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2. Player strength and effort in contests. (2024). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Gurtler, Oliver.
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   RePEc:hhs:vxesta:2024_004.

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3. Player Strength and Effort in Contests. (2024). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Gurtler, Oliver.
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   RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:285.

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4. .

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5. Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests. (2023). Chowdhury, Subhasish ; Estevegonzalez, Patricia ; Mukherjee, Anwesha.
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   RePEc:wly:soecon:v:89:y:2023:i:3:p:924-974.

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6. Optimal tie-breaking rules. (2023). Goyal, Amit ; Goel, Sumit.
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   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:108:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000654.

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7. Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China. (2022). Fang, Hanming ; Wu, Zenan ; Li, Ming.
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   RePEc:pen:papers:22-031.

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1. Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests. (2021). Grünseis, Julia ; Ewerhart, Christian ; Grunseis, Julia.
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2. A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contests. (2020). Wang, YU ; Jiang, Juncai.
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   RePEc:bla:popmgt:v:29:y:2020:i:2:p:481-500.

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4. Information Feedback in Relative Grading: Evidence from a Field Experiment. (2019). Suzuki, Shiba ; Morimoto, Keiichi ; Kajitani, Shinya.
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5. Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?. (2019). van Ommeren, Jos ; Fosgerau, Mogens ; Jost, Peter-J., ; Czerny, Achim I.
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7. A General Framework for Studying Contests. (2019). Gürtler, Oliver ; Giebe, Thomas ; Bastani, Spencer ; Gurtler, Oliver.
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8. Confidence in Knowledge or Confidence in the Ability to Learn: An Experiment on the Causal Effects of Beliefs on Motivation. (2018). Sliwka, Dirk ; Fischer, Mira.
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9. Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation. (2018). Sliwka, Dirk ; Fischer, Mira.
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21. The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2015). Koçkesen, Levent ; Kockesen, Levent ; Ertac, Seda ; Ozdemir, Duygu .
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35. Subjective evaluations with performance feedback. (2014). Zabojnik, Jan.
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36. Intertemporal Effort Provision in Sequential Tournaments. (2013). Schmutzler, Armin ; Klein, Arnd Heinrich .
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37. Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Campaigns?. (2013). Sisak, Dana ; Denter, Philipp.
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38. The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment. (2013). Non, Arjan ; Dur, Robert ; Delfgaauw, Josse ; Verbeke, Willem.
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39. Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment. (2013). Non, Arjan ; Dur, Robert ; Delfgaauw, Josse ; Verbeke, Willem.
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40. Communication and commitment in contests. (2013). Gürtler, Oliver ; Fu, Qiang ; Gurtler, Oliver ; Munster, Johannes.
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41. Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design. (2013). Chiu, Y. ; Chen, Bin R..
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42. Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures. (2012). Ludwig, Sandra.
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43. Observing your competitor – The role of effort information in two-stage tournaments. (2012). Ludwig, Sandra ; Lnser, Gabriele K..
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44. Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure. (2011). Mukherjee, Arijit ; Goltsman, Maria.
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45. Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment. (2011). Non, Arjan ; Dur, Robert ; Delfgaauw, Josse ; Verbeke, Willem.
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46. Frequency of examinations and student achievement in a randomized experiment. (2011). Scoppa, Vincenzo ; De Paola, Maria.
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47. Double-edged transparency in teams. (2011). Bag, Parimal Kanti.
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48. Frequency of examinations and student achievement in a randomized experiment. (2011). Scoppa, Vincenzo ; De Paola, Maria.
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49. Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests. (2010). Rieck, Thomas.
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50. Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence. (2008). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Poulsen, Anders ; Eriksson, Tor.
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