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2. Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence. (2023). Turner, Ian R ; Schnakenberg, Keith.
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3. Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence. (2023). Schnakenberg, Keith ; Turner, Ian R.
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4. Who is the ultimate boss of legislators: Voters, special interest groups or parties?. (2020). Stadelmann, David ; Torrens, Gustavo.
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5. Persuading policy-makers. (2019). Salas, Christian.
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6. Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning. (2017). Visser, Bauke ; Karamychev, Vladimir.
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7. Access fees for competing lobbies. (2014). Gregor, Martin.
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8. Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs. (2014). Miyamoto, Takuro.
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9. Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda. (2013). levy, gilat ; Razin, Ronny.
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10. Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process. (2011). Trebbi, Francesco ; Bombardini, Matilde ; Bertrand, Marianne.
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11. A Game-Theoretic Explanation on Legislative Inefficiency in Korea. (2011). Lee, Yong-Ju.
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12. Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature. (2011). Gregor, Martin.
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13. Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics. (2010). Ray, Debraj.
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14. Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics. (2010). Ray, Debraj.
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15. False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate. (2009). Ressler, Rand ; Mixon, Franklin ; Gibson, M..
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16. Informational lobbying and political contributions. (2006). Feldmann, Sven ; Bennedsen, Morten.
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17. Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation. (2006). Ray, Debraj ; Esteban, Joan.
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1. Activism, Costly Participation, and Polarization. (2017). Venkatesh, Raghul.
   In: CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series.
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2. Clueless Politicians. (2016). Li, Cheng ; Cotton, Christopher.
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3. Corporate Political Donations: Influences from Directors’ Networks. (2016). Shailer, Greg ; Lu, YI ; Wilson, Mark.
   In: Journal of Business Ethics.
   RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:135:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-014-2458-3.

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4. Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests. (2016). Groll, Thomas ; Ellis, Christopher J.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5809.

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5. Informational Lobbying And Agenda Distortion. (2015). Dellis, Arnaud ; Cotton, Christopher.
   In: Working Paper.
   RePEc:qed:wpaper:1348.

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6. Competing for Attention. (2015). Cotton, Christopher.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:65715.

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7. Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures. (2015). Lake, James.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:86-101.

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8. Campaigns, political mobility, and communication. (2014). Gersbach, Hans.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:31-49.

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9. Receivers access fee for a single sender. (2014). Gregor, Martin.
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10. Term limits and the tobacco industry. (2014). Glantz, Stanton A. ; Bero, Lisa A. ; Apollonio, Dorie E..
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    RePEc:eee:socmed:v:104:y:2014:i:c:p:1-5.

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11. Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs. (2014). Miyamoto, Takuro.
    In: Resource and Energy Economics.
    RePEc:eee:resene:v:38:y:2014:i:c:p:141-167.

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12. Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness. (2014). Kundu, Tapas ; Bhattacharya, Sourav.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:109:y:2014:i:c:p:124-142.

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13. Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment. (2013). Kim, Jin-Hyuk.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:14:y:2013:i:2:p:107-126.

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14. Expertise-based lobbying and accounting regulation. (2013). Königsgruber, Roland ; Konigsgruber, Roland.
    In: Journal of Management & Governance.
    RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:17:y:2013:i:4:p:1009-1025.

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15. On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas. (2013). Robert-Nicoud, Frederic ; Hilber, Christian ; Hilber, Christian A. L., .
    In: Journal of Urban Economics.
    RePEc:eee:juecon:v:75:y:2013:i:c:p:29-43.

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16. Dynamic Commercial Lobbying. (2013). Groll, Thomas ; Ellis, Christopher J..
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17. A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry. (2013). Groll, Thomas ; Ellis, Christopher J..
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18. Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access. (2012). Mayer, Wolfgang ; Mujumdar, Sudesh .
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19. Campaign Contributions over CEOs’ Careers. (2012). Schaufele, Brandon ; Richter, Brian Kelleher ; Fremeth, Adam R..
    In: Working Papers.
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20. When the squeakiest wheel gets the most oil: Exploiting ones nuisance power. (2012). van Ypersele, Tanguy ; Laussel, Didier.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1593-1606.

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21. On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas. (2012). Robert-Nicoud, Frederic ; Hilber, Christian ; Hilber, Christian A. L., .
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22. A property rights approach to legislative delegation. (2011). Grajzl, Peter.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:2:p:177-200.

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23. Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy. (2011). Ponzetto, Giacomo.
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24. Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress. (2011). Trebbi, Francesco ; Bombardini, Matilde.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:587-611.

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25. Lobbying of Firms by Voters. (2009). Glazer, Amihai ; Dur, Robert ; Dahm, Matthias.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
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26. On the origins of land use regulations: theory and evidence from US metro areas. (2009). Robert-Nicoud, Frederic ; Hilber, Christian ; Christian A. L. Hilber, .
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
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27. On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas. (2009). Robert-Nicoud, Frederic ; Hilber, Christian ; Hilber, Christian A. L., .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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28. Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication. (2009). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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29. On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas. (2009). Robert-Nicoud, Frederic ; Hilber, Christian ; Christian A. L. Hilber, .
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
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30. Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access. (2008). Cotton, Christopher.
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31. The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting. (2008). Ramanna, Karthik .
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32. A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations. (2007). Lagerlof, Johan.
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33. Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress.. (2007). Trebbi, Francesco ; Bombardini, Matilde.
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34. Should We Really Expect More from Our Friends?. (2007). van Ypersele, Tanguy ; Laussel, Didier.
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35. Predicting Committee Action. (2006). Glazer, Amihai.
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36. How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset. (2006). Glazer, Amihai ; Bucovetsky, Sam.
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37. Informational lobbying and political contributions. (2006). Feldmann, Sven ; Bennedsen, Morten.
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38. A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations. (2006). Lagerlof, Johan.
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39. Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation. (2004). Lagerlof, Johan ; Frisell, Lars .
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40. Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation. (2004). Lagerlof, Johan ; Frisell, Lars .
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41. Explaining Corruption: A Common Agency Approach. (2004). Maier, Norbert.
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42. Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation. (2004). Lagerlof, Johan ; Frisell, Lars .
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43. Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation. (2002). Reuben, Ernesto.
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44. Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence. (2002). Austen-Smith, David.
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45. Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign.. (2001). Lambertini, Luca.
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46. Show Them Your Teeth First!. (2000). van Winden, Frans ; Sloof, Randolph.
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47. LOBBYING LEGISLATURES. (2000). Feldmann, Sven ; Bennedsen, Morten.
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48. Caps on Political Lobbying. (1998). Gale, Ian ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
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49. Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills. (1998). Baldwin, Robert E. ; Magee, Christopher S..
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50. Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare. (1997). Prat, Andrea.
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