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Can democracy induce development? A constitutional perspective. (2014). Siemers, Lars-Hinrich ; Gersbach, Hans ; Lars-H. Siemers, .
In: Public Choice.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:177-196.

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  1. Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19. (2024). Yasar, Sezer ; Elgin, Ceyhun.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:198:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01107-3.

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  2. Citizen empowerment through land reform. (2024). Ulubasoglu, Mehmet ; Tong, Lan ; Jimenez-Ayora, Pablo ; Ulubaolu, Mehmet A ; Mitra, Devashish.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:52:y:2024:i:3:p:592-613.

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  3. The Efficacy of Democracy and Freedom in Fostering Economic Growth. (2021). Alam, Najib ; Kabir, Adnan M.
    In: Emerging Economy Studies.
    RePEc:sae:emecst:v:7:y:2021:i:1:p:76-93.

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