1. A mixed duopoly input market: uniform pricing versus spatial price discrimination. (2025). Heywood, John ; Ye, Guangliang ; Wang, Zerong.
   In: Journal of Economics.
   RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:144:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-024-00883-w.

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2. The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:117742.

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3. The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:157:y:2023:i:c:s001429212300140x.

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4. How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts. (2022). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:112839.

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5. How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts. (2022). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: The Economic Journal.
   RePEc:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:647:p:2563-2577..

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6. Who Should Own the Past?. (2022). Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija ; Halonen-Aktawijuka, Maija ; Parfilis, Evanjelos.
   In: Bristol Economics Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:bri:uobdis:22/758.

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1. The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:117742.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:157:y:2023:i:c:s001429212300140x.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information. (2021). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:107609.

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4. Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information. (2021). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: Journal of Public Economics.
   RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0047272721000608.

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5. Applied Economic Analysis of Information and Risk. (2020). .
   In: Springer Books.
   RePEc:spr:sprbok:978-981-15-3300-6.

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6. Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. (2020). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:97912.

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7. Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation. (2020). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:177:y:2020:i:c:p:514-532.

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8. Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. (2020). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519302393.

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9. Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. (2019). Schmitz, Patrick.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13841.

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10. Do Multinationals Transplant Their Business Model?. (2019). Verdier, Thierry ; Rousová, Linda ; Marin, Dalia ; Rousova, Linda.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7911.

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11. Opportunism and hold-up in the incomplete public private partnership (PPP) contracts. (2018). Kumar, Chandan.
    In: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers.
    RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2018-012.

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12. Opportunism and Hold-up in the Incomplete Public Private Partnership (PPP) Contracts. (2018). Kumar, Chandan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:12687.

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13. Trade in tasks and the organization of firms. (2018). Tarasov, Alexander ; Schymik, Jan ; Marin, Dalia.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:99-132.

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14. Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence. (2018). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13204.

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15. The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory. (2017). Schmidt, Klaus.
    In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:rco:dpaper:19.

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16. Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:91460.

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17. Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:90801.

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18. Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:144:y:2017:i:c:p:153-165.

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19. The management of innovation: Experimental evidence. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:706-725.

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20. Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12258.

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21. Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. (2017). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12174.

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22. The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:91458.

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23. The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:33-37.

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24. The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11276.

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25. The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick ; Kusterer, David.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11215.

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