create a website

Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021). (2022). masciandaro, donato.
In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:122:y:2022:i:c:s0261560621002308.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 3

Citations received by this document

Cites: 254

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. The partisanship of a central banker. (2025). Carmignani, Fabrizio.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:83:y:2025:i:c:s0164070424000715.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Making monetary policy in Poland: Are Polish hawks and doves different?. (2024). Mackiewicz-Łyziak, Joanna ; Kokoszczyński, Ryszard ; Kokoszczyski, Ryszard ; Mackiewicz-Yziak, Joanna.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:81:y:2024:i:c:s0176268023001258.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Monetary and macroprudential policies: How to Be green? A political-economy approach. (2024). Masciandaro, Donato ; Russo, Riccardo.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:141:y:2024:i:c:s0264999324002888.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Abrams, B.A. How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. 2006 J. Economic Perspect.. 20 177-188

  2. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Querubin, P., Robinson, J. A., 2008. When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence, NBER Working Paper Series, n. 14033.

  3. Aghion, P. ; Alesina, A. ; Trebbi, F. Endogenous Political Institutions. 2004 Quart. J. Econ.. 119 565-611

  4. Ainsley, C.T., 2019. The Consequences of Gender Diversity at the Federal Reserve: An Empirical Analysis of FOMC Voting and Discourse, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  5. Alesina, A. ; Gatti, R. Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?. 1995 Am. Econ. Rev.. 85 196-200

  6. Alesina, A. ; Grilli, V. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe. 1992 En : Canzoneri, M. ; Grilli, V. ; Masson, P.R. E stablishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the US. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  7. Alesina, A. ; Stella, A. The Politics of Monetary Policy. 2010 Handbook Monetary Econ.. 1001-1054

  8. Alesina, A. ; Summers, L.H. Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performances: Some Comparative Evidence’. 1993 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 25 151-162

  9. Alesina, A. ; Tabellini, G. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task. 2007 Am. Econ. Rev.. 97 169-179

  10. Backus, D. ; Driffill, J. Inflation and Reputation. 1985 Am. Econ. Rev.. 75 530-538

  11. Bade, R. ; Parkin, M. Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy, Department of Economics. 1985 University of Western Ontario: Mimeo
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  12. Bagheri, F.M. ; Habibi, N. Political Institutions and Central bank independence: A Cross-Country Analysis. 1998 Public Choice. 96 187-204

  13. Balls, E., Howat, J., Stansbury, A., 2016. Central Bank Independence Revisited: After the Financial Crisis, What should a Model Central Bank Look Like? Harvard Kennedy School, M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 67 (2016).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  14. Banaian, K. ; Luksetich, W.A. Central Bank Independence, Economic Freedom, and Inflation Rates. 2001 Econ. Inq.. 39 149-161

  15. Barro, R.T. inflationary Finance under Discretion and Rules. 1983 Can. J. Econ.. 16 1-16

  16. Barro, R.T. ; Gordon, D.B. Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. 1983 J. Monetary Econ.. 12 101-121

  17. Barthelemy, J., Plantin, G., 2018. Fiscal and Monetary Regimes: A Strategic Approach, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, n. 12903.

  18. Bassetto, M., Messer, T., 2013. Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper Series, n.4.

  19. Bayoumi, T., Dell'Ariccia G., Habermeier, K.F., Mancini Griffoli, T. Valencia, F., 2014. Monetary Policy in the New Normal, IMF Staff Discussion Notes, n.3.

  20. Beetsma, R. ; Jensen, H. Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences. 1998 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 30 384-403

  21. Beetsma, R.M.W. ; Jensen, H. Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences. 1998 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 30 384-403
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  22. Benigno, P. ; Nisticò, S. Non-Neutrality of Open Market Operations. 2020 Am. Econ. J.: Macroecon.. 12 175-226

  23. Bennani, H. Dissecting the Brains of Central Bankers: The Case of the ECB’s Governing Council Members on Reforms. 2015 Int. Econ.. 141 97-114

  24. Bennani, H. ; Farvaque, E. ; Stanek, P. Influence of Regional Cycles and Personal Background on FOMC Members’ Preferences and Disagreement. 2018 Econ. Model.. 68 416-424

  25. Berger, H. The Bundesbank’s Path to Independence: Evidence from the 1950s. 1997 Public Choice. 93 427-453

  26. Berger, H. ; Woitek, U. Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking. 2005 Econ. J.. 115 745-766

  27. Berger, W. ; Kissmer, F. Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability: A Tale of Perfect Harmony?. 2013 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 31 109-118

  28. Berggren, N. ; Daunfeldt, S.-O. ; Hellstrom, J. Social Trust and Central-Bank Independence. 2014 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 34 425-439

  29. Berlemann, M. ; Hielscher, K. Effective Monetary Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries. 2013 Scottish J. Polit. Econ.. 60 267-290

  30. Berlemann, M. ; Hielscher, K. Measuring Effective Monetary Conservatism of Central Banks: A Dynamic Approach. 2016 Ann. Econ. Finance. 17 105-132

  31. Bernanke, B. ; Gertler, M. Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission. 1995 J. Econ. Perspect.. 9 27-48

  32. Bernhard, W. A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence. 1998 Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.. 92 311-327

  33. Bertasiute, A., Massaro, D., Weber, M., 2018. The Behavioural Economics of Currency Unions: Economic Integration and Monetary Policy, Bank of Lithuania, Working Paper Series, n.49.

  34. Besley, T. ; Meads, N. ; Surico, P. Insiders versus outsiders in monetary policymaking. 2008 Am. Econ. Rev.. 218-223

  35. Bhattacharjee, A. ; Holly, S. Rational Partisan Theory, Uncertainty, and Spatial Voting: Evidence for the Bank of England's MPC. 2010 Econ. Politics. 22 151-179

  36. Bibow, J. Keynes on Central Banking and the Structure of Monetary Policy. 2002 History Polit. Econ.. 34 749-787

  37. Bibow, J. On the Origin and Rise of Central Bank Independence in West Germany. 2009 Eur. J. History Econ. Thought. 16 155-190

  38. Bibow, J. Reflections on the Current Fashion for Central Bank Independence. 2004 Camb. J. Econ.. 28 549-576

  39. Bibow, J., 2010. A Post Keynesian Perspective on the Rise of Central Bank Independence: A Dubious Success Story in Monetary Economics, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper Series, n.625.

  40. Blancheton, B. Central Bank Independence in a Historical Perspective. Myth. Lessons and a New Model. 2016 Econ. Model.. 52 101-107

  41. Blinder, A. ; Ehrmann, M. ; de Haan, J. ; Jansen, D. Necessity as the Mother of Invention: Monetary Policy After the Crisis. 2017 Econ. Policy. 32 707-755

  42. Blinder, A.S. How Central Should the Central Bank Be?. 2010 J. Econ. Literature. 48 123-133

  43. Blinder, A.S. Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?. 2007 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 23 106-123

  44. Blinder, A.S. ; Morgan, J. Are two heads better than one? Monetary policy by committee. 2005 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 789-811

  45. Blinder, A.S. ; Morgan, J. Do monetary policy committees need leaders? A report on an experiment. 2008 Am. Econ. Rev.. 224-229

  46. Bodea, C. Engendering the Governance of the Economy: When Are Women Elevated to Central Bank Boards?. 2018 Michigan State University: Mimeo
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  47. Bodea, C. Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions. 2010 Int. Organ.. 64 411-442

  48. Bodea, C. Fixed Exchange Rates, Independent Central Banks and Price Stability in Post-Communist Countries: Conservatism and Credibility. 2014 Econ. Politics. 26 185-211

  49. Bodea, C. ; Hicks, R. Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility and Democratic Institutions. 2015 Int. Organ.. 69 35-61

  50. Bordo, M.D, Istrefi, K., 2018. Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves and Swingers, NBER Working Paper Series, n. 24650.

  51. Brainard, W.C. Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy. 1967 Am. Econ. Rev.. 57 411-425
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  52. Brumm, H.J. Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Two-way Causality?. 2011 Econ. Lett.. 111 220-222

  53. Brumm, H.J. The Effect of Central Bank Independence on Inflation in Developing Countries. 2006 Econ. Lett.. 90 189-193

  54. Buiter, W.H. Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?. 2014 J. British Acad.. 2 269-303

  55. Burkovskaya, A. Political Economy Behind Central Bank Independence. 2019 J. Macroecon.. 61 103121-

  56. Calvo, G.A. On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy. 1978 Econometrica. 46 1411-1428

  57. Carpenter, S.B. ; Ihrig, J.E. ; Klee, E.C. ; Quinn, D.W. ; Boote, A.H. The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet and Earnings: a Primer and Projections. 2015 Int. J. Central Bank.. 11 237-283

  58. Castelnuovo, E. ; Surico, P. Model Uncertainty, Optimal Monetary Policy and the Preferences of the FED. 2004 Scottish J. Polit. Econ.. 51 105-126

  59. Castillo-Martinez, L., Reis, R., 2019. How Do Central Banks Control Inflation? A Guide for Perplexed, Mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  60. Catalano, M. ; Di Guilmi, C. Uncertainty, Rationality and Complexity in a Multi-Sectoral Dynamic Model: The Dynamic Stochastic Generalized Aggregation Approach. 2019 J. Econ. Behav. Organ.. 157 117-144

  61. Cecchetti, S.G. ; Lamfalussy, A. ; Caruana, J. ; Carney, M.J. ; Crockett, A. ; Papademos, L. ; Subbarao, D. The Future of Central Banking Under Post-Crisis Mandates. 2011 BIS Papers. -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  62. Cecchetti, S.G., 2013. Central Bank Independence–a Path Less Clear. In: Remarks prepared for the International Conference held to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the autonomy of the Bank of Mexico, Mexico City, vol. 14.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  63. Chappell, H.W. ; McGregor, R.R. A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior. 2000 South. Econ. J.. 906-922

  64. Chappell, H.W.M. ; Havrilesky, T. ; McGregor, R.R. Monetary Policy Preferences of Individual FOMC Members: A Content Analysis of the Memoranda of Discussion. 1997 Rev. Econ. Stat.. 79 454-460
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  65. Chappell, H.W.M. ; McGregor, R.R. Committee Decision-Making at Sweden’s Riksbank. 2017 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 53 120-133
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  66. Chappell, H.W.M. ; McGregor, R.R. Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment. 1993 Q. J. Econ.. 108 185-218

  67. Chortareas, G.E. ; Miller, S.M. Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises. In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?. 2003 Public Choice. 116 271-295

  68. Chortareas, G.E. ; Miller, S.M. Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency. 2004 Public Choice. 121 131-155

  69. Cihak, M., 2010. Price Stability, Financial Stability and Central Bank Independence. In: Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Central Banking after the Crisis, 38th Economic Conference, Vienna, pp. 44–55.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  70. Clarida, R. ; Gali, J. ; Gertler, M. The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. 1999 J. Econ. Literature. 37 1661-1707

  71. Consolo, A. ; Favero, C.A. Monetary Policy Inertia: More a Fiction than a Fact?. 2009 J. Monetary Econ.. 56 900-906

  72. Crowe, C. Goal Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate. 2008 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 24 748-762

  73. Cukierman, A. Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control. 1994 Econ. J.. 104 1437-1448

  74. Cukierman, A. Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions—Past, Present and Future. 2008 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 24 722-736

  75. Cukierman, A. Monetary Policy and Institutions Before, During, and After the Global Financial Crisis. 2013 J. Financial Stab.. 9 373-384

  76. Cukierman, A. ; Meltzer, A.H. A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation Under Discretion and Asymmetric Information. 1896 Econometrica. 54 1099-1128
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  77. Cukierman, A. ; Webb, S.B. ; Neyapti, B. Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and its Effects on Policy Outcomes. 1992 World Bank Econ. Rev.. 6 353-398

  78. Curdia, V. ; Woodford, M. The Central-Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of Monetary Policy. 2011 J. Monetary Econ.. 58 54-79

  79. Dal Bo, E. Committees with Super Majority Voting yield Commitment with Flexibility. 2006 J. Public Econ.. 90 573-599
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  80. Dalla Pellegrina, L. ; Masciandaro, D. ; Pansini, R.V. The Central Banker as Prudential Supervisor: Does Independence Matter?. 2013 J. Financial Stab.. 9 415-427

  81. Darabi, K.D. ; Samimi, A.J. Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Conservatism: Theory with an Application to Iran. 2016 J. Money Econ.. 11 15-30

  82. de Haan, J. ; Berger, H. ; van Fraassen, E. How to Reduce Inflation: An Independent Central Bank or a Currency Board? The Experience of the Baltic Countries. 2001 Emerg. Markets Rev.. 2 218-243

  83. de Haan, J. ; Eijffinger, S. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. 2016 DNP Working Papers. 399-410

  84. de Haan, J. ; Ejiffinger, S. Central Bank Independence under Threat?. 2017 CEPR Policy Insight. -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  85. de Haan, J. ; Knot, K. ; Sturm, J.H. On the Reduction of Disinflation Costs: Fixed Exchange Rates or Central Bank Independence?. 1993 PSL Quart. Rev.. 46 -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  86. de Haan, J. ; Van’t Hag, G. Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical evidence. 1995 Public Choice. 85 335-351

  87. Del Negro, M. ; Sims, C.A. When Does a Central Bank's Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?. 2015 J. Monetary Econ.. 73 1-19

  88. Dellas, H., Tavlas G.S., 2016. Friedman, Chicago and Monetary Rules, Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, Working Paper Series, n.8.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  89. Dellas, H., Tavlas G.S., 2021. On the Evolution of the Rules versus Discretion Debate, Hoover Institution, Economics Working Paper Series, n. 21105.

  90. Dennis, R. The Policy Preferences of the US Federal Reserve. 2006 J. Appl. Econ.. 21 55-77

  91. Di Bartolomeo, G. ; Di Pietro, M. ; Giannini, B. Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Heterogeneous Expectations. 2016 J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 73 373-387

  92. do Vale, A. Central Bank Independence, a not so New Idea in the History of Economic Thought: a Doctrine in the 1920s. 2021 Eur. J. History Econ. Thought. -

  93. Draghi, M., 2018, Central Bank Independence, Belgian Financial Forum, October, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  94. Drazen, A. Central Bank Independence, Democracy, and Dollarization. 2002 J. Appl. Econ.. 5 1-17

  95. Driffill J., Rotondi, Z., 2007. Inertia in Taylor Rules, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, n. 6570.

  96. Dupraz, S., Guilloux-Nefussi S., Penalver A., 2020. A Pitfall of Cautiouness in Monetary Policy, Banque de France, Working Paper Series, n.758.

  97. Dziuda, W., Pflueger C., 2020. A Model of Politics and the Central Bank, Mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  98. Eijffinger, S. ; Hoeberichts, M. The Trade- off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness in a New Keynesian Framework. 2008 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 24 742-747

  99. Eijffinger, S.C. ; Hoeberichts, M. The Trade Off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness. 1998 Oxford Econ. Papers. 50 397-411

  100. Eijffinger, S.C. ; Mahieu, R. ; Raes, L. Inferring Hawks and Doves from Voting Records. 2018 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 51 107-120

  101. Eijffinger, S.C., Mahieu, R., Raes, L., 2013b. Estimating the Preferences of Central Bankers: an Analysis of four Voting Records, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, n. 9602.

  102. EijffingeR, S.C., Mahieu, R., Raes, L., 2015. Hawks and Doves in the FOMC, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, n. 10442.

  103. Farvaque, E. Political Determinants of Central Bank independence. 2002 Econ. Lett.. 77 131-135

  104. Farvaque, E. ; Hammadou, H. ; Stanek, P. Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members. 2011 German Econ. Rev.. 12 223-238

  105. Farvaque, E. ; Stanek, P. ; Vigeant, S. On the Performance of Monetary Policy Committees. 2014 Kyklos. 67 177-203

  106. Farvaque, E., Hammadou, H., Stanek, P., 2006. Central Bank Committees’ Composition and Inflation Performances-Evidence from OECD and the Enlarged EU, Universite de Lille, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  107. Favaretto, F. ; Masciandaro, D. Doves, Hawks and Pigeons: Behavioral Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Inertia. 2016 J. Financial Stab.. 27 50-58

  108. Favero, C. ; Rovelli, R. Macroeconomic Stability and the Preferences of the FED: A Formal Analysis, 1961–1998. 2003 J. Money, Credit Banking. 33 545-556

  109. Firrell, A., Reinold, K., 2020. Uncertainty and Voting on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England, Staff Working Paper Series, n.898.

  110. Forch, T. ; Sunde, U. Central Bank Independence and Stock Market Returns in Emerging Economies. 2012 Econ. Lett.. 115 77-80

  111. Forder, J. Central Bank Independence – Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment. 1998 Oxford Econ. Papers. 50 307-334

  112. Forder, J. Why is CBI so Widely Approved?. 2005 J. Econ. Issues. 39 843-865
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  113. Franzese, R.J. Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation. 1999 Am. J. Polit. Sci.. 43 681-706
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  114. Friedman, M. Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority?. 1962 En : Yeager, L.B. Search of a Monetary Constitution. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  115. Friedman, M. The Role of Monetary Policy. 1968 Am. Econ. Rev.. 58 1-17
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  116. Fry, M. Assessing Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: Do Actions Speak Louder than Words. 1998 Oxford Econ. Papers. 50 512-529

  117. Fry, M. ; Julius, D. ; Mahadeva, L. ; Roger, S. ; Sterne, G. Key Issues in the Choice of Monetary Policy Framework. 2000 En : Mahadeva, L. ; Sterne, G. Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context. Routledge: London
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  118. Ftiti, Z. ; Aguir, A. ; Smida, M. Time-inconsistency and Expansionary Business Cycle Theories: What Does Matter for the Central Bank Independence-Inflation Relationship?. 2017 Econ. Model.. 67 215-227

  119. Gabaix, X. A Behavioral New Keynesian Model. 2020 Am. Econ. Rev.. 110 2271-2327

  120. Gali, J. ; Monacelli, T. Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy. 2005 Rev. Econ. Stud.. 72 707-734

  121. Garcia Herrero, A., Del Rio, P., 2003. Financial Stability and the Design of Monetary Policy, Banco de Espana, Working Paper Series, n.0315.

  122. Garriga, A.C. ; Rodriguez, C.M. More Effective than We Thought: Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Developing Countries. 2020 Econ. Model.. 85 87-105

  123. Gavin, M.A. Independent Central Banks and Banking Crisis Liquidity. 2018 Rev. Int. Organ.. 1-23
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  124. Gerlach-Kristen, P. Monetary Policy Committees and Interest Rate Setting. 2006 Eur. Econ. Rev.. 50 487-507

  125. Gerlach-Kristen, P. Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC. 2009 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 41 1099-1115

  126. Gillitzer, C. ; Prasad, N. ; Robinson, T. Political Attitude and Inflation Expectations: Evidence and Implications. 2021 J. Money, Credit Bank.. -

  127. Giordani, P., Spagnolo, G., 2001. Constitutions and Central Bank Independence: An Objection to McCallum’s Second Fallacy, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series, Stockholm School of Economics, n.426.

  128. Gohlmann, S. ; Vaubel, R. The Educational and Occupational Background of Central Bankers and its effect on Inflation: An Empirical analysis. 2007 Eur. Econ. Rev.. 51 925-941

  129. Goncharov, I., Ioannidou, V., Schmalz, M.C., 2020. (Why) Do Central Banks Care About Profits? , mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  130. Goodman, J.B. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. 1991 Comparative Polit.. 23 329-349
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  131. Goy, G. ; Hommes, C. ; Mayvromatis, K. Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility under Heterogeneous Beliefs. 2020 J. Econ. Behav. Organ.. -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  132. Grilli, V. ; Masciandaro, D. ; Tabellini, G. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. 1991 Econ. Policy. 13 341-392
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  133. Hall, R.E., Reis, R., 2015. Maintaining Central-bank Solvency under New-Style Central Banking, NBER Working Paper Series, n.21173.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  134. Hansen, S. ; McMahon, M. ; Velasco, R.C. Preferences or Private Assessments on a Monetary Policy Committee?. 2014 J. Monetary Econ.. 67 16-32

  135. Hansen, S., McMahon, M., 2008. Delayed doves: MPC voting behaviour of externals. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science.

  136. Harris, M.N. ; Levine, P. ; Spencer, C. A Decade of Dissent: Explaining the Dissent Voting Behavior of Bank of England MPC Members. 2011 Public Choice. 146 413-442

  137. Harris, M.N. ; Spencer, C. The Policy Choices and Reaction Functions of Bank of England MPC Members. 2009 South. Econ. J.. 482-499

  138. Hartweell, C.A. On the Impossibility of Central Bank Independence: Four Decades of Time – (and Intellectual) Inconsistency. 2018 Camb. J. Econ.. 43 61-84
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  139. Hasui, K. ; Kobayashi, T. ; Sugo, T. Optimal Irreversible Monetary Policy. 2021 Eur. Econ. Rev.. -

  140. Hayo, B. Inflation Culture, Central Bank Independence and Price Stability. 1998 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 14 241-263

  141. Hefeker, C. ; Zimmer, B. The Optimal Choice of Central Bank Independence and Conservatism under Uncertainty. 2011 J. Macroecon.. 33 595-606

  142. Henckel, T. ; Menzies, G.D. ; Prokhovnik, N. ; Zizzo, D.J. Barro-Gordon Revised: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations. 2011 Econ. Lett.. 112 144-147

  143. Henderson, D.W. ; McKibbin, W. A Comparison of Some Basis Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies: Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment and Wage Persistence. 1993 Carnegie – Rochester Series Public Policy. 39 221-317

  144. Herrendorf, B. ; Lockwood, B. Rogoff’s “Conservative” Central Banker Restored. 1997 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 29 476-495
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  145. Hielscher, K. ; Markwardt, G. The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence. 2012 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 28 286-301

  146. Hix, S. ; Høyland, B. ; Vivyan, N. From Doves to Hawks: A Spatial Analysis of Voting in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. 2010 Eur. J. Polit. Res.. 49 731-758
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  147. Howitt, P. What Central Bankers Learned from Modern Macroeconomic Theory?. 2012 J. Macroecon.. 34 11-22

  148. Hughes Hallet, A. ; Proske, L.D. Conservative Central Banks: How Conservative Should A Central Bank Be?. 2018 Scottish J. Polit. Econ.. 65 97-104

  149. Hughes Hallet, A. ; Weymark, D. Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design. 2005 German Econ. Rev.. 6 1-21

  150. Issing, O. Central Bank Independence – Will It Survive?. 2018 En : Eijffinger, S. ; Masciandaro, D. Hawks and Doves: Deeds and Words. CEPR Press: London
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  151. Istrefi, K., Rzhevskyy, A.N., Papell, D.H. Prodan, R., 2019. (Hawks versus Doves) versus (Rules versus Discretion), mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  152. Jordan, J.L. ; Luther, W.J. Central Bank Independence and the Federal Reserve’s New Operating Regime. 2021 Quart. Rev. Econ. Finance. -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  153. Jung, A. Policy Makers Interest Rates Preferences: Recent Evidence on for Three Monetary Policy Committees. 2013 Int. J. Central Bank.. 9 45-192
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  154. Jung, A., Kiss, G., 2012. Voting by Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the CEE Inflation Targeting Countries, MNB Working Paper Series, n. 2.

  155. Jung, A., Latsos, S., 2014. Do Federal Reserve Bank President Have a Regional Bias? ECB Working Paper Series, n. 1731.

  156. Keefer, P. ; Stasavage, D. The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. 2003 Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.. 97 407-423

  157. Keynes, J.M., 1971. The Treatise on Money 2: The Applied Theory of Money, Collected Writing of J.M. Keynes, vol. 6, Macmillan, London.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  158. Klomp, J., de Haan, J., 2009. Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability, 5, 321–338.

  159. Kwabi, F.O. ; Boateng, A. ; Du, M. Impact of Central Bank Independence and Transparency on International Equity Portfolio Allocation: A Cross-Country Analysis. 2020 Int. Rev. Financ. Anal.. 69 101464-

  160. Kydland, F.E. ; Prescott, E.C. Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. 1977 J. Polit. Econ.. 85 473-491

  161. Lahner, T. Inconsistent Voting Behaviour in the FOMC. 2018 Appl. Econ.. 50 1617-1643

  162. Le Eggertsson, G.B. ; Borgne, E. A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence. 2010 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 42 647-677

  163. Leijonhufvud, A. Life Among the Econ. 1973 Econ. Inquiry. 11 327-337

  164. Lengnick, M. ; Wohltmann, H.W. Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Animal Spirits and Financial Markets. 2016 J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 64 165-

  165. Levieuge, G. ; Lucotte, Y. A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks’ Conservatism. 2014 South. Econ. J.. 81 409-434

  166. Lohmann, S. Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility. 1992 Am. Econ. Rev.. 82 273-286

  167. Lohmann, S. Partisan Control of the Money Supply and Decentralized Appointment Powers. 1997 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 13 225-246

  168. Lossani, M. ; Natale, P. ; Tirelli, P. Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules rather than a Conservative Central Banker. 1998 Scottish J. Polit. Econ.. 45 33-47

  169. Lucas, R. Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique. 1976 Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Series Public Policy. 1 19-46

  170. Lucas, R.E. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. 1972 J. Econ. Theory. 4 103-124

  171. Lybek, T., Morris, J., 2004. Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management, IMF Working Paper Series, n.226.

  172. Malmendier, U. ; Nagel, S. ; Yan, Z. The Making of Hawks and Doves. 2021 J. Monetary Econ.. 117 19-42

  173. Martin, F.M. Debt, Inflation and Central Bank Independence. 2015 Eur. Econ. Rev.. 79 129-150

  174. Masciandaro, D. Divide et Impera: Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Fragmentation Effect. 2007 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 23 285-315

  175. Masciandaro, D. E Pluribus Unum? Authorities Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants. 2005 Open Econ. Rev.. 17 73-102
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  176. Masciandaro, D. Politicians and Financial Supervision outside the Central Bank: Why Do They Do it?. 2009 J. Financ. Stab.. 5 124-147

  177. Masciandaro, D. ; Romelli, D. Central Bankers as Supervisors: Do Crises Matter?. 2018 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 52 120-140

  178. Masciandaro, D. ; Romelli, D. Ups and Downs of Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory Institutions and Empirics. 2015 Financ. History Rev.. 22 259-289

  179. Masciandaro, D. ; Volpicella, A. Macro Prudential Governance and Central Banks: Facts and Drivers. 2016 J. Int. Money Finance. 61 101-119

  180. Masciandaro, D., Magurno, J., Tarsia, A., 2021. Central Bank Independence: Metrics and Empirics, Bocconi University, Baffi Carefin Research Paper Series, n.151.

  181. Masciandaro, D., Profeta, P., Romelli, D., 2018. Do Women Matter in Monetary Policymaking? Bocconi University, Baffi Carefin Research Paper Series, n. 88.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  182. Massaro, D. Heterogenous Expectations in Monetary DSGE Models. 2013 J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 37 680-692

  183. Maxfield, S. Gatekeepers of Growth. The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries. 1997 Princeton University Press: Princeton
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  184. McCallum, B.T. The Case for Rules in the Conduct of Monetary Policy: A Concrete Example. 1987 Rev. World Econ.. 123 415-429

  185. McCallum, B.T. Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence. 1995 Am. Econ. Rev.. 85 207-211

  186. Meade, E.E. ; Sheets, N. Regional Influences of FOMC Voting Patterns. 2005 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 37 661-677

  187. Melecki, M. ; Podpiera, A.M. Institutional Structures of Financial Sector Supervision, Their Drivers and Historical Benchmarks. 2013 J. Financ. Stab.. 9 428-444

  188. Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments. 1995 Econ. J.. 105 1381-1402

  189. Miller, G.P. An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence. 1998 J. Legal Stud.. 27 433-453

  190. Molnar, K. ; Santoro, S. Optimal Monetary Policy when Agents are Learning. 2014 Eur. Econ. Rev.. 66 39-62

  191. Moreira, R.R. ; Monte, E.Z. Reviewing Monetary Policy Inertia and its Effects: The Fractional Integration Approach for an Emerging Economy. 2020 Quart. Rev. Econ. Finance. 78 34-41

  192. Morimoto, K. Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism. 2018 Econ. Bull.. 38 1-11

  193. Moser, P. Checks and Balances, and the Supply of Central Bank Independence. 1999 Eur. Econ. Rev.. 43 1569-1593

  194. Muscatelli, A. Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?. 1998 Econ. J.. 108 529-542

  195. Muth, J. Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements. 1961 Econometrica. 29 315-335
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  196. Nakamura, E., Steinsson, J., 2019. Monetary Economics at the NBER, December, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  197. Nelson, E., 2007. Friedman and Taylor on Monetary Policy Rules, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 4, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  198. Neuenkirch, M., Neumeier, F., 2013. Party Affiliation Rather than Former Occupation: The Background of Central Bank Governors and its Effect on Monetary Policy, MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics, n.36.

  199. Nier, E., 2009. Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks; Lessons from the Crisis, IMF Staff Discussion Notes, n.9.

  200. Orphanides, A., 2003. Historical Monetary Analysis and the Taylor Rule, 50(5), 9839.

  201. Orphanides, A., 2015. Fear of Lift-off: Uncertainty, Rules, and Discretion in Monetary Policy Normalization, Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Third Quarter, 173–196.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  202. Orphanides, A., 2016. Fiscal Implications of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies, IMFS Working Paper Series, n.105, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt.

  203. Orphanides, A., 2018. The Boundaries of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Unconventional Times, Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Discussion Paper Series, n.10.

  204. Ozlale, U. Price Stability vs. Output Stability: Tales of Federal Reserve Administrations. 2003 J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 27 1595-1610

  205. Papadamou, S. ; Sidiropoulos, M. ; Spyromitros, E. Does Central Bank Independence Affect Stock Market Volatility?. 2017 Res. Int. Bus. Finance. 42 855-864

  206. Parkin, M., 2012. Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy Outcomes: A Three Decade Perspective, University of Western Ontario, December, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  207. Patra, M.D. ; Samantaraya, A. Monetary Policy Committee: What Works and Where. 2007 Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers. 28 2-
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  208. Persson, T. ; Tabellini, G. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability. 1993 Carnegie – Rochester Series Public Policy. 39 53-84

  209. Polillo, S. ; Guillén, M.F. Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence. 2005 Am. J. Sociol.. 110 1764-1802
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  210. Pollard, P., 2004. Monetary Policymaking Around the World, Presentation, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, February, 25.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  211. Pond, A. Biased Politicians and Independent Agencies. 2021 J. Theoret. Polit.. 1-21

  212. Posen, A. Declaration are not Enough: Financial Sectors Sources of Central Bank Independence. 1995 En : Bernanke, B. ; Rotemberg, J. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995. The MIT Press: Cambridge MA

  213. Proano, C.R. ; Lojak, B. Animal Spirits, Risk Premia and Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound. 2020 J. Econ. Behav. Organ.. 171 221-233

  214. Reinsberg, B. ; Kern, A. ; Rau-Gohring, M. The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality and Central Bank Independence. 2021 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 68 101987-

  215. Reis, R. Central Bank Design. 2013 J. Econ. Perspect.. 27 17-44

  216. Reis, R. Comment on: “When Does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?”, by M. Del Negro and C. A. Sims. 2015 J. Monetary Econ.. 73 20-25
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  217. Reis, R. Imperfect Macroeconomic Expectations: Yes, But, We Disagree. 2020 NBER Macroeconomic Annual. 35 -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  218. Riboni, A. ; Ruge-Murcia, F.J. Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?. 2010 Quart. J. Econ.. 125 363-416

  219. Rieder, K. Monetary Policy Decision-Making by Committee: Why, When and How it Can Work. 2021 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. -
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  220. Rivot, S., 2013. Rule-Based Frameworks in Historical Perspective: Keynes’ and Friedman’s Monetary Policies versus Contemporary Policy-Rules.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  221. Rogoff, K. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. 1985 Quart. J. Econ.. 100 1169-1189

  222. Romer, C.D. ; Romer, D.H. Institutions for Monetary Stability. 1997 En : Romer, C.D. ; Romer, D.H. Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, NBER. Chicago University Press: Chicago

  223. Sargent, T.J, Wallace, N., 1981. Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic, Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fall, 1–17.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  224. Schnellenbach, J. ; Schubert, C. Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey. 2015 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 40 395-417

  225. Sieg, G. A Model of Partisan Central Banks and Opportunistic Political Business Cycles. 1997 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 13 503-516

  226. Siklos, P. ; Neuenkirch, M. How Monetary Policy is Made: Two Canadian Tales. 2015 Int. J. Central Bank.. January 225-250

  227. Sims C.A., 2003. Fiscal Aspects of Central Bank Independence, http://sims.princeton.edu/ytfp/Munich/CBInd.pdf.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  228. Sims C.A., 2005, Limits to Inflation Targeting. In Bernanke, B.S., Woodford, M. (Eds.), The Inflation-Targeting Debate, Chapter 7, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 283–310.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  229. Sims, C.A., 2016. Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence, Economic Policy Symposium Proceedings, Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  230. Smales, L.A. ; Apergis, N. The Influence of FOMC Member Characteristics on the Monetary Policy Decision-Making Process. 2016 J. Bank. Finance. 64 216-231

  231. Sorge, M. Robust Delegation with Uncertain Monetary Policy Preferences. 2012 Econ. Model.. 30 73-78

  232. Stiglitz, J.E., 2013. A Revolution in Monetary Policy: Lessons in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis. In: The 15th C.D. Deshmukh Memorial Lecture, Mumbai, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  233. Strong, C.O. Political Influence, Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Africa: A Comparative Analysis. 2021 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. -

  234. Svensson, L.E.O. Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts. 1995 Am. Econ. Rev.. 87 98-114

  235. Tabellini, G. Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium. 1988 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 20 102-118

  236. Tavlas, G.S., 2019. A Reconsideration of the Doctrinal Foundations of Monetary Policy Rules: Fisher versus Chicago, Bank of Greece, Working Paper Series, November.

  237. Taylor, J.B. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. 1993 Carnegie – Rochester Series Public Policy. 39 195-214

  238. Taylor, J.B. The Cycle of Rules and Discretion in Economic Polic. 2011 National Affairs, Spring:
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  239. Taylor, J.B. The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence vs Policy Rules. 2013 Bus. Econ.. 48 155-162

  240. Tillman, P. Robust Monetary Policy, Optimal Delegation and Mis-specified Potential Output. 2014 Econ. Lette.. 123 244-247
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  241. Tillman, P. The Central Banker Revised: Too Conservative is More Costly than too Liberal. 2008 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 28 737-741
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  242. Ueda, K. ; Valencia, F. Central bank Independence and Macro-prudential Regulation. 2014 Econ. Lett.. 125 327-330

  243. Vaubel, R. The Bureaucratic and Partisan Behavior of Independent Central Banks: German and International Evidence. 1997 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 13 201-224

  244. Vaubel, R. The Bureaucratic and Partisan Behaviour of Independent Central Banks: German and International Evidence. 1997 Eur. J. Polit. Econ.. 13 823-827
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  245. Vickers, J. Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information. 1986 Oxford Econ. Papers. 38 443-455

  246. Vuletin, G. ; Zhu, L. Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and its effect on Inflation. 2011 J. Money, Credit Bank.. 43 1185-1215

  247. Wachtel, P., Blejer, M.I., 2019. A Fresh Look at Central Bank Independence: Origins and Prospects, September, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  248. Walsh, C.E. Monetary Policy Design: Institutional Development from a Contractual Perspective. 2000 Int. Finance. 3 375-389

  249. Walsh, C.E. Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers. 1995 Am. Econ. Rev.. 85 150-176

  250. White, W.R., 2013. Is Monetary Policy a Science? The Interaction of Theory and Practice Over the Last 50 Years, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, Working Paper Series, n. 155.

  251. Wilson, L., 2014. A Dove to Hawk Ranking of the Martin to Yellen Federal Reserves, Department of Finance, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  252. Woodford, M. Interest and Prices. 2003 Princeton University Press: Princeton
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  253. Woodford, M. Optimal Interest Rate Smoothing. 2003 Rev. Econ. Stud.. 70 861-886

  254. Woodford, M., 1999. Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia, NBER Working Paper Series, n.7261.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020). (2021). .
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20153.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. TRUMP, TWITTER, AND TREASURIES. (2020). Tillmann, Peter.
    In: Contemporary Economic Policy.
    RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:38:y:2020:i:3:p:403-408.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. ECB HELICOPTER MONEY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ECONOMY ARITHMETICS. (2020). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20138.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. COVID-19 HELICOPTER MONEY, MONETARY POLICY AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. (2020). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20137.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Electoral cycles in macroprudential regulation. (2019). Müller, Karsten ; Muller, Karsten.
    In: ESRB Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:srk:srkwps:2019106.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Did the fed raise interest rates before elections?. (2019). Dentler, Alexander.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:181:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00653-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke. (2019). Smith, Daniel ; Salter, Alexander.
    In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:71:y:2019:i:c:p:1-13.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Should the Fed Be Constrained?. (2019). Frankel, Jeffrey.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp19-003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. In Fed Watchers Eyes: Hawks, Doves and Monetary Policy. (2019). Istrefi, Klodiana.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:bfr:banfra:725.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix and Agents Beliefs. (2017). Ilut, Cosmin ; Bianchi, Francesco.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:16-166.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. The political economy of wage and price controls: evidence from the Nixon tapes. (2017). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:170:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0381-0.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016. (2017). Kane, Timothy.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:hoo:wpaper:17101.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion. (2016). Mertens, Elmar.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:48:y:2016:i:4:p:661-698.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus. (2016). Dubois, Eric.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:166:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0313-z.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus. (2016). Dubois, Eric.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01291401.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus. (2016). Dubois, Eric.
    In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
    RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01291401.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. The political economy of wage and price controls: evidence from the Nixon tapes. (2016). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:dlw:wpaper:16-08.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Digging into the Pocketbook: Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey. (2016). Persson, Mikael ; Snowberg, Erik ; Healy, Andrew J.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6171.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Fixed versus Flexible Election Cycles: Explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s Election Cycle. (2016). Ferris, J. Stephen.
    In: Carleton Economic Papers.
    RePEc:car:carecp:12-04.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Presidents and the US Economy: An Econometric Exploration. (2016). Watson, Mark ; Blinder, Alan.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:4:p:1015-45.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Debt, inflation and central bank independence. (2015). Martin, Fernando.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:79:y:2015:i:c:p:129-150.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Presidents and the U.S. Economy: An Econometric Exploration. (2014). Watson, Mark ; Blinder, Alan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:cepsud:241.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Presidents and the U.S. Economy: An Econometric Exploration. (2014). Watson, Mark ; Blinder, Alan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20324.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix and Agents Beliefs. (2014). Ilut, Cosmin ; Bianchi, Francesco.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20194.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Operation Twist-the-Truth: How the Federal Reserve Misrepresents Its History and Performance. (2014). Selgin, George.
    In: Cato Journal.
    RePEc:cto:journl:v:34:y:2014:i:2:p:229-263.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. The Supply-Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2013). Rudd, Jeremy B. ; Blinder, Alan S..
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:9160.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Debt, inflation and central bank independence. (2013). Martin, Fernando.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2013-017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix and Agents Beliefs. (2013). Ilut, Cosmin ; Bianchi, Francesco.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9645.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. The Political Business Cycle: New Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. (2012). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:44:y:2012:i:2-3:p:385-399.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Debt, Inflation and Central Bank Independence. (2012). Martin, Fernando.
    In: 2012 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed012:1019.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth?. (2011). Voia, Marcel ; Ferris, J. Stephen.
    In: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique.
    RePEc:wly:canjec:v:44:y:2011:i:1:p:107-132.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. How does the FOMC learn about economic revolutions? evidence from the New Economy Era, 1994-2001. (2011). Kliesen, Kevin ; Anderson, Richard.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-041.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. The Political Business Cycle: New Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. (2011). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:dlw:wpaper:11-05..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Do Departures from Democratic Accountability Compromise the Stability of Public Finances? Keynesianism, Central Banking, and Minority Governments in the Canadian System of Party Government, 1867 – 200. (2011). Winer, Stanley ; Ferris, J. Stephen ; Grofman, Bernard.
    In: Carleton Economic Papers.
    RePEc:car:carecp:11-09.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Discreet Commitments and Discretion of Policymakers with Private Information. (2010). Mertens, Elmar.
    In: 2010 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed010:763.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Audit the Federal Reserve?. (2010). Barnett, William.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:20261.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Reading the Recent Monetary History of the U.S., 1959-2007. (2010). Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F ; Guerron, Pablo ; Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus ; Guerron-Quintana, Pablo A..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15929.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Falling Behind the Curve: A Positive Analysis of Stop-Start Monetary Policies and the Great Inflation. (2010). Taylor, John ; Levin, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15630.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Central Banking in the Twentieth Century. (2010). Singleton, John.
    In: Cambridge Books.
    RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521899093.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Reading the Recent Monetary History of the U.S., 1959-2007. (2010). Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F ; Guerron, Pablo ; Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus ; Guerron-Quintana, Pablo A..
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7812.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL. (2010). Milani, Fabio.
    In: Economic Inquiry.
    RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:48:y:2010:i:4:p:896-915.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion?. (2008). Mertens, Elmar.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:szg:worpap:0802.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. The Supply Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2008). Rudd, Jeremy B ; Blinder, Alan S.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:cepsud:176blinder.pdf.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. The Supply Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2008). Blinder, Alan ; Rudd, Jeremy B.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:cepsud:176.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. The Supply-Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2008). Blinder, Alan ; Rudd, Jeremy B..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14563.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Electoral politics and monetary policy: does the Bank of Canada contribute to a political business cycle?. (2008). Ferris, J. Stephen.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:135:y:2008:i:3:p:449-468.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. A rejoinder to “A commentary on ‘Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?’ ”. (2008). Abrams, Burton.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:134:y:2008:i:3:p:489-490.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. A commentary on “Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?”. (2007). Tempelman, Jerry.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:433-436.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Political Business Cycles in the New Keynesian Model. (2007). Milani, Fabio.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:irv:wpaper:070805.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. The Political Economy of Wage and Price Controls: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. (2007). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:dlw:wpaper:07-10..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-09-22 06:25:28 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Last updated August, 3 2024. Contact: Jose Manuel Barrueco.