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2. Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation. (2005). Stratmann, Thomas ; Kroszner, Randall S.
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3. Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation.. (2002). Stratmann, Thomas.
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4. Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms. (2000). Kroszner, Randall S. ; Strahan, Philip E..
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1. Political Aversion To a Multilateral Fiscal Rule: The Dynamic Commitment Problem in European Fiscal Governance. (2013). Bauer, Matthias.
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2. Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs. (2012). Smets, Lodewijk ; Knack, Stephen ; Molenaers, Nadia.
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3. Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections. (2011). Héricourt, Jérôme ; Farvaque, Etienne ; Cassette, Aurélie ; Hericourt, Jerome.
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5. Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance: the Norwegian political business cycle. (2011). Helland, Leif.
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7. Ideologues: Explaining Partisanship and Persistence in Politics (and Elsewhere). (2010). Kessler, Anke ; Buehler, Benno.
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8. Go Divisive or Not? How Political Campaigns Affect Turnout. (2010). Gennaioli, Caterina.
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9. Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition. (2009). Jensen, Thomas.
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10. Political pressure deflection. (2009). Zanardi, Maurizio ; Anderson, James.
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11. Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing. (2009). Muller, Markus.
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12. Moderation of an ideological party. (2009). Yildiz, Muhamet ; Pokladnikova, Vlasta .
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13. Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks. (2008). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
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14. Public support to innovation and imitation in a non-scale growth model. (2007). Perez Sebastian, Fidel ; Perez-Sebastian, Fidel.
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15. Vote-share Contracts and Democracy. (2007). Gersbach, Hans.
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16. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks. (2007). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
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17. The Politics of Randomness. (2006). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
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18. Are voters rationally ignorant? An empirical study of Portuguese local elections. (2006). Silva, Ester ; Costa, José.
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19. Ambiguity in Electoral Competition. (2006). Laslier, Jean-François.
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20. Lemons are Green: The Informative Role of a Pigovian Tax. (2006). MAHENC, PHILIPPE.
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21. Media scrutiny and the quality of public officials. (2006). Sutter, Daniel.
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22. Why Do Politicians Delegate?. (2005). Tabellini, Guido.
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23. Salience: Agenda choices by competing candidates. (2005). Konishi, Hideo ; Berliant, Marcus.
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24. Lobbying and Compromise. (2005). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
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25. Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates. (2004). Konishi, Hideo ; Berliant, Marcus.
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26. Are Voters Rationally Ignorant? An Empirical Study for Portuguese Local Elections. (2004). Silva, Ester ; Costa, José.
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27. Bureaucrats or Politicians?. (2004). Tabellini, Guido.
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28. Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting. (2004). Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria.
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29. Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity. (2004). Westermark, Andreas.
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30. Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates. (2004). Konishi, Hideo ; Berliant, Marcus.
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31. Bureaucrats or Politicians?. (2003). Tabellini, Guido.
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32. Indicadores Sociais e Desempenho nas Eleições Estaduais. (2003). Menezes-Filho, Naercio ; Rita de Cassia Libanio, ; Naercio Aquino de Menezes Filho, .
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33. Policy biases with voters uncertainty about the economy and the government. (2002). Schultz, Christian.
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34. Politics of Randomness. (2002). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
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35. GROWTH AND PUBLIC SUPPORT TO INNOVATION AND IMITATION. (2001). Perez Sebastian, Fidel ; Perez-Sebastian, Fidel ; Perezsebastian, Fidel.
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36. Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises. (2001). Westermark, Andreas.
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41. Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity. (1999). Westermark, Andreas.
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42. Discretionary policy implementation and reform. (1999). Sutter, Daniel.
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44. Electoral defeats and local political expenditure cycles. (1997). Baleiras, Rui.
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49. A simple model of disinflation and the optimality of doing nothing. (1995). Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria.
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50. Should price reform proceed gradually or in abig bang?. (1991). van Wijnbergen, Sweder.
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