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1. Bilateral trade and conflict heterogeneity: The impact of conflict on trade revisited. (2022). Kamin, Katrin.
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2. Law Enforcement, Municipal Budgets and Spillover Effects: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy. (2016). Galletta, Sergio.
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3. On corruption, bribes and the exchange of favors. (2014). Rodrigues-Neto, José.
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4. Conjugate coupling in ecosystems: Cross-predation stabilizes food webs. (2014). Feudel, Ulrike ; Ramaswamy, Ram ; Karnatak, Rajat.
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5. Job spells, employer spells, and wage returns to tenure. (2013). Roberts, J ; Hart, Robert ; Devereux, Paul.
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6. Capture, Politics and Antitrust Effectiveness. (2013). Piga, Gustavo ; Ciciretti, Rocco ; Meraglia, Simone.
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7. Violence, access, and competition in the market for protection. (2013). Wilson, Bart ; Rogers, Douglas B. ; Smith, Adam C..
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8. Resource scarcity, effort allocation and environmental security: An agent-based theoretical approach. (2013). Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz ; Parris, Brett W..
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9. Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset. (2013). Le, Van Ha ; Dietzenbacher, Erik ; de Haan, Jakob.
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10. Corruption in Developing Countries. (2011). Pande, Rohini ; Olken, Benjamin.
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11. Governance and Asymmetric Power. (2011). Ertrk, Korkut Alp.
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12. Incomplete antitrust laws and private actions for damages. (2010). .
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13. Legal Standards, Enforcement and Corruption. (2009). Pagano, Marco ; immordino, giovanni.
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14. Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?. (2009). Polo, Michele ; Pagano, Marco ; immordino, giovanni.
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15. Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm:Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?. (2009). Polo, Michele ; Pagano, Marco ; immordino, giovanni.
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16. Long-Run Forecasting of Emerging Technologies with Logistic Models and Growth of Knowledge. (2009). de Guio, Roland ; Schenk, Eric ; Kucharavy, Dmitry.
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17. Principles of Conflict Economics. (2009). Carter, John R ; Anderton, Charles H.
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18. Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?. (2009). Polo, Michele ; Pagano, Marco ; immordino, giovanni.
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19. Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties Without Commitment. (2009). Ghosh, Parikshit.
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20. Sex, Money and Corruption. (2009). Rodrigues-Neto, José.
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21. Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. (2008). Valletti, Tommaso ; Prat, Andrea ; bandiera, oriana.
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22. Posner, Economics and the Law: from Law and Economics to an Economic Analysis of Law.. (2008). Marciano, Alain ; Harnay, Sophie.
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23. Vulnerable trade: The dark side of an Edgeworth box. (2008). Anderton, Charles ; Carter, John R..
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24. Legal Standards, Enforcement and Corruption. (2008). Pagano, Marco ; immordino, giovanni.
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25. Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. (2008). Valletti, Tommaso ; Prat, Andrea ; bandiera, oriana.
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26. Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment. (2008). Boly, Amadou ; Armantier, Olivier.
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27. The Evolution of Criminal Law and Police. (2007). Allen, Douglas ; Barzel, Yoram.
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28. Growth, Public Investment and Corruption with Failing Institutions. (2007). de la Croix, David ; Delavallade, Clara.
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29. Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. (2007). Valletti, Tommaso ; Prat, Andrea ; bandiera, oriana.
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30. Wages and Sanctions against Hierarchical Corruption. (2007). KANSO, Fadi .
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31. Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies. (2007). Priks, Mikael.
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32. Finance and economic development : policy choices for developing countries. (2006). Demirguc-Kunt, Asli.
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33. Political economy of anti-corruption reform in two-candidate elections. (2006). Evrenk, Haldun.
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34. Corruption and Reform: Introduction. (2006). Glaeser, Edward L. ; Goldin, Claudia.
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35. Norm Flexibility and Private Initiative. (2006). Polo, Michele ; Pagano, Marco ; immordino, giovanni.
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36. Bribes, Lobbying and Development. (2006). Svensson, Jakob ; Harstad, Bard.
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37. Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments. (2005). Ortmann, Andreas ; Lizal, Lubomir ; Dusek, Libor ; Duek, Libor.
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38. Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation. (2005). .
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39. A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?. (2004). Caruso, Raul.
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40. Vulnerable Trade: The Dark Side of an Edgeworth Box. (2004). Anderton, Charles ; Carter, John.
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41. Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to Lean Organizations. (2003). Kirstein, Roland.
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42. Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World. (2001). Honohan, Patrick ; Caprio, Gerard.
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43. Legal Origins. (2001). Shleifer, Andrei ; Glaeser, Edward L..
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45. Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement. (1999). Shavell, Steven ; Polinsky, A. Mitchell.
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52. Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority. (1990). topel, robert.
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53. Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?. (1989). Abowd, John.
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54. The Case for Eliminating Mandatory Retirement: Why Economics and Human Rights Need not Conflict. (1988). Krashinsky, Michael .
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55. Why Was there Mandatory Retirement? or the Impossibility of Efficient Bonding Contracts. (1987). Lang, Kevin.
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56. Do Deferred Wages Dominate Involuntary Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device?. (1986). Katz, Lawrence ; Akerlof, George.
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57. Incentive Contracts. (1986). .
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58. Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation. (1986). Katz, Lawrence.
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59. Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement. (1986). Polinsky, A. Mitchell.
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60. A Theory of Wage Dynamics. (1981). Holmstrom, Bengt ; Harris, Milton.
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