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Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make? - commentary. (2002). Walsh, Carl.
In: Review.
RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2002:i:jul:p:37-46:n:v.84no.4.

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  1. The Central Bank Inflation Bias in the Presence of Asymmetric Preferences and Non-Normal Shocks. (2009). Peel, David ; Christodoulakis, George .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08e50023.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Blinder, Alan S. Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.

  2. Christiano, Lawrence J.; Eichenbaum, Martin and Evans, Charles. Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Working Paper 8403, National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2001.

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  4. Cukierman, Alex. Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem. Unpublished manuscript, The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, 2000.

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  8. Fischer, Stanley. Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule. Journal of Political Economy, February 1977, 85(1), pp. 191-206.

  9. Friedman, Milton. The Role of Monetary Policy. American Economic Review, March 1968, 58(1), pp. 1-17.
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  10. Galí, Jordi and Gertler, Mark. Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, October 1999, 44(2), pp. 195-222.

  11. Geraats, Petra. Central Bank Transparency. Economic Journal, 2002 (forthcoming).

  12. Gerlach, Stefan. Asymmetric Policy Reactions and Inflation. BIS, April 2000.
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  13. Jensen, Henrik. Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking. University of Copenhagen, December 2000.

  14. Lucas, Robert E. Jr. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Economic Theory, April 1972, 4(2), pp. 103-24.

  15. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J. Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences. Université de Montréal, June 2001.

  16. Svensson, Lars E.O. How Should Monetary Policy Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability, in New Challenges for Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1999, pp. 195-259.

  17. Targeting. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2002 (forthcoming).
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  18. Walsh REVIEW McCallum, Bennett T. Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence. American Economic Review, May 1995, 85(2), pp. 207-11.

  19. Walsh, Carl E. Market Discipline and Monetary Policy. Oxford Economic Papers, April 2000, 52(2), pp. 249-71.

Cocites

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