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3. Did the fed raise interest rates before elections?. (2019). Dentler, Alexander.
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8. Financial Deepening and Economic Growth. (2013). Bhattarai, Keshab.
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10. Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas.
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11. Political Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies. (2009). Potrafke, Niklas ; Mechtel, Mario.
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14. Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?. (2006). Йосифов, Пламен ; Abrams, Burton ; Iossifov, Plamen .
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