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Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the Development of Irrigation in the Western United States. (2016). Libecap, Gary ; Leonard, Bryan.
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22185.

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  1. Weather Fluctuations, Expectation Formation, and Short-Run Behavioral Responses to Climate Change. (2021). Ji, Xinde ; Cobourn, Kelly M.
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:78:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-020-00525-x.

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  2. Do Property Rights Institutions Mitigate Drought-Induced Conflict?. (2020). Potter, Nicholas ; Cook, Joseph.
    In: 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri.
    RePEc:ags:aaea20:304465.

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  3. Policy Note: Water Markets as Adaptation to Climate Change in the Western United States. (2018). Libecap, Gary D.
    In: Water Economics and Policy (WEP).
    RePEc:wsi:wepxxx:v:04:y:2018:i:03:n:s2382624x18710030.

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  4. The Economic Benefits of Irrigation Districts under Prior Appropriation Doctrine: An Econometric Analysis of Agricultural Land‐Allocation Decisions. (2018). Ji, Xinde ; Cobourn, Kelly M.
    In: Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie.
    RePEc:bla:canjag:v:66:y:2018:i:3:p:441-467.

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  5. Weather Fluctuation, Expectation Formation, and the Short-run Behavioral Responses to Climate Change. (2018). Ji, Xinde ; Cobourn, Kelly M.
    In: 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C..
    RePEc:ags:aaea18:274473.

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  6. From Decentralized to Centralized Irrigation Management. (2017). Smith, Steven.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mns:wpaper:wp201709.

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  7. An Empirical Analysis of Water Allocation Efficiency through the Prior Appropriation Doctrine: A Case Study in the Carson River Valley, Nevada. (2017). Rollins, Kimberly ; Lee, Gi-Eu ; Singletary, Loretta.
    In: 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois.
    RePEc:ags:aaea17:258225.

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    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9934.

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  28. Geography and Export Performance: External Market Access and Internal Supply Capacity. (2003). Venables, Anthony ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9637.

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  29. Institutions Dont Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income. (2003). Sachs, Jeffrey D..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9490.

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  30. Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?. (2003). Schott, Peter ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9447.

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  31. Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash?. (2003). Stulz, René ; Williamson, Rohan ; Pinkowitz, Lee.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10188.

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  32. Consequences of Constitutions. (2003). Persson, Torsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10170.

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  33. Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. (2003). Verdier, Thierry ; Robinson, James ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10136.

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  34. The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies. (2003). Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10037.

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  35. Geography and Institutions: A Review of Plausible and Implausible Linkages. (2003). Olsson, Ola.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0106.

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  36. More on finance and growth: more finance, more growth?. (2003). Levine, Ross.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2003:i:jul:p:31-46:n:v.85no.4.

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  37. Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?. (2003). Schott, Peter ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0572.

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  38. The Roads To and From Serfdom. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0212011.

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  39. Mortality and early growth in England, France, and Sweden. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0212010.

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  40. The Roads To and From Serfdom. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: GE, Growth, Math methods.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0212002.

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  41. Does it Take a Lula to go to Davos? A Brief Overview of Brazilian Reforms, 1980-2000. (2002). Moreira, Mauricio ; Campos, Nauro ; Giambiagi, Fabio ; Pinheiro, Armando Castellar.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-580.

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  42. Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9379.

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  43. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. (2002). Trebbi, Francesco ; Subramanian, Arvind ; Rodrik, Dani.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9305.

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  44. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economics. (2002). Engerman, Stanley L ; Sokoloff, Kenneth L..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9259.

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  45. International Financial Integration and Economic Growth. (2002). Slok, Torsten ; Ricci, Luca ; Levine, Ross ; Edison, Hali.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9164.

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  46. Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Easterly, William.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9106.

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  47. R&D, Implementation and Stagnation: A Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence Clubs. (2002). Mayer-Foulkes, David ; Howitt, Peter.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9104.

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  48. Law, Endowment, and Finance. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9089.

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  49. Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth. (2002). Zilibotti, Fabrizio ; Aghion, Philippe ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9066.

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  50. Property Rights and Finance. (2002). Woodruff, Christopher ; Johnson, Simon.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8852.

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