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1. Stability in Repeated Matching Markets. (2021). Liu, CE.
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2. Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication. (2016). Laclau, Marie.
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3. Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games. (2015). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
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4. Equilibrium Payoffs for Pure Strategies in Repeated Games. (2014). Kitti, Mitri.
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5. Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring. (2014). Laclau, Marie.
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6. Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games. (2014). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
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7. Finitely repeated games with monitoring options. (2013). Sekiguchi, Tadashi ; Miyahara, Yasuyuki.
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8. Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication. (2013). Laclau, Marie.
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9. Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games. (2013). Vieille, Nicolas ; Takahashi, Satoru ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
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10. Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers. (2012). Kranz, Sebastian ; Goldlücke, Susanne ; Goldlcke, Susanne.
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11. Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts. (2012). Valentini, Edilio ; Iozzi, Alberto ; Cesi, Berardino.
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12. Folk Theorems for Present-Biased Players. (2011). Bernergrd, Axel.
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13. On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors. (2011). Thomas, Caroline ; Lamadon, Thibaut ; Guéron, Yves ; Gueron, Yves.
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14. The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games. (2010). Yamamoto, Yuichi.
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15. Dismissals and quits in repeated games. (2010). Casas-Arce, Pablo.
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16. Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games. (2009). Kinateder, Markus.
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17. Switching costs in infinitely repeated games. (2009). Wang, Ruqu ; Lipman, Barton.
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18. A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games. (2008). Lagunoff, Roger ; Gerardi, Dino ; Anderlini, Luca.
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19. Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model. (2008). Aramendia, Miguel.
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20. Repeated Games Played in a Network. (2008). Kinateder, Markus.
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21. On the full dimensionality assumption for the discounted Folk Theorem. (2008). Carmona, Guilherme.
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22. Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model. (2008). Aramendia, Miguel.
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23. One - memory in repeated games. (2007). Carmona, Guilherme ; Barlo, Mehmet.
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24. Social norms, cooperation and inequality. (2007). Dal Bó, Pedro ; Bo, Pedro.
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25. Stickiness of Rental Rates and Developers’ Option Exercise Strategies. (2007). Wang, Ko ; Lai, Rose ; Yang, Jing.
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26. Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient. (2007). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
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27. A `Super Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games. (2007). Lagunoff, Roger ; Gerardi, Dino ; Anderlini, Luca.
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28. Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. (2006). Kandori, Michihiro.
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29. Switching Costs In Infinitely Repeated Games. (2006). Wang, Ruqu ; Lipman, Barton.
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30. A Super Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games. (2006). Lagunoff, Roger ; Gerardi, Dino ; Anderlini, Luca.
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31. Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem. (2006). González-Díaz, Julio ; Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio.
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32. Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games. (2006). Aramendia, Miguel.
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33. Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1. (2006). Wang, Ruqu ; Lipman, Barton.
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34. Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games. (2006). Wang, Ruqu ; Lipman, Barton.
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35. Repeated Games Played in a Network. (2006). Kinateder, Markus.
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36. Robert Aumanns and Thomas Schellings Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation. (2005). Committee, Nobel Prize.
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37. Soft money and hard choices: Why political parties might legislate against soft money donations. (2005). Gill, David ; Lipsmeyer, Christine .
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38. Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. (2005). Takahashi, Satoru.
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39. Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games. (2004). Casas-Arce, Pablo.
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40. The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games. (2004). Lagunoff, Roger ; Anderlini, Luca ; Luca Anderlini , Dino Gerardi , Roger Lagunoff , .
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41. On asynchronously repeated games. (2003). Wen, Quan ; Takahashi, Satoru.
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42. Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games. (2002). Petrosjan, L. ; Puerto, J..
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43. Distribución de agua para regadío y otros usos: una solución mediante un superjuego. (2002). SOTO TORRES, Mª D., ; LECHN, FERNNDEZ R..
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44. Three Essays on Repeated Games. (2002). Dal Bó, Pedro.
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45. Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality. (2001). Dal Bó, Pedro.
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46. Folk Theorem with One-sided Information. (2000). Cheng, Harrison .
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47. The Castle on the Hill. (2000). Levine, David.
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48. The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis. (1999). Krishna, Vijay ; Benoit, Jean-Pierre.
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49. Cooperation in a resource extraction game. (1998). Stähler, Frank ; Wagner, Friedrich ; Stahler, Frank.
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50. The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis. (1996). Krishna, Vijay ; Benoit, Jean-Pierre.
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