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Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment. (2012). Wilson, Alistair ; Vespa, Emanuel.
In: Working Paper.
RePEc:pit:wpaper:461.

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Cited: 9

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Cites: 42

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Cocites: 50

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Citations received by this document

  1. Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication. (2019). Saglam, Ismail ; Gurdal, Mehmet ; Bayindir, Esra Eren ; Ozdogan, Ayca.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:97152.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders. (2014). Lu, Shih En ; Ambrus, Attila.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:174-189.

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  3. Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis. (2014). Battaglini, Marco ; Makarov, Uliana .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:147-164.

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  4. Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages. (2013). Saglam, Ismail ; Gurdal, Mehmet ; Ozdogan, Ayca.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:45727.

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  5. Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game. (2013). schotter, andrew ; Agranov, Marina.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:104:y:2013:i:c:p:26-39.

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  6. Ten possible experiments on communication and deception. (2013). Sobel, Joel.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:408-413.

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  7. Ten possible experiments on communication and deception. (2013). Sobel, J.
    In: University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt53w1f0w4.

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  8. Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis. (2012). Makarov, Uliana ; Battaglini, Marco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:metric:012_2011.

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  9. Biased Recommendations. (2012). Harbaugh, Rick ; Chung, Wonsuk.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2012-02.

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Cocites

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  1. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent. (2021). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Diehl, Christoph.
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  2. Receiver’s sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk. (2021). Ogawa, Hiromasa.
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  3. Decentralized advice. (2020). Feddersen, Timothy ; Gradwohl, Ronen.
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  4. Non-competing persuaders. (2020). Wu, Jiemai.
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  5. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. (2019). Foerster, Manuel.
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  6. Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk. (2019). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
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  7. Strategic information transmission despite conflict. (2019). Semirat, Stephan.
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  8. Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication. (2019). Saglam, Ismail ; Gurdal, Mehmet ; Bayindir, Esra Eren ; Ozdogan, Ayca.
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  9. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2019). Nafziger, Julia ; Meyer, Margaret ; de Barreda, Ines Moreno.
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  10. Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers. (2019). Jeong, Daeyoung.
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  11. The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games. (2019). Minozzi, William ; Woon, Jonathan.
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  12. A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies. (2018). Hennessy, David ; Saak, Alexander E.
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  13. Attention Manipulation and Information Overload. (2017). Persson, Petra.
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  14. Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games. (2017). Lu, Shih En ; En, Shih.
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  15. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
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  17. Competitive cheap talk. (2016). Li, Zhuozheng ; Yang, Huanxing ; Rantakari, Heikki.
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  18. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
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  19. Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission. (2016). Squintani, Francesco ; Argenziano, Rossella ; Severinov, Sergei.
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  47. Strategic Information Transmission in Networks. (2009). Squintani, Francesco ; Ghiglino, Christian ; Galeotti, Andrea.
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