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2. Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks. (2012). Meghir, Costas ; Genicot, Garance ; cardenas, juan-camilo ; Barr, Abigail ; Attanasio, Orazio.
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3. Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks.. (2011). Meghir, Costas ; Genicot, Garance ; cardenas, juan-camilo ; Barr, Abigail ; Attanasio, Orazio ; Garance Genicot, Orazio Attanasio, Abigail Barr, J, .
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1. Unfair Incentives: A Behavioral Note on Sharecropping. (2015). Schumacher, Heiner ; Kemper, Niels.
   In: VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112860.

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2. Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market. (2015). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:99.

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3. Fresh Vegetable Growers Risk Perception, Risk Preference and Choice of Marketing Contracts: A Choice Experiment. (2013). Woods, Timothy ; Hu, Wuyang ; Vassalos, Michael ; Schieffer, Jack ; Dillon, Carl R..
   In: 2013 Annual Meeting, February 2-5, 2013, Orlando, Florida.
   RePEc:ags:saea13:142506.

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4. Selecting public goods institutions: who likes to punish and reward?. (2012). Drouvelis, Michalis ; Jamison, Julian C..
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:fip:fedbwp:12-5.

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5. Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives. (2012). Sadun, Raffaella ; Prat, Andrea ; Guiso, Luigi ; bandiera, oriana.
   In: CEP Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1144.

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6. An Empirical Analysis of Risk, Incentives and The Delegation of Worker Authority. (2011). Kurtulus, Fidan ; DeVaro, Jed.
   In: UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers.
   RePEc:ums:papers:2011-13.

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7. Using opposing responses and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions. (2011). DeVaro, Jed.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:35175.

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8. Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives. (2011). Sadun, Raffaella ; Prat, Andrea ; Guiso, Luigi ; bandiera, oriana.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16691.

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9. Field Experiments with Firms. (2011). Rasul, Imran ; Barankay, Iwan ; bandiera, oriana.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5723.

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10. Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnershipso. (2011). Karaivanov, Alexander ; Ghatak, Maitreesh.
    In: STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:cep:stieop:024.

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11. Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Survey. (2011). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-036.

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12. Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry. (2010). Schneider, Henry.
    In: Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/652423.

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13. Agricultural Extension and Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar. (2010). Bellemare, Marc.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:23788.

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14. An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans. (2010). Paulson, Nicholas ; Lence, Sergio ; Katchova, Ani.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:31525.

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15. An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans. (2010). Paulson, Nicholas.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:31523.

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16. The Structural Estimation of Principal-Agent Models by Least Squares: Evidence from Land Tenancy in Madagascar. (2009). Brown, Zachary ; Bellemare, Marc.
    In: 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
    RePEc:ags:aaea09:49368.

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17. Ethnic diversity market structure and risk sharing in developing countries. (2006). Zenou, Yves ; Jellal, Mohamed.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38435.

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18. Two-Sided Matching and Spread Determinants in the Loan Market. (2006). Chen, Jiawei.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:irv:wpaper:060702.

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19. The Principal-Agent Matching Market. (2003). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Dam, Kaniska.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_945.

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20. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL TO ASSESS RISK SHIFTING AND BARGAINING POWER IN COMMODITY MARKETING CHANNELS. (2003). Pennings, Joost ; Kuwornu, John ; Pennings, Joost M. E., ; Kuwornu, John K. M., ; Kuiper, Erno W..
    In: 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada.
    RePEc:ags:aaea03:22046.

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21. Incorporating Insurance Provisions in Microfinance Contracts: Learning from Visa®?. (2002). Sadoulet, Loic .
    In: WIDER Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2002-56.

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22. Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines. (2002). Dubois, Pierre.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:68:y:2002:i:1:p:35-64.

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23. Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World. (2002). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3469.

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24. Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work. (2002). Salanié, Bernard ; Chiappori, Pierre ; Salanie, Bernard.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_738.

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25. Insecurity of Property Rights and Matching in the Tenancy Market. (2002). Macours, Karen.
    In: 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain.
    RePEc:ags:eaae02:24931.

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26. INSECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MATCHING IN THE TENANCY MARKET. (2002). Macours, Karen.
    In: 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA.
    RePEc:ags:aaea02:19603.

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27. On the Structure of Tenancy Contracts: Theory and Evidence from 19th Century Rural Sicily. (2001). bandiera, oriana.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3032.

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28. Risk-Matching in Credit Groups: Evidence from Guatemala. (2000). Carpenter, Seth ; Sadoulet, Loic .
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1310.

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29. Why Dowries?. (2000). Siow, Aloysius ; Botticini, Maristella.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0200.

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30. Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries. (1999). Mookherjee, Dilip.
    In: Boston University - Institute for Economic Development.
    RePEc:fth:bosecd:98.

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