1. Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure. (2022). Farhadi, Farzaneh ; Teneketzis, Demosthenis.
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2. Identifying the Effect of Persuasion. (2022). Lee, Sokbae (Simon) ; Jun, Sung Jae.
   In: Papers.
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3. Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning. (2021). Jain, Shobhit ; Randhawa, Ramandeep ; Drakopoulos, Kimon.
   In: Management Science.
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4. Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection. (2021). Fuchs, William ; Asriyan, Vladimir ; Green, Brett.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301174.

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5. Regime change games with an active defender. (2021). Jann, Ole ; Schottmuller, Christoph.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:96-113.

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6. Framing, Information, and Welfare. (2020). Martin, Daniel ; Caplin, Andrew.
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7. Dynamic interventions and informational linkages. (2020). Cong, Lin ; Hu, Yunzhi ; Grenadier, Steven R.
   In: Journal of Financial Economics.
   RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:135:y:2020:i:1:p:1-15.

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8. Why Echo Chambers are Useful. (2019). Schottmüller, Christoph ; Schottmuller, Christoph.
   In: VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy.
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9. Regulating a model. (2019). Leitner, Yaron ; Yilmaz, Bilge.
   In: Journal of Financial Economics.
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10. Persuasion with limited communication capacity. (2019). Tomala, Tristan ; le Treust, Mael.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0022053118305064.

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11. Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework. (2019). Liu, Yixuan ; Whinston, Andrew B.
    In: Information Economics and Policy.
    RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:47:y:2019:i:c:p:14-26.

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12. Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Large Elections. (2019). Lauermann, Stephan ; Heese, Carl.
    In: CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_128.

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13. Identifying the effect of persuasion. (2018). Lee, Sokbae (Simon) ; Jun, Sung Jae.
    In: CeMMAP working papers.
    RePEc:ifs:cemmap:19/18.

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14. Stress tests and information disclosure. (2018). Leitner, Yaron ; Goldstein, Itay.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:34-69.

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15. Information design and capital formation. (2018). Sublet, Guillaume ; Carvajal, Andrés ; Rostek, Marzena.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:255-292.

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16. Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. (2017). Morris, Stephen ; Bergemann, Dirk.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759.

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17. An Economic Model of the Evolution of Food Retail and Supply Chains from Traditional Shops to Supermarkets to e-Commerce. (2017). Reardon, Thomas ; Lu, Liang.
    In: 2018 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 5-7, 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
    RePEc:ags:assa18:266301.

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1. Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game. (2009). Ray, Indrajit ; Ganguly, Chirantan.
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2. Approche Conceptuelle et Algorithmique des Equilibres de Nash Robustes Incitatifs. (2008). Wanko, Cedric.
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3. Intraday liquidity management: a tale of games banks play. (2008). Bech, Morten.
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4. A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding. (2008). Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
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5. Learning to play partially-specified equilibrium. (2007). Solan, Eilon ; Lehrer, Ehud.
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6. Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria. (2006). Lugosi, Gabor ; Germano, Fabrizio.
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