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Rational inattention and politics: how parties use fiscal policies to manipulate voters. (2022). Sacchi, Agnese ; Murtinu, Samuele ; Piccirilli, Giulio.
In: Public Choice.
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:190:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00940-8.

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  1. The political business cycle of tax reforms. (2024). Ferwerda, Joras ; Huysmans, Martijn ; Flores, Lucia Rossel.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01143-7.

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  2. Political determinants of COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine rollouts: The case of regional elections in Italy and Spain. (2024). Prieto, Pablo Arija ; Genie, Mesfin ; Ammi, Mehdi ; Antonini, Marcello ; Paolucci, Francesco.
    In: Health Policy.
    RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:145:y:2024:i:c:s0168851024000927.

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  3. Interdependent Preferences for Financing and Providing Public Goods – The Case of National Defense. (2024). Lohse, Tim ; Qari, Salmai ; Bolouri, Armin A.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11584.

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