1. Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. (2017). Carattini, Stefano ; Baranzini, Andrea.
   In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
   RePEc:spr:envpol:v:19:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10018-016-0144-7.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Economic Targets and Loss-Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation. (2016). İriş, Doruk ; Iris, Doruk.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:sgo:wpaper:1602.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. (2016). Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Hagen, Achim ; Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:old:dpaper:391.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors. (2016). Hagen, Achim ; Eisenack, Klaus ; Kaehler, Leonhard .
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:old:dpaper:387.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. The Political Economy of Weak Treaties. (2016). Harstad, Bard ; Battaglini, Marco.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22968.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Green taxes in a post-Paris world: are millions of nays inevitable?. (2016). Thalmann, Philippe ; Carattini, Stefano ; Baranzini, Andrea ; Varone, Frdric ; Vhringer, Frank .
   In: GRI Working Papers.
   RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp243.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction. (2016). Schweinzer, Paul ; Bos, Olivier ; Roussillon, Beatrice.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01484843.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Geographical spread of global emissions: Within-country inequalities are large and increasing. (2016). Sauter, Caspar ; Mathys, Nicole ; Grether, Jean-Marie.
   In: Energy Policy.
   RePEc:eee:enepol:v:89:y:2016:i:c:p:138-149.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. ECONOMIC TARGETS AND LOSS-AVERSION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION. (2016). İriş, Doruk ; Zheng, Siqi ; Lin, Brian Chi-Ang.
   In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
   RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:30:y:2016:i:3:p:624-648.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Economic targets and loss-aversion in international environmental cooperation. (2015). İriş, Doruk.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:69240.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Nationally Self-Interested Climate Change Mitigation: A Unified Conceptual Framework. (2015). Green, Fergus.
    In: GRI Working Papers.
    RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp199.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Luring others into climate action: Coalition formation games with threshold and spillover effects. (2015). Tavoni, Alessandro ; HEUGUES, Mélanie ; Bosetti, Valentina.
    In: GRI Working Papers.
    RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp176.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries. (2015). Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Freytag, Andreas ; Wangler, Leo .
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:711-727.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation. (2015). Hovi, Jon ; Ward, Hugh ; Grundig, Frank .
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:665-688.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Luring Others into Climate Action: Coalition Formation Games with Threshold and Spillover Effects. (2015). Tavoni, Alessandro ; HEUGUES, Mélanie ; Bosetti, Valentina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.21.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Barrett, S., 1994. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46, 878–894.

2. Barrett, S., 1997. The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. Resource and Energy Economics 19 (4), 345–361.

3. Barrett, S., 2005. The theory of international environmental agreements. In: Maeler, K.-G., Vincent, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics. Vol. 3. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1457–1516.

4. Besley, T., 2006. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
5. Bryner, G., 2008. Failure and opportunity: environmental groups in us climate policy. Environmental Politics 17 (2), 319–336.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

6. Carraro, C., Marchiori, C., 2003. Stable coalitions. In: Carraro, C. (Ed.), The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

7. Carraro, C., Siniscalco, D., 1993. Strategies for international protection of the environment. Journal of Public Economics 52, 309–328.

8. Chander, P., Tulkens, H., 1992. Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems. European Economic Review 36, 389–399.

9. d’Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J., Weymark, J., 1983. On the stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics 16 (1), 17–25.

10. Dannenberg, A., 2012. Coalition formation and voting in public goods games. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 2 (1), 83–105.

11. Finus, M., 2008. Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements: insights, critical remarks, and future challenges. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 2 (1), 29–67.

12. Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 2001. Special Interest Politics. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

13. Hoel, M., 1992. International environment conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics 2 (2), 141–159.

14. Johal, S., Ulph, A., 2002. Globalization, lobbying, and international environmental governance. Review of International Economics 10 (3), 387–403.

15. Kamieniecki, S., 2006. Corporate America and Environmental Policy: How Often Does Business Get its Way? Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

16. Kolstad, C. D., 2012. Bridging reality and the theory of international environmental agreements. In: Hahn, R. W., Ulph, A. (Eds.), Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling. Oxford University Press, pp. 61–74.

17. Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., Riedl, A., 2009. Institution formation in public goods games. American Economic Review 99 (4), 1335–1355.

18. Kraft, M., Kamieniecki, S. (Eds.), 2007. Business and Environmental Policy: Corporate Interests in the American Political System. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

19. Lange, A., Vogt, C., 2003. Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity. Journal of Public Economics 87, 2049–2067.

20. Maeler, K.-G., 1989. The acid rain game. In: Folmer, H., van Ierland, E. C. (Eds.), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 231–252.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

21. Markussen, P., Svendsen, G., 2005. Industry lobbying and the political economy of ghg trade in the european union. Energy Policy 33 (2), 245–255.

22. Michaelowa, A., 1998. Impact of interest groups on eu climate policy. European Environment 8 (5), 152–160.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

23. Oates, W., Portney, P., 2003. The political economy of environmental policy. In: Maeler, K.-G., Vincent, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics. Vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 325– 354.

24. Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
25. Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT press, Cambridge, Mass.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

26. Tavoni, A., Dannenberg, A., Kallis, G., Loeschel, A., 2011. Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

1. Self-Enforcing Agreements under Unequal Nationally Determined Contributions. (2016). Silva, Emilson.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5708.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion. (2014). Finus, Michael ; Pintassilgo, Pedro ; Ulph, Alistair.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4589.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Optimal Altruism in Public Good Provision. (2014). Ritz, Robert ; Hahn, Robert.
   In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
   RePEc:cam:camdae:1403.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. The incentives of private companies to invest in protected area certificates: How coalitions can improve ecosystem sustainability. (2013). Meiner, Nathalie .
   In: Ecological Economics.
   RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:95:y:2013:i:c:p:148-158.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. A time-consistent model for cooperation in international pollution control. (2013). Wang, Yiming.
   In: Economic Modelling.
   RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:500-506.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. International trade and the negotiability of global climate change agreements. (2013). Whalley, John ; Riezman, Raymond ; Cai, Yuezhou.
   In: Economic Modelling.
   RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:421-427.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Are international environmental agreements enforceable? implications for institutional design. (2010). Matisoff, Daniel .
   In: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.
   RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:10:y:2010:i:3:p:165-186.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. A two-stage inexact-stochastic programming model for planning carbon dioxide emission trading under uncertainty. (2010). Li, Y. P. ; Chen, X. ; Huang, G. H..
   In: Applied Energy.
   RePEc:eee:appene:v:87:y:2010:i:3:p:1033-1047.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy. (2008). Rübbelke, Dirk ; Finus, Michael ; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., .
   In: Stirling Economics Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:stl:stledp:2008-13.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. (2008). Finus, Michael ; Pintassilgo, Pedro ; Lindroos, Marko ; Munro, Gordon.
    In: Stirling Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:stl:stledp:2008-11.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. On the Self-serving Use of Equity Principles in International Climate Negotiations. (2007). Ziegler, Andreas ; Löschel, Andreas ; Lange, Andreas ; Loschel, Andreas ; Vogt, Carsten.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5588.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. The Montreal Protocol: Developing Countries Import of Halons. (2007). .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2007:i:7:p:1-5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. On the Importance of Equity in International Climate Policy: An Empirical Analysis. (2006). Ziegler, Andreas ; Lange, Andreas ; Vogt, Carsten.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5432.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion. (2006). .
    In: SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:sca:scaewp:0609.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Ratification quotas in international agreements. (2006). Kohnz, Simon.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:900.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation. (2006). Sjögren, Tomas ; Bergman, Thomas.
    In: Umeå Economic Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:umnees:0669.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion. (2006). Tulkens, Henry ; Chander, Parkash ; Henry, TULKENS ; Parkash, Chander.
    In: Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques).
    RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. A NON-COOPERATIVE THEORY OF QUANTITY-RATIONING INTERNATIONAL TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION. (2006). Shah, Sudhir A..
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:cde:cdewps:143.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying: the case of international environmental agreements. (2005). Haffoudhi, Houda.
    In: Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques.
    RePEc:mse:wpsorb:j05054.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. FOREIGN MONOPOLIES AND TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS. (2005). Rubio, Santiago ; Alepuz, Maria Dolores.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-38.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements. (2005). Finus, Michael ; Eyckmans, Johan ; Carraro, Carlo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.50.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. (2005). de Zeeuw, Aart.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.41.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements. (2005). Finus, Michael ; Eyckmans, Johan ; Carraro, Carlo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5046.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes. (2005). Carraro, Carlo ; Buchner, Barbara.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5034.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. The Making of International Environmental Agreements. (2005). Haeringer, Guillaume ; courtois, pierre.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:652.05.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. The Impact of Equity-preferences on the Stability of Heterogeneous International Agreements. (2004). Lange, Andreas.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2188.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents. (2004). Tazdaït, Tarik ; Hammoudi, Abdelhakim ; Caparros, Alejandro ; Tazdait, Tarik.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.70.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation. (2004). Chander, Parkash.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:108.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties. (2004). Oreffice, Sonia ; Carraro, Carlo ; Marchiori, Carmen.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4281.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Allocations and manipulation in Kyoto type protocols. (2004). Shah, Sudhir A..
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:cde:cdewps:125.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-wide Targets. (2003). Segerson, Kathleen ; Dawson, Na.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-06.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Economic Analysis and the Formulation of U.S. Climate Policy. (2003). Toman, Michael.
    In: RFF Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-02-59.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements. (2003). Rubio, Santiago ; Ulph, Alistair.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.57.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution. (2003). Olaizola, Norma.
    In: IKERLANAK.
    RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200310.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations. (2003). Raggi, Davide ; Carraro, Carlo ; Bosello, Francesco ; Buchner, Barbara.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3606.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements. (2002). ULPH, A..
    In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
    RePEc:stn:sotoec:0210.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage Between R&D and Climate Cooperation. (2002). Carraro, Carlo ; Cersosimo, Igor ; Marchiori, Carmen ; Buchner, Barbara.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3299.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Stable Coalitions. (2002). Carraro, Carlo ; Marchiori, Carmen.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3258.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity. (2001). Lange, Andreas ; Vogt, Carsten.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5369.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. Free Trade and Global Warming: A Trade Theory View of the Kyoto Protocol. (2000). Taylor, M. Scott ; Copeland, Brian.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7657.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. An Economic Theory of Emission Cap Determination by an International Agreement. (2000). Shah, Sudhir A..
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:cde:cdewps:88.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. The Rise of Environmentalism, Pollution Taxes and Intra-Industry Trade. (2000). Aidt, Toke.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Free trade and global warming : a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol. (2000). Taylor, M. Scott ; Copeland, Brian.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:att:wimass:20004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Asymmetric Information and International Tradable Quota Treaties. An experimental evaluation. (1999). Soberg, Morten .
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:ssb:dispap:248.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. (Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts. (1999). Janssen, Josef .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:1999.14.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation. (1999). Spagnolo, Giancarlo.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:9913.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition. (1998). Mustafa Babiker of University of Colorado at Bould, .
    In: Computational Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:9807002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Searching Market Equilibria under Uncertain Utilities.. (1998). Nentjes, Andries ; Shibayev, S. ; Kryazhimskii, A. V. ; Tarasyev, A. M..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:iasawp:ir98007.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement. (1997). Schneider, Kerstin ; Hoel, Michael.
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:153-170.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Conflict and cooperation in managing international water resources. (1994). Barret, Scott ; De C, .
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1303.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-09-20 20:15:44 || Missing content? Let us know