. On Horns and Halos: Confirmation Bias and Job Rotation. (2010). Muller, Daniel.
    In: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:bonedp:052010.

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34. What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Policy? Challenges to Savings and Health Policies in the Netherlands. (2010). Prast, Henriette ; Kooreman, Peter.
    In: De Economist.
    RePEc:kap:decono:v:158:y:2010:i:2:p:101-122.

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35. Regulating sovereign wealth funds operating overseas through an external fund manager. (2010). Mazarei, Adnan ; de Palma, André ; Leruth, Luc.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00488662.

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36. Neuroeconomics: Constructing Identity. (2010). Davis, John.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00911827.

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37. Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation. (2010). Grochulski, Borys.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:908-943.

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38. Neuroeconomics: Constructing identity. (2010). Davis, John.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:3:p:574-583.

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39. Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation. (2010). Wilson, Chris.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:5:p:496-506.

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40. The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry. (2010). IVALDI, Marc ; CERASI, VITTORIA ; Chizzolini, Barbara.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7618.

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41. Product Pricing when Demand Follows a Rule of Thumb. (2009). Matzke, Christina ; Wirth, Benedikt.
    In: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:bonedp:32009.

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42. Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy. (2009). Ihori, Toshihiro ; Yang, C. C..
    In: Journal of Urban Economics.
    RePEc:eee:juecon:v:66:y:2009:i:3:p:210-217.

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43. On the robustness of laissez-faire. (2009). Phelan, Christopher ; Kocherlakota, Narayana.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:6:p:2372-2387.

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44. Empirical likelihood-based inference for nonparametric recurrent diffusions. (2009). Xu, Ke-Li.
    In: Journal of Econometrics.
    RePEc:eee:econom:v:153:y:2009:i:1:p:65-82.

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45. A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales. (2008). Matzke, Christina ; Wirth, Benedikt.
    In: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:bonedp:102008.

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46. Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?. (2008). Dafny, Leemore.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14572.

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47. Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs. (2008). MARTIMORT, David ; Koessler, Frederic.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586854.

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48. The Intensity of Competition in the Hotelling Model: A New Generalization and Applications. (2007). Kim, Jaesoo.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:6876.

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49. Are small investors naive about incentives?. (2007). Malmendier, Ulrike ; Shanthikumar, Devin.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:85:y:2007:i:2:p:457-489.

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50. (A,f) Choice with Frames. (2007). Rubinstein, Ariel ; Salant, Yuval.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000029.

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