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   RePEc:pal:compes:v:64:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1057_s41294-022-00183-6.

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2. General or central government? Empirical evidence on political cycles in budget composition using new data for OECD countries. (2020). Potrafke, Niklas.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300082.

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3. General or Central Government? Empirical Evidence on Political Cycles in Budget Composition Using New Data for OECD Countries. (2020). Potrafke, Niklas.
   In: ifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ifowps:_322.

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4. General or Central Government? Empirical Evidence on Political Cycles in Budget Composition Using New Data for OECD Countries. (2020). Potrafke, Niklas.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8134.

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5. International Financial Markets. (2019). Saglio, Sophie ; Sanhaji, Bilel ; Guerreiro, David ; Goutte, Stéphane ; Chevallier, Julien.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02183053.

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6. Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: In depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures. (2018). Martins, Rodrigo ; Castro, Vitor.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:44-64.

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7. Proposal for an Alternative Indicator for Testing the Presence of the Political-Budget Cycle in the Case of Tax Policy. (2017). Formanová, Lucie ; Milan, Kapek ; Lucie, Formanova.
   In: NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy.
   RePEc:vrs:njopap:v:10:y:2017:i:2:p:229-249:n:11.

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8. The impact of fiscal consolidations on the functional components of government expenditures. (2017). Castro, Vitor.
   In: Economic Modelling.
   RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:60:y:2017:i:c:p:138-150.

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9. On the behaviour of the functional components ofgovernment expenditures during fiscal consolidations. (2016). Castro, Vitor.
   In: NIPE Working Papers.
   RePEc:nip:nipewp:11/2016.

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10. Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis. (2016). Mandon, Pierre ; Cazals, Antoine.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01320586.

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11. Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis. (2016). Mandon, Pierre ; Cazals, Antoine.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1812.

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12. Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis. (2015). Mandon, Pierre ; Cazals, Antoine.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01238883.

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1. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - Fixed Effects estimations. Sample period: 1975-2010. - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
2. - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1975-2010.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

3. Acosta-Ormaechea, S. and Yoo, J. (2012). Tax composition and growth: A broad cross-country perspective. IMF Working Paper 12/257.

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10. Block, S. (2002). Elections, electoral competitiveness, and political budget cycles in developing countries. Harvard University CID Working Paper No. 78.
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11. Blumkin, T., Ruffle, B.J. and Ganun, Y. (2012). Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods. European Economic Review 56: 1200-19. 24 Bracco, E., Porcelli, F. and Redoano, M. (2013). Political competition, tax salience and accountability: Theory and some evidence from Italy. Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy Working Paper 126.

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16. Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J.R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 143, 67–101.

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22. Franzese, R. (2002). Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science 5: 369-421.
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23. Frey, B. S. and Schneider, F. (1978a). An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the United States. The Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 1974-183. 25 Frey, B. S. and Schneider, F. (1978b). A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom. The Economic Journal 88: 243-253.

24. General notes: - Predetermined and close elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. - t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
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25. General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies with majoritarian (plurality) electoral rules. Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. - t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
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26. General notes: - Predetermined elections in democracies with proportional electoral rules. Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. - t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
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27. General notes: - Predetermined elections in established democracies. Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. - t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
28. General notes: - Predetermined elections in new democracies. Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. - t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
29. Heinisz, W. (2000). The institutional environment for economic growth. Economics and Politics 12(1), 1-31.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

30. Hibbs, D. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71(4): 467-87.

31. Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., Rosen, H.S., 1988. Estimating vector autoregressions with panel data. Econometrica. 56, 1371-1395.

32. Judson, R.A., Owen, A.L. (1999). Estimating dynamic panel data models: A practical guide for macroeconomists. Economics Letters. 65, 9-15.

33. Katsimi, M. and Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice 151: 325-362.

34. Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in Indian States. Journal of Development Economics 73: 125-154.

35. Marshall, M., Jaggers, K., (2009). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007. Center for Global Policy, George Mason University. Data set downloadable at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity4.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
36. Notes for the System-GMM estimations: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; - Log(GDPpc 2005), Trade (%GDP) and Output gap were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two and three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged firstdifferences were used in the levels equation. The option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata was used in order to avoid a very high number of instruments; - Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.
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37. Notes: - All elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010.
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38. Notes: - All elections in democracies (Polity2≥0). Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - Fixed Effects estimations. - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
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39. Notes: - All elections in democracies (using the democracy dummy variable of Cheibub et al. 2010).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

40. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1999). The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. 1998 Marshall lecture. European Economic Review 43: 699-735.

41. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy. The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachutts.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
42. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effect of constitutions: what do the data say. The MIT Press: Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
43. Political constraints 2931 0.37 0.17 0.00 0.72 Index of political constraints (Heinisz, 2000). 34 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Description Elections and type of system (source: DPI-World Bank) Election_year 2975 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Election year for the government leader (President or Prime Minister) Election_year2 2423 0.15 0.29 0.00 1.00 Election year for the government: equals election_month/12 in the election year, (1election_month /12) in the year before, and zero otherwise Pred_Election_year 2975 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 Election year for the government leader (President or Prime Minister). Only predetermined elections considered.
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44. Pred_Election_year2 2975 0.09 0.24 0.00 1.00 Election year for the government: equals election_month/12 in the election year, (1election_month /12) in the year before, and zero otherwise. Only predetermined elections considered.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

45. Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80: 21-36. 26 Shi, M. and Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics 90(8-9): 1367-89.

46. Rogoff, K. and Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economics Studies 55: 1-16.

47. Sample period: 1975-2010. - Estimated model: 𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑓𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜹 𝑝 𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 - All the control variables were included in all models. For each estimation, only the results for the coefficient (𝛽) of the election-year variable is shown. Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request. - t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes for the Fixed Effects estimations: - The control variables were lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity/endogeneity problems.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

48. Sjahrir, B.S., Kis-Katos, K. and Schulze, G.G. (2013). Political budget cycles in Indonesia at the district level. Economics Letters 120, 342-345.

49. Solé-Ollé, A., Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2008). The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain. Journal of Public Economics, 92, 2302-2319.

50. System 2933 1.05 0.97 0.00 2.00 Political System (Parliamentary/Presidential) PR 2722 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 Proportional Representation dummy Close election 2933 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 Dummy for close elections (equals 1 if margin of victory smaller than 10 percentage points) Single party 2975 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable for single party governments.
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51. Two-party 2975 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable for two party systems (equals 1 when the effective number of parties is smaller than 3).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

52. Veiga, L.G., Pinho, M.M. (2007). The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy. Public Choice, 133, 457-477.

53. Veiga, L.G., Veiga, F.J. (2007). Political business cycles at the municipal level. Public Choice 131: 45-64.

54. Veiga, L.G., Veiga, F.J. (2013). Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel. Public Choice 155 (3/4): 335-353.

55. Vergone, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy 25(1): 63-77.

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2. Impact of Direct Taxation on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence Based on Panel Data Regression Analysis at the Level of Eu Countries. (2023). Balasoiu, Narciz ; Oancea, Marian ; Chifu, Iulian.
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5. The Sinful Side of Taxation: Is it Possible to Satisfy the Government Hunger for Revenues While Promoting Economic Growth?. (2021). Alves, José.
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6. Internal Tax Competition: Does this Result in Economic and Investment Growth?. (2020). Yana, Sarnetska ; Tetiana, Paientko ; Valeriy, Oparin.
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7. Tax structure and economic growth: a study of selected Indian states. (2020). Neog, Yadawananda ; Gaur, Achal Kumar.
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11. More oil, more or less taxes? New evidence on the impact of resource revenue on domestic tax revenue. (2020). Abdelwahed, Loujaina.
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12. Tax buoyancy in OECD countries: New empirical evidence. (2020). Sacchi, Agnese ; Liberati, Paolo ; Lagravinese, Raffaele.
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19. Vplyv verejného dlhu a jeho štruktúry na ekonomického rast vybraných vyspelých krajín. (2018). Murin, Martin.
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26. Public Finance, Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of the Evidence. (2016). Johansson, SA.
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27. Reassessing Tax and Development Research: A New Dataset, New Findings, and Lessons for Research. (2016). Prichard, Wilson.
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28. Monitoring of Austrias Efforts Within the Europe 2020 Strategy. Update 2014-15. (2015). Hofmarcher-Holzhacker, Maria M ; Schratzenstaller, Margit ; Janger, Jurgen ; Bock-Schappelwein, Julia ; Kletzan-Slamanig, Daniela ; Famira-Muhlberger, Ulrike ; Horvath, Thomas ; Boheim, Michael.
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29. The Austrian Tax System – Perspectives for Reform. (2015). Schratzenstaller, Margit ; Köppl, Angela ; Koppl, Angela.
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30. Das österreichische Abgabensystem – Reformperspektiven. (2015). Schratzenstaller, Margit ; Köppl, Angela ; Koppl, Angela.
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31. Tax shifts. (2015). Nicodème, Gaëtan ; Rua, Savino ; Mathe, Milena .
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32. Tax Revenue Trends in Asia and Latin America: A Comparative Analysis. (2015). PARK, DONGHYUN ; Jinjarak, Yothin ; Aizenman, Joshua ; Kim, Jungsuk.
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33. A Review of critical issues on tax design and tax administration in a global economy and developing countries.. (2015). Godin, Matteo ; Hindriks, Jean.
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34. A Review of critical issues on tax design and tax administration in a global economy and developing countries.. (2015). Hindriks, Jean ; Godin, Matteo.
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35. Tax Shift by Economic Functions and Its Effect on Economic Growth in the European Union. (2015). Szarowská, Irena ; Szarowska, Irena.
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36. Reassessing Tax and Development Research: A New Dataset, New Findings, and Lessons for Research. (2015). Prichard, Wilson.
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37. A Review of Critical Issues on Tax Design and Tax Administration in a Global Economy and Developing Countries. (2015). Hindriks, Jean ; Godin, M.
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38. The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries. A macroeconomic perspective with a case study for Germany. (2015). Truger, Achim ; Paetz, Christoph ; Godar, Sarah.
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39. Monitoring of Austrias Efforts Within the Europe 2020 Strategy. Update 2013-14. (2014). Hofmarcher-Holzhacker, Maria M ; Schratzenstaller, Margit ; Janger, Jurgen ; Bock-Schappelwein, Julia ; Kletzan-Slamanig, Daniela ; Famira-Muhlberger, Ulrike ; Horvath, Thomas ; Schonfelder, Stefan ; Boheim, Michael.
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40. Complementarity in Models of Public Finance and Endogenous Growth. (2014). Misch, Florian ; Kneller, Richard ; Gemmell, Norman.
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41. Complementarity in Models of Public Finance and Endogenous Growth. (2014). Misch, Florian ; Kneller, Richard ; Gemmell, Norman.
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42. Electoral effects on the composition of public spending and revenue: evidence from a large panel of countries. (2014). Veiga, Linda ; Morozumi, Atsuyoshi.
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43. Electoral effects on the composition of public spending and revenue: evidence from a large panel of countries. (2014). Veiga, Linda ; Morozumi, Atsuyoshi.
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44. Property tax and fiscal discipline in OECD countries. (2014). Zazzaro, Alberto ; Sacchi, Agnese ; Presbitero, Andrea.
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45. Vermögensbezogene Steuern. Ansatzpunkte, internationaler Vergleich und Optionen für Deutschland. (2013). Schratzenstaller, Margit.
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46. Interakce zdanění, vládních výdajů a ekonomického růstu: panelový VAR model pro země OECD. (2013). Machova, Zuzana ; Kotlan, Igor.
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47. Determining the Exogeneity of Tax Components with Respect to GDP. (2013). Yalcin, Yeliz ; Arikan, Cengiz.
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48. Besteuerung höherer Einkommen und Vermögen: internationale Entwicklungstendenzen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen. (2013). Schratzenstaller, Margit.
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49. Höhere Reichensteuern: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen: Editorial. (2013). Schratzenstaller, Margit ; Bach, Stefan.
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50. Is the Welfare State Relevant for Economic Growth? Evidence for Portugal. (). Bao, Pedro ; Simes, Marta.
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