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Central bank independence and the Federal Reserves new operating regime. (2022). Luther, William ; Jordan, Jerry L.
In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:84:y:2022:i:c:p:510-515.

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  1. Should the Federal Reserve raise its inflation target?. (2025). White, Lawrence H.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:91:y:2025:i:4:p:1372-1390.

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  2. Symposium introduction: Reviewing the Federal Reserves framework. (2025). Luther, William J ; Cutsinger, Bryan P.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:91:y:2025:i:4:p:1213-1228.

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  3. Seigniorage payments and the Federal Reserve’s new operating regime. (2022). Luther, William ; Cutsinger, Bryan P.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:220:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003548.

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  2. TRUMP, TWITTER, AND TREASURIES. (2020). Tillmann, Peter.
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