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1. Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win. (2025). Mattozzi, Andrea ; Levine, David K ; Modica, Salvatore.
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2. A Non-Cooperative Shapley Value Representation of Luce Contests Success Functions. (2024). Pelosse, Yohan.
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3. The role of luck in political and economic competition: noisy all-pay auctions. (2024). Rentschler, Lucas ; Sanders, Shane D ; Boudreau, James W ; Nagaraja, Haikady N.
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4. On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement. (2024). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:217:y:2024:i:c:p:63-90.

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5. Vote or Fight?. (2024). Stoelinga, Nicole ; Martinelli, Cesar ; Levine, David K.
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   RePEc:cla:levarc:11694000000000199.

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6. Contesting Fake News. (2023). Schweinzer, Paul ; Rehsmann, Daniel ; Roussillon, Beatrice.
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7. The n-player Hirshleifer contest. (2022). Sun, Guang-Zhen ; Ewerhart, Christian.
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8. Success in contests. (2022). Mattozzi, Andrea ; Levine, David K.
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9. Technological change, campaign spending and polarization. (2022). Casas, Agustin ; Balart, Pau ; Troumpounis, Orestis.
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10. Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win. (2022). Mattozzi, Andrea ; Modica, Salvatore ; Levine, David K.
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11. Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization. (2022). Casas, Agustin ; Balart, Pau ; Troumpounis, Orestis.
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12. A typology of military conflict based on the Hirshleifer contest. (2021). Ewerhart, Christian.
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13. Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides. (2020). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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14. Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides. (2020). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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15. Technological change, campaign spending and polarization. (2019). Troumpounis, Orestis ; Casas, Agustin ; Balart, Pau.
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16. Affirmative action through extra prizes. (2018). Esteve González, Patricia ; Dahm, Matthias ; Esteve-Gonzalez, Patricia.
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17. Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle. (2018). Dahm, Matthias.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:61:y:2018:i:c:p:256-282.

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18. Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction. (2017). Ewerhart, Christian.
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19. Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules. (2017). Troumpounis, Orestis ; Chowdhury, Subhasish ; Balart, Pau.
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20. Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits. (2017). Pietri, Antoine.
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21. An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions. (2016). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:131:y:2016:i:pa:p:92-105.

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22. An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions. (2015). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago.
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    RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2015-5.

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23. An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions. (2015). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago.
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    RePEc:edn:sirdps:637.

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24. An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions. (2015). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago.
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    RePEc:edn:esedps:255.

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25. An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions. (2015). Sanchez-Pages, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria.
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26. Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes. (2014). Esteve González, Patricia ; Dahm, Matthias.
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27. Difference-form group contests. (2014). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago.
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28. Difference-form group contests. (2014). Sanchez-Pages, Santiago ; Cubel, Maria.
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29. Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes. (2013). Esteve González, Patricia ; Dahm, Matthias.
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30. Competition for procurement shares. (2013). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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31. A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction. (2012). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
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32. A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-Pay Auction. (2012). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
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33. A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-pay Auction. (2012). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
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34. Competition for Procurement Shares. (2011). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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35. Competition for Procurement Shares. (2011). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose ; MATTHIAS, DAHM .
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36. Competition for procurement shares. (2011). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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37. Inter and intra-group conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions. (2011). Pelosse, Yohan.
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38. Winner-pay contests. (2011). Yates, Andrew.
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39. Foundations for contest success functions. (2010). Dahm, Matthias ; Corchon, Luis.
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40. Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games. (2010). TREICH, Nicolas.
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41. Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result. (2010). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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42. Mediated Contests and Strategic Foundations for Contest Success Functions. (2009). Pelosse, Yohan.
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43. Foundations for contest success functions. (2008). Dahm, Matthias ; Corchon, Luis.
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44. All-pay auction equilibria in contests. (2008). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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45. The theory of contests: a survey. (2007). Corchon, Luis.
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46. ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS. (2007). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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47. Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera. (). Dahm, Matthias ; Alcalde, Jose.
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