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4. A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations. (2003). Hvide, Hans ; Leite, Tore.
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5. The demand for intercity public transport: the case of business passengers. (2003). Carlsson, Fredrik.
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6. The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies. (2003). Rajan, Raghuram ; Wulf, Julie.
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7. On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control. (2002). Lagerlof, Johan ; Heidhues, Paul.
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8. A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm. (2002). James, Harvey.
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9. Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance. (2002). Lizal, Lubomir ; Earnhart, Dietrich.
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10. The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization. (2002). Svejnar, Jan ; Kočenda, Evžen.
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11. A Refinancing Model of Decentralization with Empirical Evidence from China. (2002). Shen, Minggao ; Park, Albert.
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12. Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders. (2002). Cespa, Giovanni ; Cestone, Giacinta.
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13. Corporate Governance and Control. (2002). Bolton, Patrick ; Becht, Marco ; Roell, Alisa.
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14. Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks. (2002). Stein, Jeremy ; Rajan, Raghuram ; Petersen, Mitchell ; Berger, Allen ; Miller, Nathan H..
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16. Consumers and Agency Problems. (2002). Prendergast, Canice.
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17. Centralization Versus Decentralization in Credit Lending. (2002). GHODBANE, Idriss M..
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18. Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance. (2002). Lizal, Lubomir ; Earnhart, Dietrich.
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19. Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders. (2002). Cespa, Giovanni ; Cestone, Giacinta.
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20. The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems. (2001). Levin, Jonathan ; Athey, Susan.
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21. Consumers and Agency Problems. (2001). Prendergast, Canice J..
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23. Gender Differences in Managerial Compensation - Evidences from Denmark. (2001). Lausten, Mette.
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24. Delegation and Organizational Design. (2001). Paolini, Dimitri ; Gautier, Axel.
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25. Seeking information: the role of information providers in the policy decision process.. (2000). Swank Otto H., .
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26. Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?. (2000). Roberts, Kevin ; Felli, Leonardo.
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27. The Governance of the New Enterprise. (2000). Zingales, Luigi ; Rajan, Raghuram.
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28. Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms. (2000). Stein, Jeremy.
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29. The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms. (2000). Zingales, Luigi ; Rajan, Raghuram.
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30. Decentralisation of Active Labour Market Policy: The Case of Swedish Local Employment Service Committees. (2000). Skedinger, Per ; Lundin, Martin.
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31. Decentralisation of active labour market policy: The case of Swedish local employment service committees. (2000). Skedinger, Per ; Lundin, Martin.
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32. Transferring Knowledge in MNCs: The Role of Sources of Subsidiary Knowledge and Organizational Context. (2000). Foss, Nicolai ; Pedersen, Torben.
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33. Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability. (2000). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
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34. Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?. (2000). Roberts, Kevin ; Felli, Leonardo.
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35. Delegation and Information Revelation. (2000). Paolini, Dimitri ; Gautier, Axel.
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36. Delegation of Authority, Managerial Initiatives, and the Design of Divisional Structure. (2000). Riyanto, Yohanes.
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37. Interference, Contracts and Authority with Insecure Communication. (2000). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
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38. When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?. (2000). Chiu, Y. ; Chatterjee, Kalyan.
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39. Delegation and information revelation. (2000). Paolini, Dimitri ; Gautier, Axel.
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40. The Rise and Fall of the Size of Firms. (2000). Trau, Fabrizio.
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41. Self-Confidence and Social Interactions. (1999). Tirole, Jean ; Benabou, Roland.
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42. Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between Basic and Applied Research. (1999). Henderson, Rebecca ; Cockburn, Iain ; Stern, Scott.
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43. Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors. (1999). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
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44. Corporate Governance. (1999). Tirole, Jean.
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45. A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance. (1997). James, Harvey.
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46. Public vs. Private Ownership of Firms: Evidence from Rural China. (1997). Qian, Yingyi ; Jin, Hehui.
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47. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1997). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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48. Influence activity and the organization of research and development. (1997). Cassiman, Bruno.
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49. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting.. (1997). Che, Yeon-Koo ; Hausch, D. B..
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50. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1996). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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