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- Starting with the 1998 election, voters can mark one preferred candidate on the ballot paper (so-called preference voting). The top of the ï¬nal ranking is set based on the ranking of such preference votes, given that a candidate has reached the preference vote threshold of 5% of the party’s votes in the constituency, which must be at least 50 votes.
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- The ï¬nal number of borderline elected candidates amounts to 1917, 1838 and 1837 from the 1991, 1998 and 2002 election, respectively. Because the preference votes were only introduced in 1998 and as only candidates elected via comparison numbers can be borderline elected, the 1991 number is somewhat larger. Figure 10 shows the corresponding number of candidates at each rank in the range −20 ≤ rank∗ ≤ 3, but summed over all three elections. The reason why the number of observations decreases to the left of the borderline elected (at rank = 0) is that some groups lack a sufficiently large number of defeated candidates to assign low values of rank to anyone.49 Analogously, the main reason why the number of observations decreases to the right of the borderline elected is that many parties (and hence groups) These error events can be calculated using an indicator contained in the data for whether or not a candidate was elected.
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