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2. Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?. (2016). Kitchens, Carl ; Isaac, R. ; Portillo, Javier E.
   In: Journal of Urban Economics.
   RePEc:eee:juecon:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:16-30.

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1. Investment Disputes and Abnormal Volatility of Stocks. (2020). Nevrla, Matěj ; DRABEK, Zdenek ; Baruník, Jozef.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2006.10505.

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2. An economic and comparative analysis of specificatio (the accession doctrine). (2015). Chang, Yun-Chien.
   In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:39:y:2015:i:2:p:225-243.

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3. The Cost of Kelo: Are Property Taxes a Form of Public Use?. (2014). Miceli, Thomas.
   In: Working papers.
   RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-35.

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4. Takings. (2014). Segerson, Kathleen ; Miceli, Thomas.
   In: Working papers.
   RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-17.

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5. The use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority. (2014). Kitchens, Carl.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:160:y:2014:i:3:p:455-466.

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6. Private Takings. (2014). Nosal, Ed ; Marchesiani, Alessandro.
   In: Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2014-26.

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7. A Group Utility Maximizer Mechanism for Land Assembly. (2013). Sridhar, Usha ; Mandyam, Sridhar.
   In: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:47:y:2013:i:3:p:466-488.

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8. Property versus political holdouts: the case of the TGV rail line Lyon–Budapest in Italy. (2013). Navone, Livia .
   In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:3:p:409-426.

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9. Audit fee pricing and internationally-credible GAAP: a property rights analysis. (2013). Klumpes, Paul.
   In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:1:p:21-39.

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10. Land Acquisition for Industrialization and Compensation of Displaced Farmers. (2013). Mookherjee, Dilip ; Ghatak, Maitreesh.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:5216.

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11. Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications. (2012). Turnbull, Geoffrey.
    In: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:45:y:2012:i:2:p:305-325.

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12. Regulatory Takings. (2011). Segerson, Kathleen ; Miceli, Thomas.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-16.

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13. Natural and Industrial Disasters : Land Use and Insurance. (2011). Grislain-Letremy, Celine ; Villeneuve, Bertrand.
    In: Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
    RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/7845.

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14. Natural and Industrial Disasters : Land Use and Insurance. (2011). Villeneuve, Bertrand ; Grislain-Letremy, Celine.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crs:wpaper:2011-32.

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15. Irreversible development and eminent domain: Compensation rules, land use and efficiency. (2010). Turnbull, Geoffrey K..
    In: Journal of Housing Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:19:y:2010:i:4:p:243-254.

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16. Compensation for Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Agreements: Implications of National Treatment and Rights to Invest. (2010). McAusland, Carol ; Karp, Larry ; Aisbett, Emma.
    In: Journal of Globalization and Development.
    RePEc:bpj:globdv:v:1:y:2010:i:2:n:6.

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17. Compensation for Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Agreements: Implications of National Treatment and Rights to Invest. (2010). McAusland, Carol ; Karp, Larry ; Aisbett, Emma.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:auu:dpaper:648.

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18. The Economics of Endangered Species. (2009). innes, robert ; Frisvold, George.
    In: Annual Review of Resource Economics.
    RePEc:anr:reseco:v:1:y:2009:p:485-512.

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19. An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game. (2008). Swope, Kurtis ; Shupp, Robert ; Schmitt, Pamela ; Cadigan, John.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:usn:usnawp:21.

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20. Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows. (2008). Janmaat, John.
    In: Resource and Energy Economics.
    RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:455-473.

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21. Efficiency and fairness: Compensation for takings. (2008). Shapiro, Perry ; Niemann, Paul.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:3:p:157-165.

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22. Police-powers, regulatory takings and the efficient compensation of domestic and foreign investors. (2008). McAusland, Carol ; Karp, Larry ; Aisbett, Emma.
    In: Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt5x84h5kf.

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23. A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings. (2007). Segerson, Kathleen ; Miceli, Thomas.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2006-22.

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24. Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?. (2007). Janmaat, John.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:6147.

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25. Private takings. (2007). Nosal, Ed.
    In: Working Papers (Old Series).
    RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0713.

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26. Takings of development rights with asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality. (2007). Winfree, Jason ; McCluskey, Jill.
    In: Journal of Housing Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:16:y:2007:i:3-4:p:320-333.

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27. Buyer-Type Effects in Conservation and Preservation Property Values. (2006). Winfree, Jason ; Mittelhammer, Ron ; McCluskey, Jill.
    In: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:33:y:2006:i:2:p:167-179.

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28. Property Rights and the Urban Environment: Local Public Goods in Indonesian Cities.. (2006). Hoy, Michael ; Jimenez, E..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gue:guelph:2006-9.

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29. Fairness in Urban Land Use: An Evolutionary Contribution to Law & Economics. (2006). Schubert, Christian.
    In: Papers on Economics and Evolution.
    RePEc:esi:evopap:2005-22.

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30. Regulatory Takings and Environmental Regulation in NAFTAs Chapter 11. (2006). McAusland, Carol ; Karp, Larry ; Aisbett, Emma.
    In: Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt1qh5j6dv.

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31. Economic Analysis of Law. (2005). Polinsky, A. Mitchell ; Shavell, Steven.
    In: Discussion Papers.
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32. The Investment Incentive Effects of Land Use Regulations. (2005). Turnbull, Geoffrey.
    In: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:31:y:2005:i:4:p:357-395.

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33. The Economics of Biodiversity. (2005). Polasky, Stephen ; Costello, Christopher ; Solow, Andrew.
    In: Handbook of Environmental Economics.
    RePEc:eee:envchp:3-29.

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34. Loggers vs. campers: compensation for the taking of property rights. (2004). Nosal, Ed ; Giammarino, Ronald .
    In: Working Papers (Old Series).
    RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0406.

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35. Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices. (2004). Lin, Tun ; Goeschl, Timo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.55.

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36. Development moratoria. (2004). Turnbull, Geoffrey K..
    In: Journal of Housing Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:13:y:2004:i:3:p:155-169.

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37. Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework. (2003). Kaplow, Louis.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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38. Protection against Government Takings: Compensation for Regulation?. (2002). Guerin, Kevin.
    In: Treasury Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:nzt:nztwps:02/18.

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39. Taking the Castle: Efficiency and the Vibe of It. (2002). Shapiro, Perry.
    In: University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt442909rh.

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40. The taking of land: market value compensation should be paid. (2001). Nosal, Ed.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:82:y:2001:i:3:p:431-443.

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41. Protection des habitats despèces menacées en terres privée: analyse dinstruments et de la politique canadienne. (2000). Barla, Philippe ; Doucet, Joseph A. ; Saphores, Jean-Daniel M..
    In: Canadian Public Policy.
    RePEc:cpp:issued:v:26:y:2000:i:1:p:95-110.

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42. OPTIMAL COMPENSATION FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. (1999). Rollins, Kimberly ; McKitrick, Ross ; Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane.
    In: 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN.
    RePEc:ags:aaea99:21693.

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43. Takings, litigation, and just compensation. (1998). .
    In: Atlantic Economic Journal.
    RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:397-412.

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44. Discouraging Federal actions that reduce the value of private property: evaluating procedural and financial approaches. (1998). Hunt, Robert ; VandenBerg, Tim.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:98-24.

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45. When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information. (1998). Polasky, Stephen ; DOREMUS, HOLLY .
    In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
    RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:35:y:1998:i:1:p:22-47.

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46. ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY AND THE OPTIMAL DISPERSION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS. (1998). Weinberg, Marca ; Hsu, Shi-Ling.
    In: 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT.
    RePEc:ags:aaea98:20882.

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47. A Deferential Role for Efficiency Analysis in Unravelling the Takings Tangle. (1997). Burrows, Paul .
    In: Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:noj:journl:v:24:y:1997:p:105-123.

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48. The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Taking Risk on Land Value and Development Activity. (1997). Riddiough, Timothy J..
    In: Journal of Urban Economics.
    RePEc:eee:juecon:v:41:y:1997:i:1:p:56-77.

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49. Pluralism and Regulatory Failure: When Should Takings Trigger Compensation?. (1996). Brennan, Timothy ; Boyd, James.
    In: RFF Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-96-09.

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50. Public Sector Dynamics. (1990). Auerbach, Alan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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