1. A master of two servants: lessons from the israeli experience about the effect of separation of powers on public accountability and social welfare. (2023). Schwarz, Mordechai E.
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2. Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony. (2014). Mixon, Franklin ; Faria, Joao ; Caudill, Steven B ; Wineke, Samantha J. ; Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., .
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1. Home country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis. (2016). Meyer, Klaus ; Estrin, Saul ; Nielsen, Sabina.
   In: Journal of World Business.
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2. Heterogeneous outside options in contests. (2015). Grossmann, Martin ; Dietl, Helmut.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:280-287.

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3. Supermajorities and Political Rent Extraction. (2015). Potrafke, Niklas ; Kauder, Björn.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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4. Endogenous Property Rights, Conflict Intensity And Inequality In Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contest. (2014). Yarkin, Alexander.
   In: HSE Working papers.
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5. Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition: Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries. (2013). Hessami, Zohal.
   In: Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
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6. CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES. (2013). Amarandei, Cristina Mihaela .
   In: CES Working Papers.
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7. CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES. (2013). Amarandei, Cristina Mihaela .
   In: CES Working Papers.
   RePEc:jes:wpaper:y:2013:v:5:i:3:p:311-322.

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8. On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework. (2013). Vasilev, Aleksandar.
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9. The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature. (2013). van Long, Ngo.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:161-181.

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10. Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?. (2011). Rusche, Christian.
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
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11. Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation. (2011). Liu, Taoxiong ; Zhou, Bi-Hua ; Hu, An-Gang .
    In: MPRA Paper.
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12. Corruption and the Composition of Public Expenditures: Evidence from OECD Countries. (2010). Hessami, Zohal.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:25945.

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13. What is the Driving Force Behind Industrial Development in Iran? Rent Seeking and Labor Exploitation as the Driving force of Industrial Growth. (2009). Seyyed Hamid Reza Ashrafzadeh, ; Musai, Maysam .
    In: Iranian Economic Review (IER).
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14. Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation. (2009). Lee, Sanghack ; Congleton, Roger.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:102-114.

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15. Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents. (2008). Schmidt, Frederik .
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:3:p:189-208.

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16. Efforts in two-sided contests. (2008). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil ; Schwarz, Mordechai .
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:3:p:283-291.

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17. Influence Costs in Agribusiness Cooperatives: Evidence from Case Studies. (2008). Hendrikse, G. W. J., ; Iliopoulos, C..
    In: ERIM Report Series Research in Management.
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18. Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats. (2007). Zhou, Liang ; Hu, Audrey.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
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19. Rent seeking and the value of time. (2005). Mantell, Edmund.
    In: Journal of Economics and Finance.
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20. Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment. (2005). Winner, Hannes ; Egger, Peter.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:21:y:2005:i:4:p:932-952.

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21. Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations. (2004). Nti, Kofi O..
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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22. Competition among volunteers. (2004). Ferrero, Mario ; Cugno, Franco.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:3:p:637-654.

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23. Strategic restraint in contests. (2004). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
    In: European Economic Review.
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24. Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization. (2003). Sato, Motohiro.
    In: European Economic Review.
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25. Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination. (2002). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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26. On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach. (2001). .
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
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27. Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests. (2001). Yates, Andrew ; Heckelman, Jac.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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28. Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation. (2001). Bodenstein, Martin.
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29. Corruption and institutions in Russia. (2000). Levin, Mark ; Satarov, Georgy.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:113-132.

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30. Strategic Restraint in Contests. (2000). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
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31. The Endogenous Determination of Minimum Wage. (1999). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
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32. The Endogenous Determination of Minimum Wage. (1999). Nitzan, Shmuel ; Epstein, Gil.
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33. Rent-seeking in rural development projects: its potential causes and measures to reduce its costs. (1998). Fleming, Euan.
    In: Journal of International Development.
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34. Collective contests with externalities. (1998). Lee, Sanghack ; Kang, Hyeong J..
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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35. Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests. (1998). Baik, Kyung.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:4:p:685-701.

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36. Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests. (1998). Gradstein, Mark.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:4:p:575-585.

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37. Delegation in contests. (1997). Baik, Kyung ; Kim, In-Gyu.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:281-298.

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38. Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking. (1996). Appelbaum, Elie ; Katz, Eliakim.
    In: Working Papers.
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39. Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence. (1996). Sloof, Randolph ; Potters, Jan ; Potters, J. J. M., .
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40. Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence. (1996). Sloof, Randolph ; Potters, Jan.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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41. La crise des économies maghrébines : les politiques redistributives en question. (1993). Ahmed, Abdelkader Sid .
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    RePEc:prs:rtiers:tiers_0040-7356_1993_num_34_135_4780.

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42. Political Economy and Pollution Regulation: Instrument Choice in a Lobbying Economy. (1993). Roe, Terry ; Graham-Tomasi, Ted ; Chen, Kai-Lih.
    In: Staff Paper Series.
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43. Intraorganizational influence relations and the optimality of collective action. (1992). Rausser, Gordon ; Zusman, Pinhas .
    In: Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series.
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44. Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium. (1990). Roe, Terry ; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore.
    In: Bulletins.
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45. Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities. (1989). Fabella, Raul.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:3:p:287-293.

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46. On the economic incentives for taking bribes. (1989). Rich, Daniel ; Goel, Rajeev.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:3:p:269-275.

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47. Rent-seeking and second best economics. (1988). Anam, Mahmudul ; Katz, Eliakim.
    In: Public Choice.
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48. Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries. (1988). Smith, Barry ; Katz, Eliakim.
    In: Public Choice.
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49. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. (1987). Samet, Dov ; Hillman, Arye.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:54:y:1987:i:1:p:63-82.

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50. Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers. (1987). Riley, John ; Hillman, Arye.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
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