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A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games. (2021). Sawa, Ryoji.
In: Games and Economic Behavior.
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:570-589.

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  1. The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition. (2022). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:50-57.

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