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2. Attack-defense game modeling framework from a vulnerability perspective to protect critical infrastructure systems. (2025). Wu, Yanfang ; Guo, Peng ; Zio, Enrico ; Wang, Ying.
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3. A Review of Attacker–Defender Games and Cyber Security. (2024). Hausken, Kjell ; Zhuang, Jun ; Welburn, Jonathan W.
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36. Aggregation in Networks. (2017). Allouch, Nizar.
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