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Does control concentration affect board busyness? International evidence. (2020). Martins, Henrique Castro ; Costa, Cristiano Machado.
In: Journal of Management & Governance.
RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:24:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10997-019-09487-9.

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