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39. Amissibility and Common Belief. (2000). Dufwenberg, Martin ; Asheim, Geir.
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40. Admissibility and common belief. (2000). Dufwenberg, Martin ; Asheim, Geir.
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41. Proper Consistency. (2000). Asheim, Geir.
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42. On the epistemic foundation for backward induction. (1999). Asheim, Geir.
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43. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium. (1999). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Dekel, Eddie.
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44. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium. (1999). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Dekel, Eddie.
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45. The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability. (1998). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques.
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47. Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium. (1996). Hillas, John ; Kohlberg, Elon.
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48. Admissibility and Common Knowledge. (1996). Dufwenberg, Martin ; Asheim, Geir.
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