1. Concurrent elections and political accountability: Evidence from Italian local elections. (2018). Revelli, Federico ; Bracco, Emanuele.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:148:y:2018:i:c:p:135-149.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections.. (2017). Revelli, Federico ; Bracco, Emanuele.
   In: Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers.
   RePEc:uto:dipeco:201719.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections. (2017). Revelli, Federico ; Bracco, Emanuele.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:lan:wpaper:170337308.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections. (2017). Revelli, Federico ; Bracco, Emanuele.
   In: Working papers.
   RePEc:ipu:wpaper:56.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Employment, Wages and Voter Turnout. (2011). Stephens, Melvin ; Charles, Kerwin Kofi.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17270.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress. (2011). Trebbi, Francesco ; Bombardini, Matilde.
   In: Journal of Public Economics.
   RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:587-611.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Electoral participation and communicative voting in Europe. (2010). Sobbrio, Francesco ; Navarra, Pietro.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:2:p:185-207.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. [1] Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal, (1996). A Theory of Divided Government, Econometrica, 64, 1331-1341.

2. [10] Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers (2004). The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data: A Unified Approach, American Political Science Review, 98, 355-370.

3. [11] Coate, Stephen, and Michael Conlin, (2004). A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence, American Economic Review, 94, 1476-1504. 39

4. [12] Coate, Stephen, Conlin, Michael, and Andrea Moro, (2005). The Performance of the Pivotal-Voter Model in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda, Working Paper, Department of Economics, Cornell University.

5. [13] Connolly, Terry, and Marcel Zeelenberg, (2002). Regret in Decision Making, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 212-216.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

6. [14] Degan, Arianna, (2006), Policy Positions, Information Acquisition, and Turnout, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108, 669-82.

7. [15] Degan, Arianna, (2007). Candidate Valence: Evidence from Consecutive Presidential Elections, International Economic Review, 48, 457-482.

8. [16] Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo, (2005). A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, American Economic Review, 95, 347-373.

9. [17] Dhillon, Amrita, and Susana Peralta, (2002). Economic Theories of Voter Turnout, Economic Journal, 112, F332-F352.

10. [18] Downs, Anthony, (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

11. [19] Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich, (1984). A Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. New York, Cambridge University Press.

12. [2] Alvarez, Michael, (1998). Information and Elections. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
13. [20] Feddersen, Timothy J., (2004). Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Vot- ing, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 99-112.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

14. [21] Feddersen, Timothy J., and Wolfang, Pesendorfer, (1996), The Swing voters Curse. American Economic Review, 86, 408-424.

15. [22] Feddersen, Timothy J., and Wolfang, Pesendorfer, (1999). Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences, American Political Science Review, 93, 381-398.

16. [23] Feddersen, Timothy, and Alvaro Sandroni, (2006). A Theory of Participation in Elec- tions, American Economic Review, 96, 1271-1282. 40
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
17. [24] Ferejohn, John and Morris P. Fiorina, (1974). The Paradox of Non-Voting, American Political Science Review, 68, 525-536.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
18. [25] Fiorina, Morris, (1992). Divided Government. New York: Mcmillan.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
19. [26] Gilovich, Thomas D., and Victoria H. Medvec, (1995). The Experience of Regret: What, When, and Why, Psychological Review, 102, 379-395.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
20. [27] Ghirardato, Paolo, and Jonathan Katz, (2002). Indecision Theory: Quality of Informa- tion and Voting Behavior, Working Paper, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

21. [28] Hansen, Steven, Thomas Palfrey, and Howard Rosenthal, (1987). The Downsian Model of Electoral Participation: Formal Theory and Empirical Analysis of the Constituency Size Effect, Public Choice, 52, 15-33.

22. [29] Harsanyi, John C., (1980). Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations, and the Theory of Rational Behavior, Theory and Decision, 12, 115-33.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
23. [3] Anderson, Barbara A., and Brian D. Silver, (1986). Measurement and Mismeasurement of the Validity of the Self-Reported Vote, American Journal of Political Science, 30, 771-785.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
24. [30] Heckman, James J., and James M. Jr. Snyder, (1997). Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators, Rand Journal of Economics, 28, 142-189.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
25. [31] Jacobson, Gary, (1990). The Electoral Origin of Divided Government: Competition in the U.S. House of Representatives 1990. Boulder: Westview.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
26. [32] Johnson, Norman L., and Samuel Kotz, (1970). Continuous Univariate Distributions. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
27. [34] Langer, Ellen (1975). The Illusion of Control, Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 32, 311-328. 41
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
28. [35] Ledyard, John 0., (1984). The Pure Theory of Two Candidate Election, Public Choice, 44, 7-41.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

29. [36] Loomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden, (1982). Regret Theory: an Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty, The Economic Journal, 92, 805-824.

30. [37] Luce, Duncan R., and Howard Raiffa, (1957). Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

31. [38] Matsusaka, John G., (1995). Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information The- ory, Public Choice, 84, 91-117.

32. [39] Matsusaka, John G., and Filip Palda, (1999). Voter Turnout: How Much Can We Explain? Public Choice, 98, 431-46.

33. [4] Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr. , and Charles Stewart, III (2001). Can- didate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, American Journal of Political Science, ~5, 136-159.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

34. [40] Mebane, Walter, (2000). Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections, American Political Science Review, 94, 37-57.

35. [41] Merlo, Antonio (2006). Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues, in Richard Blundell, Whitney Newey and Torsten Persson (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Theory and Applications: Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

36. [43] Parlfrey, Thomas, and Keith Poole, (1987). The Relationship Between Information, Ideology and Voting Behavior, American Journal of Political Science, 31, 5 11-530.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

37. [44] Palfrey, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal, (1983). A Strategic Calculus of Voting,, Public Choice, 41, 7-53.

38. [45] Palfrey, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal, (1985). Voters Participation and Strategic Uncertainty, American Political Science Review, 79, 63-78. 42

39. [46] Poole, Keith T. (1998). Recovering the Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, Amer- ican Journal of Political Science, 42, 954-993.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
40. [48] Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal, (1997). Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

41. [5] Bell, David E., (1982). Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty, Operations Research, 30, 961-981.

42. [50] Poole, Keith T., (2003). Changing Minds? Not in Congress, mimeo, Universtiy of Houston.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
43. [51] Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook, (1968). A Theory of the Calculus of Vot- ing, American Political Science Review, 62, 25-42.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

44. [52] Shachar, Ron (2003). Party Loyalty as Habit Formation, Journal of Applied Econo- metrics, 18: 251-269.

45. [53] Shachar, Ron and Barry Nalebuff, (1999). Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation, American Economic Review, 89, 525-547.

46. [55] Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone, (1980). Who votes? New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
47. [57] Zeelenberg, Marcel, Van Dijk Wilco W. and Anthony S.R. Manstead, (2000). Regret and responsibility resolved? Evaluating Ordonez and Connolys (2000) conclusions, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 143-154. 43
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
48. [6] Blais, Andre, (2000). To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

49. [7] Borgers, Tilman, (2004). Costly Voting, American Economic Review, 94, 57-66.

50. [8] Burden Barry C., and David C. Kimball, (2002). Why Americans Split their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition and Divided Government. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

51. [9] Chari, V. V., Larry E. Jones, and Ramon Marimon, (1997). The Economics of Split- Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies, American Economic Review, 87, 957-976.

1. The Race to the Base. (2020). Hidir, Sinem ; Bernhardt, Dan ; Buisseret, Peter.
   In: American Economic Review.
   RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:3:p:922-42.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies. (2016). , Andreasbernecker.
   In: Journal of Public Economics.
   RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:142:y:2016:i:c:p:24-38.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Partisan Politics: The Empirical Evidence from OECD Panel Studies. (2016). Potrafke, Niklas.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6024.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Moderating Government. (2015). De Sinopoli, Francesco ; Ferraris, Leo ; Iannantuoni, Giovanna.
   In: Social Choice and Welfare.
   RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:2:p:415-440.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention. (2015). Llavador, Humberto.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:34.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for The Midterm Gap. (2014). Knight, Brian.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20311.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results. (2014). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:cie:wpaper:1403.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies. (2014). , Andreasbernecker.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4564.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. The Impact of Voter Uncertainty and Alienation on Turnout and Candidate Policy Choice. (2014). Brown Natalya R., .
   In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:14:y:2014:i:1:p:20:n:7.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel. (2013). Veiga, Linda.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:335-353.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions. (2013). Freier, Ronny ; Ade, Florian .
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:64:y:2013:i:c:p:1-20.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Zum Einfluss von Parteiideologie auf die Staatstätigkeit in den US-Bundesstaaten. (2013). Potrafke, Niklas ; Schneider, Margret ; Simon, Christian.
    In: ifo Schnelldienst.
    RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:66:y:2013:i:11:p:24-29.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable. (2012). Schelker, Mark.
    In: Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:30.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Is German domestic social policy politically controversial?. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:3:p:393-418.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power. (2012). Park, Jung Chul ; Pantzalis, Christos ; Kim, Chansog.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:106:y:2012:i:1:p:196-228.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Moderating Government. (2011). iannantuoni, giovanna ; Ferraris, Leo ; De Sinopoli, Francesco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ver:wpaper:09/2011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals. (2011). Scoones, David ; Gallego, Maria.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:3:p:591-610.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Judiciaries in corrupt societies. (2011). Priks, Mikael.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:75-88.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Independence, Investment and Political Interference: Evidence from the European Union. (2011). Rondi, Laura ; Cambini, Carlo.
    In: RSCAS Working Papers.
    RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2011/42.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. A political agency model of coattail voting. (2011). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:11:p:1652-1660.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods. (2011). Moreno-Ternero, Juan.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:29-36.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Sincere Lobby Formation. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/151545.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28800.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Sincere Lobby Formation. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28249.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach. (2010). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we1011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. (2008). Bugarin, Mauricio Soares ; Umeno, Luis Gustavo .
    In: Brazilian Review of Econometrics.
    RePEc:sbe:breart:v:28:y:2008:i:1:a:1516.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Communication for Public Goods. (2008). Kawamura, Kohei.
    In: Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:edn:esedps:182.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence on Institutional Restraints on the Fiscal Commons Problem for Swiss Cantons. (2008). Schaltegger, Christoph ; Feld, Lars.
    In: CREMA Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections. (2007). Merlo, Antonio ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:07-011.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. The electoral college: diversification and the election process. (2007). .
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:1:p:21-34.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Political Cycles : Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage. (2006). Soubeyran, Raphael ; Gautier, P..
    In: Working Papers MoISA.
    RePEc:umr:wpaper:200613.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Investigating the Effects of Moral Disengagement and Participation on Unethical Work Behavior. (2006). Zyphur, Michael J. & Johnson, Emily, ; Islam, Gazi ; Barsky, Adam J..
    In: Insper Working Papers.
    RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_62.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. The Art of Compromise. (2005). Scoones, David ; Gallego, Maria.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0042.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues. (2005). Merlo, Antonio.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:05-033.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates. (2005). Glazer, Amihai ; Gradstein, Mark.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:122:y:2005:i:3:p:467-482.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention. (2004). Llavador, Humberto.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:571.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections. (2004). Merlo, Antonio ; Degan, Arianna.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:04-014.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule. (2004). Trannoy, Alain ; Renault, Régis.
    In: IDEP Working Papers.
    RePEc:iep:wpidep:0403.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria. (2003). iannantuoni, giovanna ; De Sinopoli, Francesco.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
    RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:31.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. Divided government and dominance solvability. (2003). iannantuoni, giovanna.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:715-733.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada. (2001). .
    In: Constitutional Political Economy.
    RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:4:p:313-331.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Bad politicians. (2000). Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco.
    In: Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:fip:fedmem:134.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. On the Optimal Number of Representatives. (2000). Gary-Bobo, Robert ; Auriol, Emmanuelle.
    In: THEMA Working Papers.
    RePEc:ema:worpap:2000-01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Bad Politicians. (2000). Morelli, Massimo ; Caselli, Francesco.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. Checks and balances : an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia. (2000). Kugler, Maurice ; Rosental, Howard.
    In: Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo.
    RePEc:col:000123:002117.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty. (1998). Bugarin, Mauricio.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. - IDEOLOGICAL VERSUS DOWNSIAN POLITICAL COMPETITION. (1998). Ortin, Ignacio Ortuo.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-22.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Appointing the median voter of a policy board. (1998). Waller, Christopher.
    In: Working Papers (Old Series).
    RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9802.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock. (1998). Swank, Otto ; Dur, Robert.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:3:p:561-572.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Comparative Politics and Public Finance. (). Tabellini, Guido ; Roland, Gérard ; Persson, Torsten.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:114.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-09-20 20:21:30 || Missing content? Let us know