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Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device, or: Everybody Happy but the Consumer. (1998). Spagnolo, Giancarlo.
In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
RePEc:hhs:hastef:0243.

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  1. Internal Capital Markets, Cross-Subsidization and Product Market Competition. (2001). Cestone, Giacinta.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2935.

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  2. Corporate Financing and Product Market Competition: An Overview. (1999). Cestone, Giacinta.
    In: CSEF Working Papers.
    RePEc:sef:csefwp:18.

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