This document has not been cited yet.

1. Agastya, M. (1997). Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations. Review of Economic Studies 64, 411-426.

2. Agastya, M. (1999). Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games. Journal of Economic Theory 89, 207-233.

3. Albers, W. (1979). Core- and Kernel- Variants Based on Imputations and Demand Profiles, in Game Theory and Related Topics, ed. by O. Moeschlin and D. Palaschke. North-Holland.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

4. Arnold, T., Schwalbe, U. (2002) Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 49, 363-380.

5. Aumann, R. J., Myerson, R. (1988). Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: an application of the Shapley value, in The Shapley value, Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley (edited by A. Roth). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
6. Bennett E. (1983) The Aspiration Approach to Predicting Coalition Formation and Payoff Distribution in Sidepayment Games. International Journal of Game Theory 12, 1-28.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
7. Bennett E., Maschler M., Zame W. (1997) A Demand Adjustment Process. International Journal of Game Theory 26, 423-438.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

8. Bennett, E., van Damme, E. (1991). Demand Commitment Bargaining: The Case of Apex Games, in Game Equilibrium Models, Vol III, Strategic Bargaining (edited by R. Selten.) 118-140. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

9. Cross J. (1967) Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economic and Political Coalitions. Journal of Conflict Resolution 11, 184-195.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

10. Davis, M., Maschler, M. (1965). The Kernel of a Cooperative Game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 223-259.

11. Feldman, A.M. (1974) Recontracting Stability. Econometrica 42, 35-44.

12. Fréchette, G., Kagel, J., Morelli, M. (2005) Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers. Econometrica 73, 1893-1937.

13. Freixas, J., Molinero, X. (2009) On the Existence of a Minimum Integer Representation for Weighted Voting Systems. Annals of Operations Research 166, 243-260.

14. Funk, S. G., Rapoport, A., Kahan, J. P. (1980). Quota vs. Positional Power in 4-person Apex Games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 77-93.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

15. Green, J.R. (1974) The Stability of Edgeworth’s Recontracting Process. Econometrica 42, 21-34.

16. Inarra, E., Kuipers, J., Olaizola, N. (2005) Absorbing and Generalized Stable Sets. Social Choice and Welfare 24, 433-437.

17. Klaus, B., Klijn, F., Walzl, M. (2010) Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets. Journal of Economic Theory 145, 2218-2240.

18. Klaus, B., Newton, J. (2016) Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics 62, 62-74.

19. Kohlberg, E. (1971) On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 20, 62-66.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
20. Maschler M., Peleg B. (1966) A Characterization, Existence Proof and Dimension Bounds for the Kernel of a Game. Pacific Journal of Mathematics 18, 289-328.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

21. Montero, M. (2002) Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel. Games and Economic Behavior 41, 309-321.

22. Morelli, M., Montero, M. (2003) The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games. Games and Economic Behavior 42, 137-155.

23. Naidu, S., Hwang, S.H., Bowles, S. (2010) Evolutionary Bargaining with Intentional Idiosyncratic Play. Economics Letters 109, 31-33.

24. Nash, J. (1953) Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica 21, 128140.

25. Nax, H.H. (2019) Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics into the Core. German Economic Review 20, 243-256.

26. Nax, H.H., Pradelski, B.S.R. (2015) Evolutionary Dynamics and Equitable Core Selection in Assignment Games. International Journal of Game Theory 44, 903-932.

27. Nax, H.H., Pradelski, B.S.R. (2016) Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market. Games 7, 10

28. Neumann, J. von, Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

29. Newton, J. (2012) Recontracting and Stochastic Stability in Cooperative Games. Journal of Economic Theory 147, 364-381.

30. Newton, J. (2018) Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance. Games 9, 31.

31. Newton, J., Sawa, R. (2015) A One-Shot Deviation Principle for Stability in Matching Problems. Journal of Economic Theory 157, 1-27.

32. Nöldeke G., Samuelson L. (1993) An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 425454.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
33. Peleg, B. (1968) On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 16, 527-532.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
34. Rapoport, A. (1990) Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Games. Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions. Theory and Decision Library Volume 5, 1990, pp 183-209
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
35. Rapoport, A., Kahan, J., Funk, S., Horowitz, A. (1979). Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players. Springer-Verlag.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

36. Reny, P.J., Winter, E., Wooders, M. (2012) The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments. Social Choice and Welfare, 521-536.

37. Rozen, K. (2013) Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Demand Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 87, 35-42.

38. Sawa, R. (2019) Stochastic Stability under Logit Choice in Coalitional Bargaining Problems. Games and Economic Behavior 113, 633-650.

39. Schmeidler, D. (1969) The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17, 1163-1170.

40. Selten, R., Schuster, K.G. (1968). Psychological Variables and Coalition-Forming Behavior, in Risk and Uncertainty (edited by K. Borch and J. Mossin) 221-241. London: Macmillan.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
41. Shenoy, P.P. (1979) On Coalition Formation: A Game-Theoretic Approach. International Journal of Game Theory 8, 133-164.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

42. Young, H.P. (1993) An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 59, 145-168.

43. Young, H.P. (1998) Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

1. “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games. (2024). Possajennikov, Alex ; Montero, Maria.
   In: Annals of Operations Research.
   RePEc:spr:annopr:v:336:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10479-023-05179-8.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. A Representation for Many Player Generalized Divide the Dollar Games. (2023). Greenwood, Garrison W ; Ashlock, Daniel.
   In: Games.
   RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:2:p:19-:d:1077719.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Greedy Demand Adjustment in Cooperative Games. (2022). Possajennikov, Alex ; Montero, Maria.
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:not:notcdx:2022-05.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining. (2022). Khan, Abhimanyu.
   In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
   RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:137:y:2022:i:c:s0165188922000379.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games. (2021). Possajennikov, Alex ; Montero, Maria.
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:not:notcdx:2021-06.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in bargaining. (2021). Khan, Abhimanyu.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:187:y:2021:i:c:p:399-414.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability. (2021). Sawa, Ryoji.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:184:y:2021:i:c:p:692-711.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems. (2019). Sawa, Ryoji.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:633-650.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance. (2018). Newton, Jonathan.
   In: Games.
   RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:2:p:31-:d:148859.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market. (2016). Pradelski, Bary ; Nax, Heinrich H.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:2:p:10-:d:66888.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Stochastic stability in assignment problems. (2016). Newton, Jonathan ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:62-74.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. (2015). Nax, Heinrich ; Pradelski, Bary.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:903-932.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. (2015). Nax, Heinrich H.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:65428.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. (2015). Sawa, Ryoji ; Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1-27.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics. (2015). Young, Peyton H. ; Wallace, Chris.
    In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
    RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:327-380.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. (2014). Sawa, Ryoji ; Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9223.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems. (2014). Newton, Jonathan ; Klaus, Bettina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:syd:wpaper:2014-05.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game. (2014). Bary S. R. Pradelski, .
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:700.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems. (2014). Newton, Jonathan ; Klaus, Bettina ; and, Bettina Klaus .
    In: Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie.
    RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.02.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Dynamic coalition reformation for adaptive demand and capacity sharing. (2014). Nof, Shimon Y. ; Seok, Hyesung.
    In: International Journal of Production Economics.
    RePEc:eee:proeco:v:147:y:2014:i:pa:p:136-146.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Introduction into the literature of cooperative game theory with special emphasis on dynamic games and the core. (2013). Szikora, Peter.
    In: Proceedings- 11th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2013).
    RePEc:pkk:meb013:273-280.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets. (2013). Young, H. ; Pradelski, Bary ; Nax, Heinrich H. ; Bary S. R. Pradelski, .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.50.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining. (2013). Rozen, Kareen.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:87:y:2013:i:c:p:35-42.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation and the core. (2012). Szikora, Peter.
    In: Proceedings- 10th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2012).
    RePEc:pkk:meb012:291-296.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. (2012). Young, Peyton H. ; Nax, Heinrich H. ; Bary S. R. Pradelski, .
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:607.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games. (2012). Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:1:p:364-381.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?. (2011). Peter, Szikora.
    In: Proceedings- 9th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2011).
    RePEc:pkk:meb011:379-386.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. A comparison of dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation. (2010). Szikora, Peter.
    In: Proceedings-8th International Conference on Mangement,Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2010).
    RePEc:pkk:meb010:225-232.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining. (2009). Rozen, Kareen.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1641.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining. (2008). Rozen, Kareen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:yaleco:39.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Dynamic coalition formation and the core. (2002). Schwalbe, Ulrich ; Arnold, Tone.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:49:y:2002:i:3:p:363-380.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core. (2000). Schwalbe, Ulrich ; Dieckmann, Tone .
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1878.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games. (1999). Agastya, Murali.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:2:p:207-233.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core. (1998). Schwalbe, Ulrich ; Dieckmann, Tone .
    In: Economics Department Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:may:mayecw:n810798.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-10-06 01:43:59 || Missing content? Let us know