1. Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs. (2023). Saraceno, Margherita ; Rampa, Giorgio.
   In: Journal of Economics.
   RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:139:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-022-00810-x.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Arlen, J.H. Liability for physical injury when injurers as well as victims suffer losses. 1992 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations. 8 411-426

2. Arlen, J.H. Should defendants’ wealth matter?. 1992 Journal of Legal Studies. 21 413-429

3. Arlen, J.H. Tort damages. 2000 En : Bouckaert, B. ; De Geest, G. . Edward Elgar: Cheltenham
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
4. Arrow, K. Optimal insurance and generalized deductibles. 1964 Scandinavian Actuarial Journal. 1 1-42
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

5. Bergstrom, T. ; Blume, L. ; Varian, H. On the private provision of public goods. 1986 Journal of Public Economics. 29 25-49

6. Borch, J. Equilibrium in a reinsurance market. 1962 Econometrica. 30 424-444
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
7. Botzen, W.J.W. ; van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. Insurance against climate change and flooding in the Netherlands: Present, future, and comparison with other countries. 2008 Risk Analysis. 28 413-426
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

8. Boyd, J. ; Ingberman, D.E. Noncompensatory Damages and Potential Insolvency". 1994 Journal of Legal Studies. 23 895-910

9. Briys, E. ; Schlesinger, H. Risk-aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-protection. 1990 Southern Economic Journal. 57 458-467
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
10. Brown, J.P. Toward an economic theory of liability. 1973 Journal of Legal Studies. 2 323-349
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
11. Calabresi, ; Guido, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis. 1970 Yale University Press: New Haven
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

12. Calfee, J.E. ; Rubin, P.H. Some implications of damage payments for nonpecuniary losses. 1992 Journal of Legal Studies. 21 371-411

13. Chateauneuf, A. ; Dana, R.-A. ; Tallon, J.M. Optimal risk sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility. 2000 Journal of Mathematical Economics. 34 191-214

14. Chiu, H. On the propensity to self-protect. 2000 The Journal of Risk and Insurance. 67 555-578
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

15. Cook, P. ; Graham, D. The demand for insurance and protection: The case of irreplaceable commodities. 1977 Quarterly Journal of Economics. 41 143-156

16. Cooter, R. D., & Schäfer, H. B. (2009). Law and the poverty of nations. Available from: http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/144.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

17. Cooter, R.D. ; Porat, A. Does risk to oneself increase the care owed to others? Law and economics in conflict. 2000 Journal of Legal Studies. 29 19-34

18. Cornes, R. ; Sandler, T. The simple analytics of pure public good provision. 1985 Economica. 52 103-116

19. Dari-Mattiacci, G. ; De Geest, G. Judgment proofness under four different precaution technologies. 2005 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 161 38-56

20. Dehez, P. ; Drèze, J. State-dependent utility, the demand for insurance and the value of safety. 1987 Cambridge University Press:
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

21. Dharmapala, D. ; Hoffmann, S. Bilateral accident with intrinsically interdependent costs of precaution. 2005 Journal of Legal Studies. 34 239-272

22. Ehrlich, I. ; Becker, G.S. Market insurance self-insurance and self-protection. 1972 Journal of Political Economy. 80 623-648

23. Endres, A. Strategic behavior under tort law. 1992 International Review of Law and Economics. 12 377-380

24. Friehe, T. On the similarity of bilateral harm an unilateral harm with role-type uncertainty. 2007 Review of Law and Economics. 3 553-580

25. Friehe, T. Sequential torts and bilateral harm. 2009 International Review of Law and Economics. 29 161-168

26. Ganuza, J.J. ; Gomez, F. Realistic standards: Optimal negligence with limited liability. 2008 Journal of Legal Studies. 37 577-594

27. Graff Zivin, J. ; Just, R. ; Zilberman, D. Risk aversion liability rules and safety. 2006 International Review of Law and Economics. 25 604-623
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

28. Graff Zivin, J. ; Small, A. Risk sharing in Coasian contracts. 2003 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 45 394-415

29. Greenwood, P. ; Ingene, P. Uncertainty externalities, liability rules and resources allocation. 1978 American Economic Review. 68 300-310

30. Hirschleifer, J.K. Investment, interest, and capital. 1970 Prentice Hall: Engelwood Cliffs, NJ
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

31. Jones-Lee, M. The value of changes in the probability of death or injury. 1974 Journal of Political Economy. 82 835-849

32. Jullien, B. ; Salanié, B. ; Salanié, F. Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort?. 1999 The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. 24 19-28

33. Kaplow, L. ; Shavell, S. Should legal rules favor the poor? Clarifying the role of legal rules and the income tax in redistributing income. 2000 Journal of Legal Studies. 29 821-835

34. Kaplow, L. ; Shavell, S. Why the legal system is less efficient than the income tax in redistributing income?. 1994 Journal of Legal Studies. 23 667-681

35. Karni, E. Decisionmaking under uncertainty: The case of state-dependent preferences. 1985 Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

36. Karni, E. Risk aversion for state-dependent utility functions: Measurement and applications. 1983 International Economic Review. 24 637-647

37. Keeney, R.L. ; Raiffa, H. Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and value trade-offs. 1976 Wiley and Sons: New York
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

38. Kessler, D.P. ; Rubinfeld, D.L. Empirical study of the civil justice system. 2007 En : Polinsky, A.M. ; Shavell, S. Handbook of law and economics. Elsevier: Amsterdam

39. Kim, J. ; Feldman, A. Victim or injurer small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty. 2006 International Review of Law and Economics. 26 455-477

40. Kornhauser, L.A. ; Revesz, R.L. Apportioning damages among potentially insolvent actors. 1990 Journal of Legal Studies. 19 617-651

41. Landes, W.M. ; Posner, R.A. The economic structure of tort law. 1987 Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
42. Landsberger, M. ; Meilijson, I. Co-monotone allocations Bickel–Lehmann dispersion and the Arrow–Pratt measure of risk-aversion. 1994 Annals of Operations Research. 52 97-106
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

43. Lee, K. Risk aversion and self-insurance-cum protection. 1998 The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 17 139-150

44. Lee, K. Wealth effects on self-insurance and self-protection against monetary and nonmonetary losses. 2005 The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review. 30 147-159

45. Leong, A. Liability rules when injurers as well as victims suffer losses. 1989 International Review of Law and Economics. 9 105-111

46. Miceli, T. ; Segerson, K. Defining efficient care: The role of income distribution. 1995 Journal of Legal Studies. 24 189-208

47. Nell, M. ; Richter, A. The design of liability rules for highly risky activities - Is strict liability superior when risk allocation matters?. 2003 International Review of Law and Economics. 23 31-47

48. Nielson, W. ; Winter, H. On criminals’ risk attitude. 1997 Economics Letters. 55 97-102
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

49. Raviv, A. The design of optimal insurance policy. 1979 American Economic Review. 69 84-96

50. Segerson, K. Risk sharing and the design of environmental policy. 1986 American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 68 1261-1265

51. Shavell, S. A note on efficiency versus distributional equity in legal rulemaking: Should distributional equity matter given optimal income taxes?. 1981 American Economic Review - Papers and Proceedings. 71 414-418

52. Shavell, S. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. 1987 Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
53. Shavell, S. Foundations of economic analysis of law. 2004 Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

54. Shavell, S. On liability and insurance. 1982 The Bell Journal of Economics. 13 120-132

55. Shavell, S. Strict liability versus negligence. 1980 Journal of Legal Studies. 9 1-25
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
56. Shavell, S. Torts in which victim and injurer act sequentially. 1983 Journal of Law and Economics. 26 569-612
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

57. Spence, M. Consumer misperception product failure and producer liability. 1977 Review of Economic Studies. 44 561-572

58. Sweeney, G. ; Beard, T. The comparative statics of self-protection. 1992 The Journal of Risk and Insurance. 59 301-309
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
59. Viscusi, W.K. Valuing life and risks to life. 2000 En : Newman, P. . :
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

60. Viscusi, W.K. ; Evans, W.N. Utility functions that depend on health status: Estimates and economic implications. 1990 American Economic Review. 80 353-374

61. Winter, H. Sequential torts with imperfect information. 1994 International Review of Law and Economics. 14 35-40

1. Fines for unequal societies. (2025). immordino, giovanni ; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe ; Russo, Francesco F.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:86:y:2025:i:c:s017626802400123x.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Let the punishment fit the criminal: An experimental study. (2020). Tremewan, James ; Montag, Josef.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:175:y:2020:i:c:p:423-438.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. ‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation. (2016). Singh, Ram.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:11237.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records. (2015). Hlobil, Tobias ; Guerra, Alice.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:66281.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Social Wealth and Optimal Care. (2012). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe.
   In: International Review of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:2:p:271-284.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents. (2010). LANGLAIS, Eric.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:25710.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Sequential torts and bilateral harm. (2009). Friehe, Tim.
   In: International Review of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:2:p:161-168.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. On judgment proofness in the case of bilateral harm. (2008). Friehe, Tim.
   In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:26:y:2008:i:2:p:175-185.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Social Wealth and Optimal Care. (2008). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04140721.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Social Wealth and Optimal Care. (2008). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe.
    In: EconomiX Working Papers.
    RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-34.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. A Positive Theory of Strict Liability. (2008). Hylton, Keith N..
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:4:y:2008:i:1:n:9.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. ‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts. (2007). Singh, Ram.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:2:p:179-203.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Economic Efficiency and Damage Awards in Personal Injury Torts. (2007). Schieren, George.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:apl:wpaper:07-08.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety. (2005). Zilberman, David ; Just, Richard ; Graff Zivin, Joshua.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:4:p:604-623.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Optimal negligence rule under limited liability. (2004). Ganuza, Juan-José ; Gomez, Fernando.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:759.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Liability Rules and Evolutionay Dynamics. (2003). Zheng, Mingli.
    In: Law and Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0312001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Law and neoclassical economics theory: a critical history of the distribution/efficiency debate. (2003). Hackney, James Jr., .
    In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
    RePEc:eee:soceco:v:32:y:2003:i:4:p:361-390.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. The design of liability rules for highly risky activities--Is strict liability superior when risk allocation matters?. (2003). Nell, Martin ; Richter, Andreas.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:31-47.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses. (2003). Cooter, Robert D..
    In: Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt5rf3f1m2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victims cost of care and negligence rule. (2002). Ganuza, Juan-José ; Gomez, Fernando.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:666.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution. (2002). Hoffmann, Sandra ; Dharmapala, Dhammika.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-11.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics. (2001). Zheng, Mingli.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200112)157:4_520:lraed_2.0.tx_2-a.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Personal goods, efficiency and the law. (2001). .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:4:p:673-703.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Optimal liability with stochastic harms, judgement-proof injurers, and asymmetric information1. (1999). innes, robert.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:181-203.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining. (1996). Kobayashi, Bruce ; Lott, John Jr., .
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:4:p:397-416.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-09-17 04:57:26 || Missing content? Let us know