1. Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter?. (2024). Zheng, Kun ; Xu, Xue.
   In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
   RePEc:eee:soceco:v:112:y:2024:i:c:s221480432400106x.

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2. Self-evident events and the value of linking. (2023). Zhang, Wenzhang ; Chan, Jimmy.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:212:y:2023:i:c:s002205312300087x.

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3. Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion. (2022). Spector, David.
   In: Review of Industrial Organization.
   RePEc:kap:revind:v:60:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11151-021-09851-w.

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4. Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion. (2022). Spector, David.
   In: PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint).
   RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03760756.

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5. Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion. (2022). Spector, David.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03760756.

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6. Cheap talk, monitoring and collusion. (2020). Spector, David.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01983037.

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7. Cheap talk, monitoring and collusion. (2020). Spector, David.
   In: PSE Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01983037.

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8. Communication and cooperation in repeated games. (2019). Krishna, Vijay ; Awaya, Yu.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:3049.

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9. An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization. (2019). Hino, Yoshifumi.
   In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
   RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:101:y:2019:i:c:p:47-53.

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10. What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs. (2019). Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit ; Lehrer, Ehud.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:197-237.

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11. Blackwells comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games. (2019). Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit ; Lehrer, Ehud.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:163-194.

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12. Structural experimentation to distinguish between models of risk sharing with frictions in rural Paraguay. (2019). Schechter, Laura ; Ligon, Ethan.
    In: Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt6vp5g054.

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13. Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions. (2018). Fehrler, Sebastian ; Dvorak, Fabian.
    In: TWI Research Paper Series.
    RePEc:twi:respas:0112.

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14. Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions. (2018). Fehrler, Sebastian ; Dvorak, Fabian.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11897.

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15. Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. (2017). Liu, Heng.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0569-7.

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16. Cheap talk, monitoring and collusion. (2017). Spector, David.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01975642.

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17. Instability of belief-free equilibria. (2017). Heller, Yuval.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:261-286.

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18. Structural experimentation to distinguish between models of risk sharing with frictions in rural Paraguay. (2017). Schechter, Laura ; Ligon, Ethan.
    In: Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt9891t8g3.

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19. Instability of Belief-free Equilibria.. (2017). Heller, Yuval.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:biu:wpaper:2017-01.

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20. Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals. (2016). Zhang, Wenzhang ; Chan, Jimmy H..
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1369.

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21. Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication. (2016). Laclau, Marie.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01285070.

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22. Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication. (2016). Laclau, Marie.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01285070.

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23. Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring. (2015). Heller, Yuval.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:64485.

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24. Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring. (2015). Heller, Yuval.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:64468.

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25. On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. (2015). Li, Jiawei ; Kendall, Graham.
    In: PLOS ONE.
    RePEc:plo:pone00:0136032.

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26. Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports. (2015). Spector, David.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01119959.

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27. Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports. (2015). Spector, David.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01119959.

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28. Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring. (2015). Zhang, Wenzhang ; Chan, Jimmy.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:188-211.

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29. Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags. (2014). Kominers, Scott ; Ishii, Yuhta ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:11880354.

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30. Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring. (2014). Postlewaite, Andrew ; Obara, Ichiro ; McLean, Richard.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:191-212.

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31. Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags. (2014). Kominers, Scott ; Ishii, Yuhta ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:150:y:2014:i:c:p:487-514.

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32. The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations. (2014). Maestri, Lucas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:412-418.

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33. Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring. (2014). Laclau, Marie.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:136-160.

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34. Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication. (2013). Laclau, Marie.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:332-337.

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35. Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence. (2012). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:12-005.

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36. Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. (2012). Zhao, Wei ; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., .
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:587.

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37. Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. (2012). Zhao, Wei ; Harrington, Joseph E..
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:277-289.

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38. Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence. (2012). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1998-2027.

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39. A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network. (2012). Laclau, Marie.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:711-737.

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40. Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations. (2012). Maestri, Lucas.
    In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:34-56.

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41. Finite Automata in Undiscounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. (2011). Romero, Julian.
    In: Purdue University Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:pur:prukra:1260.

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42. Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version. (2011). Postlewaite, Andrew ; Obara, Ichiro ; McLean, Richard.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:11-029.

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43. Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. (2011). Koessler, Frederic ; Jacquemet, Nicolas.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00565157.

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44. Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. (2011). Koessler, Frederic ; Jacquemet, Nicolas.
    In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
    RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00565157.

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45. Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices. (2011). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Harrington, Joseph E..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:6:p:2425-49.

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46. A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences. (2010). Roman, Mihai Daniel.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38389.

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47. Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. (2010). Zhao, Wei ; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., .
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:559.

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48. Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations. (2009). Roman, Mihai.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:37527.

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49. Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices. (2009). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., .
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:555.

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50. A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. (2009). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:802-824.

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11. Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty. (2009). Osório, António ; Osorio-Costa, Antonio M..
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14. Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring. (2009). Smith, Lones ; Cherry, Josh .
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15. Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships. (2008). Sekiguchi, Tadashi ; Ohta, Katsunori ; Kobayashi, Hajime.
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21. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. (2007). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
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24. Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration. (2006). Obara, Ichiro.
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25. Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts. (2006). Macleod, W. Bentley.
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29. Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production. (2005). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Sannikov, Yuliy.
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50. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games. (1989). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
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