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6. Moral hazard under ambiguity. (2016). Mastrolia, Thibaut ; Possamai, Dylan.
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1. New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting. (2022). Hansen, Peter G.
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2. Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikovs principal-agent problem?. (2022). Touzi, Nizar ; Possamai, Dylan.
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3. New Formulations of Ambiguous Volatility with an Application to Optimal Dynamic Contracting. (2021). Hansen, Peter G.
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4. CEO Overconfidence and Shadow-Banking Life Insurer Performance Under Government Purchases of Distressed Assets. (2019). Yao, Wenyu ; Chen, Shi ; Lin, Jyh-Horng ; Huang, Fu-Wei.
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5. Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity. (2019). Bhattacharjee, Swagata.
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6. Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity. (2019). Bhattacharjee, Swagata.
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7. Moral Hazard Under Ambiguity. (2018). Mastrolia, Thibaut ; Possamai, Dylan.
   In: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications.
   RePEc:spr:joptap:v:179:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10957-018-1230-8.

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8. Financial choice and financial information. (2017). Koszegi, Botond ; Kondor, Péter.
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9. Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning. (2016). Wei, Bin ; He, Zhiguo ; Yu, Jianfeng ; Gao, Feng.
   In: FRB Atlanta Working Paper.
   RePEc:fip:fedawp:2016-10.

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10. Moral hazard under ambiguity. (2016). Mastrolia, Thibaut ; Possamai, Dylan.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1511.03616.

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11. Cursed financial innovation. (2015). Koszegi, Botond ; Kondor, Péter.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2015306.

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12. Cursed financial innovation. (2015). Koszegi, Botond ; Kondor, Péter.
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13. Dynamic contracts when agents quality is unknown. (2014). Prat, Julien ; Jovanovic, Boyan.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
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14. Capital Structure under Heterogeneous Beliefs. (2014). Jung, Haewon ; Subramanian, Ajay.
    In: Review of Finance.
    RePEc:oup:revfin:v:18:y:2014:i:5:p:1617-1681..

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15. Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs. (2013). Giat, Yahel ; Subramanian, Ajay.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
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16. Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning. (2012). Wei, Bin ; He, Zhiguo ; Yu, Jianfeng.
    In: 2012 Meeting Papers.
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17. Public Disagreement. (2012). Yildiz, Muhamet ; Sethi, Rajiv.
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18. Contracting in Vague Environments. (2012). Vierø, Marie-Louise.
    In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
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19. DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDER PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY. (2011). Prat, Julien.
    In: 2011 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed011:249.

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20. Overconfidence and moral hazard. (2011). de la Rosa, Leonidas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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21. Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment. (2011). Sautmann, Anja.
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22. Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty. (2010). Prat, Julien ; Jovanovic, Boyan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16649.

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23. The Role of Dynamics in Stakeholder Thinking. (2010). Windsor, Duane.
    In: Journal of Business Ethics.
    RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:96:y:2010:i:1:p:79-87.

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24. Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty. (2010). Prat, Julien ; Jovanovic, Boyan.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5323.

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25. Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty. (2010). Prat, Julien ; Jovanovic, Boyan.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8136.

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