1. The Mystique of Central Bank Speak. (2006). Geraats, Petra.
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2. Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections. (2006). Williams, John ; Rudebusch, Glenn.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
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3. Revealing the secrets of the temple: the value of publishing central bank interest rate projections. (2006). Williams, John ; Rudebusch, Glenn.
   In: Working Paper Series.
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4. Central bank transparency under model uncertainty. (2005). Eusepi, Stefano.
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5. Communication, transparency, accountability: monetary policy in the twenty-first century. (2005). Issing, Otmar.
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6. Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union. (2005). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
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7. Monetary Policy Uncertainty and the Stock Market. (2005). Locarno, Alberto ; Massa, Massimo.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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8. Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice. (2005). Geraats, Petra.
   In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
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9. The Mystique of Central Bank Speak. (2005). Geraats, Petra.
   In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
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10. Does Central Bank Transparency Matter for Economic Stability. (2004). Eusepi, Stefano.
    In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2004.
    RePEc:sce:scecf4:176.

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11. Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?. (2004). Carpenter, Seth B..
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2004-35.

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12. Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve. (2004). Meade, Ellen ; Stasavage, David.
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0608.

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13. Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts. (2004). Geraats, Petra.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0473.

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14. COMUNICAÇÃO EM POLÍTICA MONETÁRIA. (2004). Pereira, Robson Rodrigues.
    In: Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting].
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15. Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting. (2003). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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16. Interests and Independence: The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy. (2002). Forder, James.
    In: International Review of Applied Economics.
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17. How Transparent are Central Banks?. (2002). Geraats, Petra ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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18. Transparency in the practice of monetary policy. (2001). J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., .
    In: Economic Quarterly.
    RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2001:i:sum:p:1-9.

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19. On the optimality of transparent monetary policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: Working Papers.
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20. Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts. (2001). Sterne, Gabriel ; Stasavage, David ; Chortareas, Georgios.
    In: Bank of England working papers.
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21. Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts. (2000). Geraats, Petra.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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22. Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve. (2000). Haldane, Andrew ; Read, Vicky .
    In: Bank of England working papers.
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23. Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?. (2000). Blinder, Alan.
    In: American Economic Review.
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24. Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?. (1999). Blinder, Alan.
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25. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. (1999). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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26. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. (1999). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: Seminar Papers.
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27. The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy. (1999). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: International Finance Discussion Papers.
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28. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. (1999). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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29. Inflation Targeting, Transparency and Interest Rate Volatility: Ditching Monetary Mystique in the UK. (1999). Nolan, Charles ; Chadha, Jagjit.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
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30. Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy: Impact on Financial Markets. (1999). Muller, P. ; M. Zelmer, .
    In: Technical Reports.
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31. Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals. (1998). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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32. Lifting the veil of secrecy from monetary policy: evidence from the Feds early discount rate policy. (1998). Thornton, Daniel.
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33. Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals. (1998). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
    In: International Finance Discussion Papers.
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34. Vagueness, credibility, and government policy. (1995). Haubrich, Joseph.
    In: Economic Review.
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35. When and how much to talk: credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information. (1990). Garfinkel, Michelle ; Oh, Seonghwan.
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36. When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information. (1990). Garfinkel, Michelle ; Oh, Seonghwan.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclawp:593.

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6. Brunner, Karl. The Art of Central Banking. Center for Research in Government Policy and Business, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester, Working Paper No. GPB 81-6, June 1981.
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10. Cornell, Bradford. The Money Supply Announcements Puzzle: Review and Interpretation. American Economic Review 73, (September 1983), pp. 644-57.

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15. Goodfriend, Marvin. A Model of Money Stock Determinationwith Loan Demand and a Banking System Balance Sheet Constraint. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review, (January/February 1982), pp. 3-16.

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1. Political Connections and Corporate Borrowing: an Analysis on the Listed Real Estate Firms in China. (2018). Yang, Zan ; Fan, Ying ; Shi, Song ; Liao, Jing.
   In: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:57:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11146-017-9629-9.

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2. GENDER AND CENTRAL BANKING. (2017). Pépin, Dominique ; Diouf, Ibrahima.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01224266.

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3. Gender and central banking. (2017). Pépin, Dominique ; Diouf, Ibrahima ; Pepin, Dominique.
   In: Economic Modelling.
   RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:61:y:2017:i:c:p:193-206.

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4. GENDER AND CENTRAL BANKING. (2016). Diouf, Ibrahima ; Pepin, Dominique.
   In: Working Papers.
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5. Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? A Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935-75. (2015). Ryan-Collins, Josh.
   In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
   RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_848.

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6. Inflation-Forecast Targeting: Applying the Principle of Transparency. (2015). Laxton, Douglas ; Juillard, Michel ; Freedman, Charles ; Kamenik, Ondrej ; Clinton, Kevin ; Wang, Hou.
   In: IMF Working Papers.
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7. Policy-making of the European Central Bank during the crisis: Do personalities matter?. (2014). Basham, James ; Roland, Aanor.
   In: IPE Working Papers.
   RePEc:zbw:ipewps:382014.

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8. Central Bank Communications Before, During and After the Crisis: From Open-Market Operations to Open-Mouth Policy. (2013). Vayid, Ianthi .
   In: Staff Working Papers.
   RePEc:bca:bocawp:13-41.

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9. Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009. (2012). Winer, Stanley ; Ferris, J. Stephen ; Grofman, Bernard.
   In: Constitutional Political Economy.
   RePEc:kap:copoec:v:23:y:2012:i:3:p:213-243.

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10. Do Departures from Democratic Accountability Compromise the Stability of Public Finances? Keynesianism, Central Banking, and Minority Governments in the Canadian System of Party Government, 1867 – 200. (2011). Winer, Stanley ; Ferris, J. Stephen ; Grofman, Bernard.
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11. Central Banking in the Twentieth Century. (2010). Singleton, John.
    In: Cambridge Books.
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12. Duisenberg and Trichet : Measures of their Degree of Conservatism. (2010). Pépin, Dominique ; Diouf, Ibrahima ; Pepin, Dominique.
    In: Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain).
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13. Independent Central Banks: Some theoretical and empirical problems?. (2009). Howells, Peter.
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14. No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries. (2008). Siklos, Pierre.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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15. Wicksell At The Bank Of Canada. (2006). Clinton, Kevin.
    In: Working Paper.
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16. Interests and Independence: The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy. (2002). Forder, James.
    In: International Review of Applied Economics.
    RePEc:taf:irapec:v:16:y:2002:i:1:p:51-69.

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17. Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques : Un réexamen. (1995). CARTAPANIS, Andre ; Bassoni, Marc .
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18. INSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE. (1991). AUERBACH, ROBERT D..
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19. The Contribution of a Monetary History of the United States: 1867 to 1960 To Monetary History. (1988). Bordo, Michael.
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20. A public choice theory of the great contraction. (1988). Shughart, William ; Tollison, Robert ; Anderson, Gary.
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21. Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks. (1985). Toma, Eugenia.
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