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2. The shape of luck and competition in tournaments. (2019). Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Drugov, Mikhail.
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3. The shape of luck and competition in tournaments. (2019). Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Drugov, Mikhail.
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1. A sharp characterization of equilibria in a tournament with performance and distinction standards. (2025). Romano, Richard ; Epple, Dennis ; Sieg, Holger.
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2. How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests. (2025). Santos-Pinto, Luis ; Sekeris, Petros G.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:116:y:2025:i:c:s0304406824001290.

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3. Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests. (2024). Sela, Aner.
   In: Theory and Decision.
   RePEc:kap:theord:v:97:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-024-09992-w.

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4. Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns. (2024). Yildirim, Huseyin ; Name, Alvaro J.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:215:y:2024:i:c:s0022053123001746.

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5. Performance bundling in multi-dimensional competitions. (2024). Lu, Jingfeng ; Wang, Zhewei ; Shen, BO.
   In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
   RePEc:eee:indorg:v:95:y:2024:i:c:s0167718724000286.

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6. An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests. (2024). Sela, Aner ; Rabi, Ishay ; Cohen, Chen.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2408.

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7. All-pay matching contests. (2023). Sela, Aner.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00831-2.

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8. Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat. (2023). Netzer, Nick ; Liu, Shuo ; Letina, Igor.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:213:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000121.

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9. Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests. (2023). Lu, Jingfeng ; Liu, Bin.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:208:y:2023:i:c:s0022053122001843.

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10. Asymmetric shocks in contests: Theory and experiment. (2023). Houser, Daniel ; Song, Jian.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:216:y:2023:i:c:p:243-267.

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11. On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests. (2023). Wu, Zenan ; Zhu, Yuxuan ; Fu, Qiang.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:139:y:2023:i:c:p:180-199.

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12. An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests. (2023). Sela, Aner ; Rabi, Ishay ; Cohen, Chen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2317.

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13. All-Pay Matching Contests. (2023). Sela, Aner.
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14. Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments?. (2022). Stadler, Manfred ; Pull, Kerstin ; Glokler, Thomas.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:13:y:2022:i:5:p:65-:d:930097.

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15. Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests. (2022). Sela, Aner ; Rabi, Ishay ; Cohen, Chen.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:13:y:2022:i:5:p:64-:d:929613.

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16. STATUS CLASSIFICATION BY LOTTERY CONTESTS. (2022). Sela, Aner.
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17. INEFFECTIVE PRIZES IN MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONTESTS. (2022). Sela, Aner.
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18. Asymmetric Shocks in Contests: Theory and Experiment. (2021). Houser, Daniel ; Song, Jian.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gms:wpaper:1081.

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19. Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests. (2021). Jindapon, Paan ; Brookins, Philip.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:95:y:2021:i:c:s0304406821000379.

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20. Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players. (2021). Wu, Zenan ; Wang, Xiruo ; Fu, Qiang.
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    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:513-535.

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21. Social Motives and Risk-Taking in Investment Decisions. (2021). Weitzel, Utz ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Lindner, Florian ; Kirchler, Michael.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
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22. Optimal prize allocations in group contests. (2020). Trevisan, Francesco.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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23. Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests. (2020). Sela, Aner.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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24. Tournament rewards and heavy tails. (2020). Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Drugov, Mikhail.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120301095.

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25. Inequality and conflict outbreak. (2019). Vesperoni, Alberto ; Yildizparlak, Anil.
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26. Social Status and Risk-Taking in Investment Decisions. (2019). Weitzel, Utz ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Lindner, Florian ; Kirchler, Michael.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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27. Social Motives and Risk-Taking in Investment Decisions. (2019). Weitzel, Utz ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Lindner, Florian ; Kirchler, Michael.
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28. Multiple prizes in research tournaments. (2019). Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun ; Wagener, Andreas.
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29. THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS. (2017). Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
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30. An envelope approach to tournament design. (2016). Ewerhart, Christian.
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    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:63:y:2016:i:c:p:1-9.

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31. Rewards versus punishments in additive, weakest-link, and best-shot contests. (2016). Kamijo, Yoshio.
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32. The Optimal Allocation of Punishments in Tullock Contests. (2016). Sela, Aner.
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33. THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PUNISHMENTS IN TULLOCK CONTESTS. (2016). Sela, Aner ; Amiad, Maya .
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34. An envelope approach to tournament design. (2015). Ewerhart, Christian.
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35. Strive to be First or Avoid Being Last: An Experiment on Relative Performance Incentives. (2015). Sutter, Matthias ; Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
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36. Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. (2015). Sutter, Matthias ; Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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37. Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments revisited. (2014). Kräkel, Matthias ; Krakel, Matthias.
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38. Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs. (2014). Sela, Aner ; Segev, Ella.
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39. All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes. (2014). Sela, Aner ; Minchuk, Yizhaq.
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40. Strive to be first and avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. (2013). Sutter, Matthias ; Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order.
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41. Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives.. (2013). Sutter, Matthias ; Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
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42. Optimal punishment in contests with endogenous entry. (2013). Wang, Zhewei ; Thomas, Jonathan.
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43. Introduction. (2012). Konrad, Kai ; Kovenock, Dan.
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44. The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents. (2012). Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Lindner, Florian ; Dutcher, E. ; Balafoutas, Loukas.
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45. CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS. (2012). Shi, Xianwen ; Sela, Aner ; Moldovanu, Benny.
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46. Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs. (2011). Sela, Aner ; Segev, Ella.
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47. Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs. (2011). Sela, Aner ; Segev, Ella.
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48. Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions. (2009). Sela, Aner.
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49. Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests. (2008). Shi, Xianwen ; Sela, Aner ; Moldovanu, Benny.
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50. Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests. (2008). Shi, Xianwen ; Sela, Aner ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Modovanu, Benny .
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