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2. Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective. (2014). Ogilvie, Sheilagh ; Carus, A. W..
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3. Coordination, compensation and the expansion of trade: The merchant guilds revisited. (2011). Harbord, David ; von der Fehr, Nils Henrik .
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4. Structure, conduct and performance of grain trading in Tigray and its impact on demand for commodity exchange: The case Maychew, Mokone, Alemata, Mekelle and Himora. (2010). Mezgebo, Taddese ; Dereje, Fikadu .
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5. Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised. (2008). Ogilvie, Sheilagh ; Edwards, Jeremy.
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2. Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly. (2007). Sorenson, Timothy L..
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3. Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements. (2006). Saggi, Kamal ; Limão, Nuno.
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4. Credibility and endogenous societal discounting. (2006). Yeltekin, Sevin ; Sleet, Christopher.
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5. Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited. (2006). Harbord, David.
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6. Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?. (2006). Perroni, Carlo ; Conconi, Paola.
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7. Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements. (2006). Saggi, Kamal ; Limão, Nuno.
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8. Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games. (2005). Conlon, John.
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9. Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games. (2005). Jackson, Matthew ; Watts, Alison.
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10. Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games. (2005). Jackson, Matthew ; Watts, Alison.
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11. Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies. (2004). Wengström, Erik ; Andersson, Ola.
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12. Divide et Impera. Optimnal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime. (2004). Spagnolo, Giancarlo.
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13. The GATT and Gradualism. (2004). Zissimos, Benjamin ; Lockwood, Ben.
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14. The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping. (2004). Hege, Ulrich ; Bergemann, Dirk.
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15. Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient. (2004). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
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16. Viable Tax Constitutions. (2003). Scharf, Kimberley ; Perroni, Carlo.
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17. Prisoners Other Dilemma. (2003). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Blonski, Matthias.
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18. Nonlinear Price Discrimination with a Finite Number of Consumers and Constrained Recontracting. (2003). Hamilton, Jonathan ; Slutsky, Steven .
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19. Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with a Finite Population. (2003). Hamilton, Jonathan ; Slutsky, Steven .
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20. Self-Enforcing International Agreements and Domestic Policy Credibility. (2003). Perroni, Carlo ; Conconi, Paola.
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21. Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?. (2002). Limão, Nuno.
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22. Credible Communication in Dynastic Government. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger.
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23. Credible Communication in Dynastic Government. (2002). Lagunoff, Roger.
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24. Informal Family Insurance And The Design Of The Welfare State. (2002). MacCulloch, Robert ; Di Tella, Rafael.
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25. Globalization and Cooperative Relations. (2002). Spagnolo, Giancarlo.
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26. Relational Contracts and Property Rights. (2002). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Blonski, Matthias.
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27. The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping. (2001). Hege, Ulrich ; Bergemann, Dirk.
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28. Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Transfers and the Provision of Education. (2001). Balestrino, Alessandro ; Anderberg, Dan.
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29. The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping. (2001). Hege, Ulrich ; Bergemann, Dirk.
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30. Monetary Regimes and the Co-Ordination of Wage Setting. (2001). Holden, Steinar.
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31. Self-Confidence and Survival. (2001). Bar-Isaac, Heski.
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32. Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem. (2001). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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33. Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter. (2000). Wright, Brian ; Kletzer, Kenneth.
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34. Monetary regime and the co-ordination of wage setting. (2000). Holden, Steinar.
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35. Competing Norms of Cooperation. (2000). Eeckhout, Jan.
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36. Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance. (2000). Burkart, Mike ; Wallner, Klaus.
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37. Club Enlargement: Early Versus Late Admittance. (2000). Burkart, Mike ; Wallner, Klaus.
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38. Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation. (2000). Schjelderup, Guttorm ; Haufler, Andreas.
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39. Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter. (2000). Wright, Brian ; Kletzer, Kenneth.
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40. (Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts. (1999). Janssen, Josef .
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41. Contractual Intermediaries. (1999). Watson, Joel ; Ramey, Garey.
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42. Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation. (1999). Watson, Joel ; Ramey, Garey.
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43. Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation. (1999). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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44. On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion. (1999). Spagnolo, Giancarlo.
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45. The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation. (1999). Maggi, Giovanni.
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46. The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition. (1998). Mustafa Babiker of University of Colorado at Bould, .
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47. Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State. (1998). MacCulloch, Robert ; Di Tella, Rafael.
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48. Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion: on Extremal Equilibria of Interdependent Supergames. (1998). Spagnolo, Giancarlo.
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49. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1998). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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50. Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.). (1998). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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51. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1997). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
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52. The scope for collusion under fractional defections. (1994). DAMANIA, Dick .
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53. Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality. (1991). Pearce, David G..
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54. Foreign direct investment and the risk of expropriation. (1990). Worrall, Timothy ; Thomas, Jonathan.
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55. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RISK OF EXPROPRIATION.. (1990). Worrall, Timothy ; Thomas, Jonathan.
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56. The Environment as a Commodity. (1990). Dasgupta, Partha.
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57. Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners dilemma. (1990). van Damme, Eric ; van Damme, E. E. C., .
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58. Sur quelques propriétés stratégiques de lintéressement des salariés dans lindustrie. (1990). Gary-Bobo, Robert ; Bensaid, Bernard ; Federbusch, Serge .
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59. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RISK OF EXPROPRIATION. (1990). Worrall, Timothy ; Thomas, Jonathan.
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60. Information Structures and the Delegation of Monitoring. (1989). Olivella, Pau.
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61. A Theory of Managed Trade. (1989). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
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62. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games. (1989). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
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63. Economic Organization of Trading Relationships: Hierarchies and Asset Ownership. (1988). wernerfelt, birger.
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64. A Theory of Managed Trade. (1988). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
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65. Competing Norms of Cooperation. (0000). Eeckhout, Jan.
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66. Ethnicity and Reciprocity: A model of Credit Transactions in Ghana. (). La Ferrara, Eliana.
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